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Abstract 
 
This thesis questions the possibility of liberal multiculturalism, both normatively and in 
practice. In particular, it explores whether multicultural group rights may fail to achieve 
their liberal ends when distinct minority claims conflict. Though liberal multiculturalism 
presents a seemingly uniform justification of minority rights, national minorities and 
immigrant minorities are treated differently both in the literature and as a matter of 
policy. Often, national minorities – historically continuous and territorially bound – have 
demanded and received significant degrees of self-government within larger states. Is this 
culturally based self-government compatible with multicultural accommodation for 
nonmember immigrant minorities, or does it deny this possibility? I develop this question 
through an organized survey of the literature, and contextualize both types of minorities 
in relation to the nation-state. I conclude that universal and differentiated citizenship 
cannot be reconciled on principle alone. For this reason, I further explore this theoretical 
puzzle through case studies. I develop hypotheses about scenarios where the national 
minority self-government is most likely to be compatible with the integration and 
accommodation of immigrants, and test these hypotheses in two “most likely” cases, 
Quebec and Catalonia. Ultimately, I draw these findings together to consider whether and 
how an approach to minority rights can better account for competing claims. 
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Introduction 	  
 Last summer, at a friend’s recommendation, I read Ian Buruma’s Murder in 
Amsterdam, a thought-provoking and journalistic study of the 2004 murder of the Dutch 
filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, by Dutch-born Islamist Mohammed Bouyeri. It is a story 
about not so much about the murder itself, but about Dutch society’s ambivalent and 
complex relationship with culture, religion, and diversity. Buruma investigates how a 
society built on progressivism and acceptance to the point of being “self-congratulatory,” 
has seen the rise of extremism, anti-immigrant right-wing parties, and an increasingly 
vocal rejection and distrust of the very model of multiculturalism upon which it was 
arguably founded. His book left me with far more questions than answers – questions 
about what it means to belong to a society or country, what practices should be 
supported, tolerated, or rejected, and the role of government and law in addressing 
diversity.   
Though I did not make the connection then, I had already tackled many of these 
questions before. In my first senior-level Politics class at Bates, my seminar paper 
considered Sammy Smooha’s model of “Ethnic Democracy,” where he claims, using the 
case of Israel as a model, that ethnos (ethnic preference) and demos (rule of the people) 
can coexist as guiding principles in a democratic state. In reading Smooha and his critics, 
I wrestled with normative questions about legitimate and just governance – what are 
appropriate moral frameworks in which democratic governments can represent one or 
many culture(s), religion(s), language(s), or people(s)? But I also considered how these 
moral arguments informed and were influenced by political necessity and real-world 
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context. I have always been drawn to these two levels – the empirical and the normative – 
and sought to bridge the perceived gap between them.   
  Multiculturalism intrigues me because it ties these levels together, linking 
fascinating developments in political theory to current events and the evolving practice of 
modern liberal democracies. As I began to learn more, I was engrossed by the so-called 
backlash against multiculturalism, evidenced by the public denouncements of state 
multiculturalism by Angela Merkel and David Cameron, who viewed it a failed 
experiment which worsened the problems of difference it set out to solve. Was this, I 
wondered, a problem of failed application, flawed theory, or something else entirely?  
At this stage in my thinking, I was deeply influenced by the European examples, 
and the challenge immigrants posed to traditional nation-states. However, I soon realized 
that multiculturalism was not only an issue of immigration, but also arguably the driving 
force behind minority self-government within states, as in Canada, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, or Belgium. I recalled researching, while studying abroad in Spain, the rise of 
nationalism and violent extremism in the Basque Country. I vividly remember the graffiti 
I saw scrawled, in English, on a church wall in the town of Guernica: “Basque Country is 
NOT Spain.”  
I began to consider and question the relationship between these two fascinating 
issues – immigrant multiculturalism and minority nationalism. This paper seeks to 
understand these phenomena by viewing the interaction between them. Though both 
minority nationalism and immigrant multiculturalism embody the challenge of diversity 
in the liberal state, it is not clear how these two interact with one another when 
immigrants seek to settle and live the self-governing minority territory. This thesis asks 
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whether national minority self-government is compatible with, or denies the possibility of 
multicultural accommodation for immigrant minorities within its borders? 
 I develop this question through a guided analysis of the literature. Chapter 1 
explains the philosophical bases and meaning of multiculturalism through a survey of the 
major justifications of multiculturalism, and the challenges that these group-differentiated 
approaches to politics raise. Narrowing in on liberal multiculturalism, I explore the 
academic debate between proponents of universal and differentiated citizenship. This rich 
normative conversation seems to work implicitly from an unsettled division between 
group rights (held by a collective) and group-differentiated rights (held by individuals by 
nature of their belonging to a group). As I suspect, the “type” of minority (either 
immigrant or national minority) affects normative evaluations of the strength of its 
members’ claims. I ask how separate claims for group or group-differentiated rights can 
be weighed against each other if and when these conflict. This leads me to develop my 
research question: Is immigration a challenge to, or compatible with, the aims of national 
minorities for cultural preservation through self-government? 
 Chapter 2 focuses more closely on each ‘type’: immigrant minorities and national 
minorities. I consider both minorities in the context of the nation state – each makes 
specific demands and poses unique challenges to nation building. In order to understand 
this relationship, I begin by examining the normative bases of nationalism and nation 
building, exploring normative justifications for homogeneity or unity within a state in the 
theory of liberal nationalism. This chapter then explores the challenge each type of 
minority poses to nation building – with the notable difference being that national 
minorities seek to engage in counter-nation building, supporting and institutionalizing a 
	   Lipton	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nation within a larger, multinational state. I note that the self-government rights national 
minorities receive involve not just protections against the state, but also restrictions 
within their borders. Notably, these restrictions affect immigrants through the regulation 
of admission and integration. Do the policies necessary for national minority self-
government have the ironic consequence of legitimizing illiberal treatment towards 
immigrants within their borders? This question cannot be answered without a clear 
understanding of the empirical terms of the relationship between national minority 
autonomy and immigrant integration and accommodation.  
 Chapter 3 pursues the same question through case studies and considers how we 
might assess immigrant-host relationship within the context of national minority self-
government. I also consider the role that context plays in shaping the development of 
distinct models of immigrant management. Because of the complexity of these 
arrangements, I employ a configurational approach to assess compatibility. This approach 
considers how combinations of conditions relate to outcomes of interest. Chapter 3 
identifies, explains, and justifies relevant conditions (independent variables), as well as 
the four outcomes (dependent variables) I consider – admission policy, integration policy, 
nationality policy, and multicultural accommodation.  
 Chapter 4 develops hypotheses to link the case conditions to these four outcomes. 
My core hypothesis is, paradoxically, that control over admission and integration policies 
is a necessary but limiting condition for allowing national minority openness to the 
inclusion and integration of immigrants. Following Blad and Couton, I speculate that this 
model of openness within a protected and promoted culture represents a third model of 
nationalism, “intercultural nationalism.” I develop hypotheses about when national 
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minorities are likely to seek and gain competency over these immigration policies, and 
how the presence or absence of said policies might impact the potential for compatibility 
between national minority self-governance and immigrant integration and 
accommodation.  
 I test these hypotheses in Chapters 5 and 6, through case studies of Quebec and 
Catalonia, drawing conclusions about the validity of the hypotheses I develop in 
explaining the findings in these two ‘most likely’ cases of immigrant-minority 
compatibility. Though Quebec, as the archetype of intercultural nationalism, seems to 
show that competencies over admission and integration policy are necessary, Catalonia 
challenges this hypothesis by demonstrating considerable openness even in the absence 
of these competencies.  
 In conclusion, I offer some thoughts about the relevance of these findings for 
liberal multiculturalism more broadly, and the difficulties of evaluating cases where 
moral and political dimensions influence one another. 
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Chapter 1: What is Multiculturalism? A Review of Culture, 
Rights, and Liberalism 
 
Recent decades have been dominated by conversations about culture and 
difference. As a result of what Brubaker calls the “differentialist turn” of politics, identity 
has jumped to the forefront of public consciousness. Activists, politicians, and scholars 
across disciplines have all engaged with the questions this turn has raised, and produced a 
substantial and fascinatingly diverse body of literature and policies addressing difference. 
This effort, true to its philosophical roots, is global in scope. Yet as the sheen of novelty 
wears away in the 21st century, underlying inconsistencies and problems bubble to the 
surface. The political backlash we read about in the newspaper is just one of the signs of 
the difficulties multiculturalism faces, and the substantial challenges it poses to political 
philosophers and policy-makers alike. This chapter seeks to survey these foundations and 
tensions.  
Before this review, it is important to clarify some terminology. Despite being the 
subject of much philosophical and political debate, the term multiculturalism remains 
poorly understood and often misused. Journalists may speak of the “multicultural” state, 
referring to the ‘fact’ of diversity; still others might take multiculturalism to refer to the 
celebration of difference. One reason for this confusion, as Melzer, Weinberger, and 
Zinman note, is that multiculturalism lacks a “recognized leader…fundamental text [or] 
official history.”1 Helpfully, Augie Fleras parses the various uses of “multiculturalism” to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Arthur Melzer et al.  “Introduction” Multiculturalism and American Democracy (University Press of 
Kansas 1998) 1. 
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identify five levels of meanings: Multiculturalism as A) empirical fact, B) ideology, C) 
policy and program, D) practice, and E) counterhegemony.2 
The first use, wherein multiculturalism is equated with demographic diversity, 
does not excite much interest here, and, as many scholars note, may do serious harm by 
confusing the terms of the debate. Similarly, although I acknowledge the 
counterhegemonic lens, I pay less attention to this dimension.3 I aim to link normative 
theory and political applications, specifically on the level of group-differentiated rights; 
for this reason, I focus on what Fleras refers to as ideology, policy and program, and 
practice, which I see as inherently interrelated.  
Duncan Ivison’s conception of multiculturalism encompasses the fundamental 
aspects of multiculturalism in which I am most interested.  He writes,  
Multiculturalism refers to a broad array of theories, attitudes, beliefs, norms, 
practices, and policies that seek to provide public recognition of and support for 
accommodation of non-dominant ethno-cultural groups. [It is distinguished by] 
the aim to go beyond the protection of basic civil and political liberties associated 
with liberal citizenship to forms of differentiated citizenship that allow groups to 
express their distinct identities and practices.4  
 
Ivison links multiculturalism as ideology with the practice of what is termed 
differentiated citizenship. His working definition provides a strong basis for 
understanding the normative basis of multiculturalism as ideology, and how it relates to 
practice. Ideologically, it points to the importance of culture and group affiliation, and 
shows that multiculturalism can be seen as a challenge to previous conceptions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Augie Fleras, The Politics of Multiculturalism (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),  6 
3 Fleras, 110 
4 Duncan Ivison, “Introduction: Multiculturalism as a Public Ideal,” in Duncan Ivison ed. The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Multiculturalism (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 2 
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individual liberal rights.5 As a matter of policy and program, multiculturalism demands 
that the government acknowledge and work with cultural pluralism; multiculturalism 
challenges universal civil and political liberties and demands that the state be open to the 
possibility of legislating difference. Moreover, this shift is reflected in the actual policy-
making of modern liberal states, many of which recognize cultural difference in law or 
policy, through special legislation and / or exemptions to laws. The third dimension, 
multiculturalism as practice, flows naturally from the first two, and scrutinizes 
implementation, circumstance, and outcome. I use the word multiculturalism 
intentionally to bridge these levels, connecting the conceptual level to state efforts to 
address diversity as a matter of policy. 
I survey the sizable literature on multiculturalism by focusing on what I see as 
being two fundamental clusters of puzzles: First, in what ways are culture and identity 
important – not just to individuals, but at the level of governance? Second, can liberalism 
be reconciled with multiculturalism? This chapter is divided into two sections, each one 
focusing on one of these questions.6  
To better understand why individual attachment to culture might merit political 
action, I survey three justifications for multiculturalism: the politics of recognition, the 
politics of difference, and liberal multiculturalism. Next, I explore the criticism that these 
policies may encourage stereotyped, homogenized or reified interpretations of culture. To 
address the dilemma these critics pose, I turn to Anne Phillips, who maintains that despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Of course, one could argue that rights are a matter of policy as well. I agree. While it is useful to unpack 
the various parts here, one of the most fascinating and challenging aspects of multiculturalism is that 
ideology and policy are so closely linked.  
6 Not surprisingly, the distinctions in the literature between these two puzzles are not as neat as one might 
hope; these questions are themselves parts of a whole and few scholars ask or answer just one. Nonetheless, 
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these challenges, we ought not give up on culture as an appropriate subject of analysis 
and policy.  
The second half of the chapter narrows in on liberal multiculturalism as the most 
pertinent realm of normative debate. I begin by offering a spectrum-based approach to the 
contentious relationship between liberalism and multiculturalism. In the second and third 
sections, I focus on the terms of this debate, particularly over the values and meaning of 
liberalism. The challenge here is that multiculturalism may fail to achieve the liberal ends 
it sets for itself. I review two debates: one about freedom and autonomy, and another 
about equality and universality. From this debate, I develop the perspective that context 
plays a significant role in the moral balancing act these scholars attempt.  
I. Considerations for Group-Differentiated Policymaking  
A. Three Justifications for Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism can first and foremost be seen as an increased sensitivity, and 
response, to the dissimilar ways humans relate to their social and political environments. 
This general focus is not new; however, it has provoked tremendous interest in recent 
years because it brings with it the challenge of conceptualizing the way that diversity and 
difference matter in the public sphere. Ulf Morkenstam identifies three closely related 
justifications for multiculturalism: the politics of recognition, the politics of difference, 
and liberal multiculturalism. Although they stem from the same broad intention to take 
culture and pluralism seriously, each frames this intention in a different shade, which in 
turn shapes the policies they advocate. Below, I show how each author explains the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I argue that these questions and the debates, both within and against multiculturalism, provide a useful lens 
for understanding a complex and multifaceted debate. 
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importance of culture and justifies multicultural policy-making. Although I include other 
scholars as necessary, I generally take Charles Taylor’s “The Politics of Recognition,” 
Iris Young’s “Ruling Norms and the Politics of Difference” and Will Kymlicka’s 
Multicultural Citizenship as representatives of each.  
The politics of recognition seeks to show how human identity develops in relation 
to the community and context, and argues for a public role in supporting and affirming 
such identity: “Recognizing and treating members of some groups as equals now seems 
to require public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural particularities.”7 
Charles Taylor’s landmark essay “The Politics of Recognition” makes two points towards 
this claim: first, that society’s recognition of an individual or group’s worth affects the 
esteem and dignity of that person; second, that the state has an obligation to recognize 
such claims.  
Morkenstam sees the “groundedness of the individual” as the heart of the politics 
of recognition: “Identities define what is important and what is not.”8 Taylor asserts that 
we are “only capable of understanding ourselves” in continuing interaction and dialogue 
with others. 9  Taylor construes recognition – the feeling of being acknowledged, 
understood, and valued equally – as a basic human need. It is not merely that pre-existing 
identities require recognition, but that “recognition forges identity,” particularly for non-
dominant groups.10 Moreover, lack of recognition, either as an individual or member of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Amy Gutmann, “Introduction” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5 
8 Ulf Morkenstam, "Group-Specific Rights as Political Practice" in Ishtaq Ahmed ed. The Politics of Group 
Rights: The State and Multiculturalism (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2005), 39 
9 Taylor, 32-3 
10 Ibid. 66 
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group constitutes a serious harm. For Taylor, therefore, recognition is not a temporary 
alleviation of injustices, but a permanent investment in cultural survival.11 
 Morkenstam identifies “the politics of difference” as a second, related defense of 
multiculturalism:   
In a similar vein [to the politics of recognition], proponents of a ‘politics of 
difference’ focus on identities and dominant societal ideas and conceptions – but 
as institutional objects to self-development and autonomy…It is the systematic 
character of oppression in group-belonging, not the recognition of identities per 
se, that makes groups the primary focus of analysis.12 
 
As Iris Marion Young explains, the politics of difference is broader than the 
politics of recognition, and focuses not only on culture, but also on other forms of 
socially produced group difference. Young sees the politics of difference as distinct in 
that “it is primarily critical, as opposed to self-assertive.”13 Both Taylor and Young 
emphasize the relationship between identity and power; however, Young focuses 
primarily on the power of norms, whereas Taylor focuses more on the power of symbols 
and recognition.14 Young views majority institutions as propagators of “hegemonic 
discourses,” which doubly disadvantage individuals from non-dominant groups by 
embodying norms while simultaneously claiming neutrality.15 Group affiliations like race, 
class, disability, and gender are important to Young because they positions individuals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 He writes, “[the goal is to] maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we’re 
concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it never be lost?” Later, he 
adds that such measures may entail not just to protect the community’s survival, but also to “create 
members of the community, for instance, in assuring that futures generations [of Quebecois] continue to 
identify as French-speakers.” Ibid. 40, 57-8    
12 Morkenstam, 40  
13 Young (1999), 416 
14 I do not want to overemphasize the distinctiveness here, but instead view it as a matter of emphasis. It is 
plain to see that symbols are norm producing, and norms contain symbolic value as well.  
15 Iris Young, "Ruling Norms and the Politics of Difference: A Comment on Seyla Benhabib," Yale Journal 
of Criticism 12.2 (1999), 417 
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and collectives in relation to these norms. 16  Common to all defenses of multiculturalism, 
the politics of difference challenges the ideal of a “difference-blind” liberalism and the 
notion that equality is synonymous with equal treatment. For justice to be achieved 
against the force of dominant norms, Young argues for a differentiated (rather than 
universal) citizenship, which reflects and counterbalances the distinct ways that norms 
may disadvantage individuals by the nature of their group membership.  
 Liberal multiculturalism, the third account Morkenstam identifies, is now the 
dominant justification of multiculturalism. 17 Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: 
A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights exemplifies this position by framing a defense of 
multiculturalism as not only consistent with but also derived from a the liberal tradition. 
Kymlicka narrows the scope of his argument by focusing on what he defines as “societal 
cultures: a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the 
full range of human activities.”18 Such cultures have “not just shared memories or values, 
but also common institutions or practices.”19 This move is common in discussions of 
multiculturalism, where discussions of cultural rights often involve making judgments 
about what cultures ‘count’.  
Kymlicka attempts to show that societal cultures are necessary for the fulfillment 
of the traditional liberal values of autonomy and equality. He argues that societal culture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Elsewhere, Young distinguishes between aggregates and associations, where an aggregate is classifies by 
the presence or absence of a certain attribute, but an association connotes an intentional collectivity. Iris 
Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics, 99.2 (Jan, 
1989)  
17 While I delve deeper into the relationship between multiculturalism and liberalism in part two of this 
chapter, here I only examine how the argument that liberalism justifies multiculturalism.  
18 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 76. This definition of culture is distinct from his earlier work.   
19 Kymlicka, 76 In the context of Kymlicka’s well-known distinction discussed below between national 
minorities (historically situated and territorially bound) and ethnic groups (migration-produced), the label 
standard of societal culture would generally only apply to the former. 
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enhances individual autonomy because the latter provides a “context of choice.”20 
Kymlicka sees cultural membership as a primary good, which simultaneously dictates the 
extents and limits of autonomy. He writes, “Freedom involves making choices amongst 
various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes 
them meaningful to us.”21 Many scholars have developed similar arguments about the 
relationship between culture and choice.22  Kymlicka further attempts to show that 
multiculturalism produces greater equality, as well, particularly between groups within 
the same society. Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism continues to shape the 
debate over multiculturalism today, as I review below.   
 Each of the opinions outlined above focuses on the importance of culture and 
membership in order to justify some form of group-differentiated policymaking. Clearly, 
there is much overlap, but together they serve to highlight the variegated foundations of 
differentiated citizenship. All three reach the conclusion that for minorities in society, the 
status quo propagates unequal treatment, and propose a new logic and practice of 
addressing pluralism. Differentiated citizenship may take many forms, but refers broadly 
to the notion that a universal citizenship – by which all citizens are equal and the same in 
the state’s eyes – can no longer succeed in accounting for diversity and difference. This is 
a major development in theories of citizen-state relations, In spite of the distinctions 
between them, the three justifications I identify above work as a whole to highlight 
different aspects of the importance of culture. The politics of recognition focuses on the 
importance of symbolic representation and recognition in the public sphere; the politics 
of difference focuses on the oppressive nature of norms for marginalized groups; liberal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Kymlicka, 1995, 82 
21 Kymlicka, 1995, 83 
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multiculturalism grounds the importance of belonging in liberal values, and sees culture 
as a context of choice. Despite their distinctive foundations, all three authors propose 
multiculturalism and differentiated citizenship.   
B. The Trouble with Groups 
Still, defenders of group-differentiated rights face a significant challenge – both 
over how to define the groups they wish to recognize, and the consequences of such 
labels. One aspect of this challenge focuses on the difficulty of defining groups and their 
members, the other on potential consequences, such as stereotyping, reification, and lack 
of social unity.  
Much of the literature concentrates on the problems of defining groups – 
questioning the utility of race, ethnicity, gender, and culture as meaningful social 
distinctions.23 Roger Brubaker calls this the “tendency to represent the social and cultural 
world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial, or cultural blocks.”24 Even 
when individuals may identify themselves in this language, it does not logically follow 
that these identities should be “uncritically adopted…as our categories of social 
analysis.”25  
Jack Eller points out the fear that politically and institutionally recognizing such 
categories, may reinforce “a specious cultural essentialism will reify differences and lead 
to a kind of cultural provincialism.”26 At its extreme, this attack criticizes cultural 
essentialism. As Chandran Kukathas writes, “The primary reason for rejecting the idea of 
group claims as the basis for moral and political settlements is that groups are not fixed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cited in Kymlicka 1995, 89 
23Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), 40 
24 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 8 
25 Brubaker, Ethnicity, 10 
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and unchanging entities in the moral and political universe.”27 He extends this criticism 
on three points: first, that groups may change over time; second, that groups are not 
internally homogenous; and third, that the “interests” of the group are not easily known 
and may reflect those of cultural elites.28 This last point reveals his predilection for a 
conception of multiculturalism that opposes oppression, as Young’s does. 
To be clear, few proponents of multiculturalism fall into this trap of viewing 
social groups or participants in a culture as a static, easily defined, internally homogenous 
‘it’. Young, for example, goes to great lengths to define the permeability of cultural 
belonging, and Kymlicka dissociates the notion of a group from substantive content, 
arguing we should act to preserve the group itself but not its values or doctrines.29 
Yet critics like Kukathas and Tebble are unsatisfied by these clarifications. 
Inevitably, they say, members of some groups have rights accorded to them and members 
of others will not. It is this step, labeling in order to ascribe legal status, not arguments 
about importance of belonging or collective identity per se, that they most often take 
issue with. James Tebble elaborates on Kukathas’s claim by showing that attempts by 
proponents of group rights to conceive of a group in an unessentialized way merely 
postpone the inevitable act of labeling: “However the unessentialized, collective identity 
is to be described at the ontological, social scientific level…that does nothing to rebut the 
charge that, at the level of politics and institutions, such groupings must by necessity be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 J. D Eller, “Anti-Anti-Multiculturalism,” American Anthropologist (99.1, 1999): 250 
27 Chandran Kukathas, Political Theory 20.1 (Feb., 1992), 110 
28 Kukathas ultimately takes issue with the demand that group rights ought to be permanent, turning 
Taylor’s point of dialogical creation on its head by focusing on the relationship between the cultural 
community and the institution as a reason to deny permanent status. He writes, “It is not acceptable to 
evaluate or choose political institutions or to establish legal rights on the basis of the claims or interests of 
cultural community because those very institutions or rights will profoundly affect the kinds of cultural 
communities individuals decide to perpetuate or to reform.” Kukathas, 112  
29 Young, “Polity…” 260, Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 101-5 
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essentialized so that they may be the fitting subject of politics [emphasis original].”30 He 
delivers a devastating critique: that proponents of politics of difference merely repeat the 
problem they seek to combat on the group, rather than individual, level: 
Despite their criticism of liberal individualism as presupposing an untenable 
ontological atomism, the proponents of group rights such as Young are 
themselves group-level atomists who have to assert the ‘giveness’ of groups so 
that they may be clearly defined. But in doing so, they merely transpose the 
problems of atomism to a new, group-differentiated level.31  
  
We are seemingly left with a puzzle: how to go about addressing problems suffered 
unequally by group members while simultaneously recognizing that those groups are 
themselves amorphous, changing, permeable, and undefined? This is not simply a 
philosophical diversion, but a practical challenge: even if a government were to seek to 
address the challenges of diversity among the populace, how could it do so without 
divvying up and labeling its citizens? How can a government work with difference in a 
way that doesn’t invite criticism of ethnic preference, discrimination, or resentment?  
In the following section, I detail a potential solution to this paradox: Anne Phillips’ 
multiculturalism, which acknowledges the challenges of dealing with culture, but without 
abandoning the pursuit of cultural justice altogether.   
C. Potential Solutions  
Anne Phillips offers an answer to this puzzle in her book Multiculturalism 
Without Culture. As the title suggests, Phillips questions the homogenizing tendency that 
comes with using “culture” as a political unit, and the cultural determinism that 
invariably follows. Her question is a good one: how can we take collective difference 
seriously without encountering the deterministic or homogenizing views of culture? She 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Adam James Tebble, “What is the Politics of Difference,” Political Theory 30.2, (April, 2002), 269 
31 Tebble, 270 
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argues only when we do away with reified, deterministic, or stereotyped interpretations of 
culture can society appropriately address the challenges it raises:  
When I say I want a multiculturalism without culture, I mean I want a 
multiculturalism without particular notions of culture I have found unhelpful. But 
while I think that cultures have been reified and cultural conflict exaggerated, it is 
no part of my argument to deny that people are cultural beings.32  
 
Despite her provocative title, Phillips is interested in using culture to understand 
the choices and disadvantages that individuals face as a result of their membership in 
cultural, gendered, or ethnic groups. Yet she attempts to understand and address these 
disadvantages while keeping the dangers of such an approach in mind. For Phillips, 
answering this question involves unpacking the complex relationship between culture and 
choice (or its opposite, coercion). Her goal in this endeavor is to “allow for the relevance 
of culture without making culture a determinant of action.”33 I believe that Phillips 
succeeds on this account, and provides scholars and policy-makers good reason not to 
abandon cultural justice altogether.  
On a policy level, it is impossible to address the issues that multiculturalism raises 
without thinking about cultural belonging and “groups” of some type. However, 
following Phillips, such categories should be taken with a grain of salt. Critics of group-
differentiated politics pose a significant normative and practical challenge to proponents 
of multiculturalism – the problem of defining groups. Though I continue to use the 
language of religion, culture, and minorities, it is important to consider the ways in which 
these broad analytical constructs obscure important difference at the individual level. 
Similarly, policies that are group-differentiated also encounter the challenge of who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Phillips, 52 
33 Phillips, 131 
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belongs to the group. Nonetheless, dealing with and speaking of “groups” is a necessary 
evil for understanding conflicting claims for minority rights, as I seek to in this paper.  
Multiculturalism paints a complex picture of the importance of group membership 
for individuals. Although liberal democracies have convincing reasons to consider 
differentiated citizenship rights, they can only do so with an eye to the dangers these 
projects encounter.  
II. The Tensions, Limits, and Challenges of Liberal Multiculturalism 	  
I show above three justifications for taking collective and individual difference 
seriously, and the first of the challenge these theories face – namely, that they must 
define and work with groups as units. Below, I explore the terms of the current debate 
about multiculturalism, focusing in on liberal multiculturalism, the dominant position 
today. 34 First, I establish a spectrum approach to understand the relationship between 
liberalism and multiculturalism, and how liberal multiculturalism situates itself between 
the two. I then focus on disagreements about the liberal values of equality and autonomy. 
The rich debates surrounding each of these points frame the particular challenge I wish to 
highlight: how liberal states can negotiate competing demands by immigrants and 
national minorities when both of these claims are grounded in liberal values. This narrow 
question relates to my broader theoretical question of whether liberal multiculturalism 
can succeed on the liberal challenge it sets itself. Here, I situate the theoretical aspect of 
this question by seeking to understand the values of liberal multiculturalism.  
A. From “Difference-Blind” Liberalism to Radical Multiculturalism: A Spectrum 
Approach   
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In 2001, Will Kymlicka notably declared that liberal multiculturalism had “won 
by default,” and further debates would focus on “how to develop and refine the liberal 
multiculturalist position, rather than whether to accept it in the first place.”35 He is 
partially right; much of the extensive literature on multiculturalism, with a few notable 
exceptions, works from a liberal perspective (as Kymlicka does in Multicultural 
Citizenship), or applies primarily to liberal democracies. However, Kymlicka’s 
declaration of victory brushes aside significant debates from within and outside of the 
liberal tradition.  
 What does it mean for multiculturalism to be liberal? To address this question, I 
situate liberal multiculturalism on a spectrum of liberal and ‘multicultural’ beliefs, 
ranging from a “difference-blind,” egalitarian liberalism to a radical multiculturalism that 
rejects liberal norms altogether. 36 Liberal multiculturalism occupies an intermediate 
position. I will review both extremes in order to show how liberal multiculturalism falls 
between them.  
Chart 1.1: From Difference-Blind Liberalism to Radical Multiculturalism  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Geoffrey Levey, “Liberal Multiculturalism” in Duncan Ivison ed. The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Multiculturalism (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 19 
35 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 42 
36 This concept grew out of both Brahm Levey’s discussion and Patrick Loobuyck’s terminology in 
“Liberal Multiculturalism: A Defense of Liberal Multicultural Measures without Minority Rights,” 
Ethnicities 5.1 (03//2005), although neither represents the debate as a spectrum in quite this way.  
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“Difference-blind” or egalitarian liberalism is the liberalism of the Enlightenment, 
linked to ideas of universal citizenship, equality, and impartial justice.37  The notion of 
equality as universal treatment and universal rights was long held as the ideal for the 
liberal state. Multiculturalism, of course, challenges the ideal that liberalism should be 
“difference-blind.” In recent years, anti-multicultural liberal scholars have defended 
egalitarian liberalism against its critics. They see the challenges multiculturalism levels 
against liberalism – the ‘atomized’ individual, insensitivity to difference – as misguided, 
and argue that multiculturalism may cause more significant problems than those it wishes 
to solve. Brian Barry, for example, offers a forceful defense of “egalitarian liberalism,” 
suggesting that what few problems encountered under a “uniform system of liberal laws” 
demonstrate incomplete application, rather than flawed ideals.38  
Chandran Kukathas, too, rejects liberal multiculturalism as inconsistent with the 
“core of common assumptions” in the liberal tradition, which he details:  
First, liberal theory is individualist in asserting or assuming the moral primacy of 
the person against the claims of any social collectivity [as distinct from 
communitarianism]; second, it is egalitarian because it confers on all such 
individuals ‘the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political 
order of differences in moral worth among human beings’; and third, it is 
universalist because it affirms the moral unity of the human species and accords 
“a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms.”39   
 
By this definition of liberalism, Kukathas has an easy case for asserting the 
incompatibility of multiculturalism and liberalism. But, as Loobuyck points out, 
multiculturalism and liberalism are only incompatible when multiculturalism is defined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2001) 
38 Barry, 21 
39 Kukathas, 108 
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as “that which transcends liberalism to accommodate cultural and religious diversity.”40 
Nonetheless, some go to great lengths to show liberalism’s credentials in dealing with 
many types of group difference, and the extent of minority rights allowed by universal 
rights and freedoms.41 As Loobuyck writes, “egalitarian liberalism is not the enemy of 
diversity; rather it is the foundation upon which pluralism in the areas of culture, religion, 
and lifestyle can be fairly implemented in a single society.”42 
On the other end of the spectrum, anti-liberal multiculturalism sees liberalism as 
insufficient to accommodate the importance of cultural difference. Melzer, Weinberger, 
and Zinman assert that liberal multiculturalists do not take the radicalism of 
multiculturalism seriously enough because they do not acknowledge the “serious 
challenge it means to pose to traditional liberalism.”43  As a whole, they seem to view 
multiculturalism as what Fleras terms “multiculturalism as counter-hegemony.” They 
write,   
[Multiculturalism] is a movement that radicalizes and Nietzscheanizes the liberal 
idea of tolerance – thus turning that ideal against liberalism – by tending to deny 
the possibility of universal truth as well as of non-oppressive power and by 
seeking, through this very denial, a comprehensive redistribution, not so much of 
wealth as of self-esteem, and not so much to individuals as to various 
marginalized groups.44  
 
 To be sure, they develop an extreme position, and one fitting with the radicalism 
they wish to convey. By these anti-liberal multicultural standards, the state would have 
little claim to enforce any standards of justice on peoples within it, as any law or policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Of course, this assertion, which Loobuyck rejects, is tautological. However, within egalitarian liberalism, 
it is important to distinguish “multicultural” measures beyond what liberalism permits, from the already 
substantial accommodation available within liberalism.  Loobuyck, 109-110 
41 Barry, 63-8, Kukathas 115-8, As I show below, they may even permit that the groups be illiberal, so long 
as they are not given special treatment (i.e. Kukathas 117).  
42 Loobuyck, pg. 110 
43 Melzer et al., 2 
44 Melzer et al., 4 
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act would merely propagate a hegemonic and dominant ideology. Their language – 
particularly the ‘impossibility of universal truth’ – is in fact more typical of critics who 
fear “endless turmoil, ethical relativism, and ultimately nihilism.”45 However, many 
scholars do accept, to varying degrees, the limitations liberalism imposes on 
multiculturalism, precisely because it “absolutizes liberalism” and seeks to impose liberal 
values on others.46 This ongoing debate in the realm of radical multiculturalism is 
engaging and necessary, though mostly outside of the scope of this paper.    
 Liberal multiculturalism seeks to carve out a middle ground between these two 
philosophies. As I detail, Kymlicka grounds his defense in much of the same language as 
Kukathas, and both appeal to the liberal tradition to make their claims. That leads us to a 
second paradox: it would seem that both egalitarian liberalism and liberal 
multiculturalism could be supported or contested in the language of liberalism. That the 
two reach such different conclusions from the same principles is puzzling, unless we 
appreciate how values are interpreted, applied, and even weighed against each other. The 
following two sections explore this paradox by highlighting the terms upon which these 
liberal principles are debated: the first focuses on the distinction between autonomy and 
freedom (freedom to vs. freedom from), the latter on defining equality.  
 Still, one alternative narrative we must first consider is that egalitarian liberals 
and liberal multiculturalists disagree primarily about what values matter (not, as I 
suggest, the meaning of the values themselves. For example, Barry’s rejection of 
multiculturalism may stem from the view that equality (and not autonomy) is the heart of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Eller, 251 
46 See, for example, Parekh, 109-113 
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liberalism.47 Furthermore, though many liberal multiculturalists support the liberal values 
Kukathas names, autonomy is notably and intentionally absent from the list. We might 
conclude that the point of distinction between liberals and liberal-multiculturalists stems 
from a disagreement over the age-old tension between freedom and equality, with each 
side choosing a favorite.48 49 Although there is some truth to this interpretation, I believe 
the substantial disagreement involves both more subtle and complex understandings, not 
only of relative worth, but also of the values themselves. I note here a significant 
difference in interpretation: competing definitions of autonomy, and competing 
understandings of equality. For this reason, I take each of these in turn, showing the role 
they play in defenses of multiculturalism, and the challenges these commitments raise.   
B. Autonomy and Tolerance: Freedom to or Freedom From? 
 As I show above, Kymlicka grounds his theory of liberal multiculturalism in both 
equality between groups and freedom within groups. In Chapter 5 of Multicultural 
Citizenship, he focuses on autonomy, writing “Liberals can only endorse minority rights 
in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy of 
individuals…[minority rights] are not only consistent with individual freedom, but can 
actually promote it.”50 I will not rehash his “context of choice” argument, but he 
explicitly echoes the language of Rawls and Dworkin in defining autonomy in terms of 
individual choice and the ability to reflect on and revise these choices; it “allows people 
to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Mitnick writes, “Suffice it to say that, contrary to Barry, many liberal theorists see liberalism as 
committed, in some sense, foremost to individual autonomy” Eric J Mitnick, “Differentiated Citizenship 
and Contextualized Morality,” Ethnical Theory and Moral Practice, 7.2 (Apr. 2004), 167  
48 This analysis would not suggest that liberal multiculturalists only care about autonomy, nor that 
‘egalitarian’ liberals only care about equality, but rather that they differ over the question of which rules out 
when the two conflict.  
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decision.”51 In this way, he makes a case for the importance of culture in providing the 
individual with the capacity to decide, without relying on reified notions of culture or 
determinism.  
The first important consideration questions whether culture supplements or limits 
autonomy.  Anne Phillips identifies the tendency to view culture as either an enabler, or 
as a constraint.52 For those who see culture as enabling, culture provides a range of 
options; one can make, understand, and revise choices only within these options. By this 
“enabling” view culture, “we need our cultures in order to be become autonomous 
beings.”53 The politics of group-differentiated rights are more easily justified from this 
conception.54 On the other hand, some view culture as a constraint on autonomy. 
Interestingly, those who view culture as a constraint may employ this view either in favor 
of or in opposition to multiculturalism. A culture-as-constraint argument in favor of 
multiculturalism would emphasize how cultural belonging produces unequal choices: “it 
represents (at least some) cultural conventions or values as so much bound up in one’s 
identity as to become beyond one’s control.”55 The constraint, though a product of 
culture, acts from within an individual. By this assessment, cultural rules or practices may 
make conforming to certain laws or job requirements more difficult, thereby justifying 
exemptions or special treatment.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See also Phillips 38-41 
50 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 75 
51 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 80-1 
52 While she identifies the two positions (as arguments for multiculturalism) with Kymlicka and Parekh, I 
don’t think this opposition necessarily works, as Phillips herself notes, n.16 
53 Phillips, 105 
54 Phillips continues, “If this [analysis of individual choice] is so, then the very value that liberals attach to 
autonomy requires them to support policies aimed at protecting and sustaining cultures that might 
otherwise fall apart,” Phillips 105 
55 Phillips, 108 
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A more meaningful challenge from those who view culture as a constraint 
emphasizes the ways in which membership in a group may coercively limit individual 
autonomy. This is a significant challenge to multiculturalism; it suggests that 
multicultural measures intended to secure the autonomy of individuals could ironically 
limit it. This line of thinking focuses more on how cultural membership may constrain 
individuals if cultural practices or even membership without the possibility of exit are 
forced on an individual by other members of the culture, particularly cultural elites.  
 This leads to what I see as the most significant debate surrounding autonomy, 
which pits autonomy against tolerance. This is a tug-of-war between two competing types 
of freedom: one, a freedom to, the other a freedom from. The question posed is as 
follows: if we take freedom of choice to be fundamental, how can the state adequately 
deal with groups who either do not value autonomy, or restrict the autonomy of their own 
members? This question problematizes autonomy in two ways: first, it asks if liberal 
autonomy is concerned with the process of decision-making or with its result. Second, 
and more pressingly, it puts two competing conceptions of freedom in conflict – the 
freedom to make and pursue ones conception of the good life, and the freedom from 
government interference, commonly referred to as tolerance. As Gaus shows in his 
article, “The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism,” the liberal tradition supports liberty 
as a norm “until some justification is offered for limiting [said] liberty.” 56  Can 
multiculturalism address this challenge? 
 Kukathas’s and Kymlicka’s debate in the pages of Political Theory shows the 
competing degrees of freedom at work here. Their competing perspectives represent two 
	   Lipton	  29	  
distinct categories of liberalism.57 Kukathas initially raises the question of how to address 
a group that does not value liberalism. He argues that by placing autonomy at the core of 
liberal multiculturalism, as Kymlicka does, scholars will be drawn to challenge minorities 
to uphold liberal values via “cultural interference rather than cultural protection.”58 
Kukathas flatly rejects the importance of autonomy for many groups, writing “critical 
reflection need play no part in their conception of the good life.”59 He seeks to turn the 
tables on Kymlicka, showing that his own logic takes him “down the path of 
interference,” undermining, rather than promoting, liberty.60  
Kukathas advocates a “liberal individualist standpoint [that] seeks…balance 
between the claims of the individual and the interests of the community.” The numerous 
freedoms (individual rights) they are accorded even permit that these groups be “quite 
illiberal.”61  Bhikhu Parekh makes a similar claim, albeit as a criticism of liberal rigidity, 
not an affirmation of liberal tolerance. He writes, “Paradoxical as it may seem, it is the 
glory of liberal (that is, tolerant, open and free) society that it is not, and does not need or 
even seek to become, exclusively or entirely liberal (that is committed to a strong sense 
of autonomy, individualism, self-creation, and so on). Liberal writers misunderstand its 
inner logic and strength when they seek to turn it into one.”62 Both Parekh and Kukathas 
see autonomy and tolerance as inherently at odds, criticizing what they see as the logical 
conclusion a liberal affirmation of individual autonomy – interference and intolerance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Gerald F. Gaus, “The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism,” in ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson, 
Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 
2005) 3 
57 George Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” Political Theory 35.2 (Apr., 2007) 
58 Kukathas, 122 
59 Kukathas, 120 
60 Kukathas, 120-121 
61 He writes, “If members of a cultural community wish to continue to live by their beliefs, the outside 
community has no right to intervene to prevent those members acting within their rights” Kukathas, 117  
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These scholars are more concerned with shielding religious and cultural groups from the 
state interference than they are with ensuring that these groups foster the capacity for 
individual choice among their members.  
 Kymlicka’s response to these critics affirms much of what has already been 
covered here in terms of his values, but makes an important qualification on this charge. 
He writes that the charge of the inevitable “path of interference…conflates two distinct 
questions,” one of “identifying a defensible theory” and another question of “imposing.”63 
Articulating a set of values and coercively enforcing them are separate enterprises.64 He 
claims that while we would encourage all groups to respect and foster the autonomy of 
their members, we would not permit ‘interference’ except in extreme scenarios. Joseph 
Raz, in his article “Multiculturalism,” articulates a similar balance: while we may seek to 
“fight superstition, repression, and error wherever we find them…when we do so we are 
of course constrained by principles of toleration and of respect for people.”65 Still, the 
challenge remains: Can multiculturalism promote individual autonomy through groups 
without diminishing other types of freedom? Although it is possible to find some balance 
between autonomy and tolerance, I leave open the challenge of whether multiculturalism 
supplements autonomy as it claims to.   
C. Equality, Universality, and Neutrality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Parekh here responds to Rawls, Raz, and Kymlicka. Parekh, 113 
63 Will Kymlicka, “The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas,” Political Theory 20.1 (Feb. 
1992), 144 
64 He writes, “Liberals have no right to impose their views on others. But they do have the right, and indeed 
the responsibility, to identify what those views actually are” Kymlicka, “The Rights…” 145 
65 Joseph Raz “Multiculturalism” Ratio Juris 11.3 (Sept.1998), 205 
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 A second significant set of debates centers on the application and interpretation of 
equality.66 Defenders of liberal multiculturalism, like liberal egalitarians, appeal the to 
language of universality and equality as justifications for minority rights. As above, this 
defense places a significant burden on the liberal multiculturalists to prove that the 
measures they propose meet these standards. I build on the three justifications presented 
at the outset, but work to highlight the tensions among liberals about the meaning and 
application of equality: How can different treatment be justified in the language 
universalism? To what extent is it possible or desirable for the liberal state to claim 
cultural neutrality? Finally, do group-differentiated rights lead inevitably to inequality 
either between or within groups? 
 The meaning of equality has been hotly contested in recent normative debates. As 
Amartya Sen writes, much of this debate revolves around the question: “equality of 
what?”67 Chris Armstrong, in Rethinking Equality points to a number of schools of 
answers, showing how much of the debate stems from disparate ideas of what individuals 
ought to have the equal opportunity to obtain.68  
Interestingly, defenders of group-differentiated rights often appeal to the language 
of equality and even universalism, but reject that either implies uniform treatment. Iris 
Young, for example, shows how different meanings of universality may conflict: “I argue 
that far from implying one another, the universality of citizenship, in the sense of the 
inclusion and participation of everyone, stands in tension with the other two meanings of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Whereas some scholars (Kukathas, for example) deny that individual autonomy need hold a central place 
in liberalism, liberal scholars are nearly unanimous on the importance of equality, although they differ 
markedly over both what type of equality matters and over its application. Patrick Neal points out two 
questions faced by a defender of liberalism: “Why is it right to treat people as equals?” and “What does it 
mean to treat people as equals?” (679). The debates I trace here focus on the latter question.  
67 Amartya Sen,“Equality of What?” The Tanner Lecture on Human Values. (May 1979) 
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universality embedded in modern political ideas: universality as generality, and 
universality as equal treatment.”69 She argues that the latter two outweigh the former, and 
that seeking equality requires recognizing the particular disadvantages individuals face. 
As Young writes, “the inclusion and participation of everyone in social and political 
institutions therefore sometimes requires the articulation of special rights that attend to 
group differences in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage” [emphasis mine].70 
Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka both ground their theories in the language of 
universalism as well. 
The first step in many of these arguments is to show that the state71 cannot provide 
the neutral treatment that ‘difference-blind’ liberals suppose it can. Liberal neutrality 
would hold that the state acts as an impartial mediator or realm wherein disparate groups 
can meet and coexist. This norm of a “morally and culturally neutral state,” Bhikhu 
Parekh argues, “is logically impossible.” All state actions, even the failure to legislate on 
substantive questions, “have an inescapable moral dimension.” 72  Furthermore, the 
‘public’ sphere, though portrayed a neutral grounds, in fact reflects the dominant culture. 
As Charles Taylor writes,  
The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the 
politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. 
Consequently, the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only 
inhumane…but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly 
discriminatory.73 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Chris Armstrong, Rethinking Equality, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006) 
69 Young, “Polity”  
70 Young, “Polity,” 251 
71 Here, the idea of state neutrality and liberal neutrality are inevitably bound together. The claim is that 
liberalism, embodied by a state, cannot be neutral. Neither can “liberalism” independently be neutral, 
because it is in itself one of many prioritizations of value.  
72 Parekh, 201-2 
73 Taylor, 43 
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The dominant, often majority, culture enjoys a preference and recognition (often 
unnoticed) in language, holidays, curriculum, norms, and dress. I see two related 
dimensions of non-neutrality. The first is a passive inequality, as state laws and 
institutions inevitably and unavoidably capture the traditions, values, and morals of the 
majority; Young’s defense of “the politics of difference” captures this argument 
perfectly. Secondly, as I discuss in Chapter 2, the state actively pursues a partial strategy 
by pursuing a nation-building policy, particularly through language and education.74 That 
is, the state seeks to create new members and foster some sort of social cohesion. For 
Kymlicka, contextualizing multiculturalism policies as a response to nation building 
involves rethinking the necessary justificatory language; rather than as a demand to 
“depart from the norm of ethnocultural neutrality,” it is seen as a response to and 
protection against nation-building.75 If the premise of neutrality, even in civic nations, is 
shown to be “manifestly false,” then the burden of proof shifts away from those 
advocating differential treatment.76 As Joseph Raz sees it, multiculturalism at its core 
aspires to “undo some of the harms done by nationalism.”77  The nation-state, as I show 
in the next chapter, relies on this process of unification, and therefore stands in explicit 
tension with multiculturalism.  
 The measures multiculturalists seek require that the state counterbalance its own 
passive and active propagation of a dominant culture by either seeking fairer treatment 
for immigrants against these pressures, or by allowing national minorities to pursue their 
own nation-building policies to counter those of the dominant majority. However, as with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Gupreet Mahajan, The Multicultural Path: Issues of Diversity and Discrimination in Democracy. (New 
Delhi: Sage, 2002), 28-30 
75 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 24 
76 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 24-9 
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autonomy, multiculturalism faces a critique on its own values: critics affirm that 
multiculturalism actually creates greater inequality than liberal egalitarianism.  
    First, defenders of liberal egalitarianism argue that equality does, in fact, require 
universal rules. For Eric Mitnick, the egalitarian challenge [particularly Barry’s] to 
multiculturalism is based on the “obvious moral difficulty [of a policy whereby…] social 
benefits and obligations are distributed in a formally unequal way.”78 Take Barry’s 
defense of a uniform legal system: “From an egalitarian liberal standpoint, what matters 
are equal opportunities. If uniform rules create identical choice sets, then opportunities 
are equal.”79  In response to the “same law…different impact” argument, Barry retorts 
that all laws affect some people more than others, and may even give preference to 
certain individuals over others (he includes rape law, drunk driving laws, and gun laws as 
examples). Although “unequal impact of a law may in some cases be an indication of 
unfairness,” claimants must prove inequality on a case-by-case basis.80 He rejects the 
notion that cultural belonging or preference ought to hold any more weight than 
individual preference, which lawmakers should already consider when deciding whether 
to ban or allow a particular behavior for the general population. Again, what matters are 
equal options. These arguments challenge that by departing from a standard of formal, 
universal equality, multiculturalism abandons what matters most about equality itself.  
Liberal multiculturalism must prove that it actually achieves equality in the way it 
seeks to for society as a whole. This literature asks both “Are the various groups the state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Raz, 195 
78 Mitnick, 169 
79 He continues: “We may expect that people will make different choices from these identical choice sets, 
depending on their preference for outcomes and their beliefs…But this has no significance: either way it is 
irrelevant to any claims based on justice, since justice is guaranteed by equal opportunities” Barry, 32 
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recognizes equal with one another?” and also “Are all members of or within a given 
group equal?”  
At the level of policy, these seemingly theoretical debates are continuing evidence 
of the difficult challenge faced by governments in recent years. On the one hand, we see 
continuing pressure towards increasing egalitarianism and universalism that spawned 
from the French Revolution; on the other, modern scholars’ emphasis on pluralism and 
difference is gaining traction and importance, as the various proponents of 
multiculturalism show. The values of liberalism, supposed to be the guiding principles of 
most modern democracies, are caught in tension between these seemingly contradictory 
trends. This chapter details how the values are balanced, their meanings debated, and the 
inconsistencies and contradictions this debate produces. Despite the difficulties, I believe 
that states face the imperative to address pluralism, as liberal multiculturalism suggests, 
by moving past universal citizenship, but it must do so while succeeding on its liberal 
terms.  
III. Why Principles Alone Are not Sufficient  
Stepping back from the literature, we can see multiculturalism as a balancing act 
of competing ideals, one that requires a thorough and thoughtful analysis and cannot be 
solved conclusively. The questions that engage me most ask whether multiculturalism 
achieves what it seeks to, and whether a liberal multiculturalism is constrained or 
enhanced by its liberalism. However, I note that the substance of these moral questions 
seems to be highly shaped by the type and situation of the group in question. Many times, 	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this distinction is implicit and subtle, but it has a profound impact on the discussion at 
hand.  
 In particular, the distinction between national minorities and immigrants appears 
critical. For example, arguments for increased tolerance gain more traction when the 
groups in question are considered national minorities: historically or territorially bound 
nations within states. Immigrants, on the other hand, are more often encouraged to 
integrate and participate within the larger society; their cultural affiliation is weighed as 
less valuable. Even more importantly, national minorities are often the bearers of group 
rights in the form of political autonomy or language rights. Immigrants, on the other 
hand, are at best granted group-differentiated rights (rights that individuals may exercise 
by nature of their membership in groups). Disagreements over liberal values alone cannot 
explain why a rights-based perspective would produce these different outcomes.  
For this reason, the distinction between immigrant minorities and national 
minorities excites me. Though many scholars treat multiculturalism for these two 
categories of minorities as compatible, distinct projects with the same philosophical 
foundations, I question whether this division is so neat. In particular, I ask how separate 
claims for group and group-differentiated rights can be weighed against each other if and 
when they conflict, as when immigrants seek to settle in national minority territories. 
As I explore in the next chapter, both of these forms of multiculturalism frame 
themselves in liberal language as a response to nation building; but how do they respond 
to each other? Does self-government for national minorities legitimize illiberal treatment 
towards immigrant minorities within their borders, denying the possibility of 
multicultural accommodation? Is immigration a challenge to, or compatible with, the 
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aims of national minorities for cultural preservation or self-government? Before we can 
develop hypotheses for each of these questions, we need to better understand the distinct 
relationship of each type of multiculturalism (national and ethnic) in the context of the 
nation-state.   
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Chapter 2: Competing Needs – Nationalism and Minorities 
 
 
 To fully understand multiculturalism, one must first understand nationalism and 
nation building. Nationalism not only sets the backdrop and context of multiculturalism, 
but is the force against which multiculturalism acts, as the state pursues policies aimed at 
creating social unity through shared ways and means of belonging. This chapter explores 
this tension in order to assess the scope and limits of multiculturalism, and furthermore, 
to understand how the demands of national minorities and immigrant minorities engage 
with nation building in distinct ways. This tension is inescapably infused with the 
language of culture, rights, autonomy and equality I review above. 
 I begin by focusing on the state itself, the potential benefits of homogeneity and 
social cohesion, and, more specifically, the normative justification of the nation-state 
proposed by a liberal nationalism. “Liberal nationalism” appeals to me here because it 
argues that social cohesion (with the nation as the standard political unit) is necessary for 
the realization of liberal values. After understanding the political and moral justifications 
of state-led nation building, I revisit the demands of multiculturalism. Immigrant 
minorities and national minorities raise discrete challenges that highlight different aspects 
of the tensions between multiculturalism and nationalism. I address each of these tensions 
separately. Finally, I ask whether, and how national minorities, which themselves engage 
in nation building, can reconcile the need for cultural preservation with the challenge of 
internal diversity raised when immigrants seek to settle within and join the national 
minority. 
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I. In Defense of the Nation  
A. The Utility Argument for Nationalism 
Before turning to the ways that national and immigrant minorities interact with 
the state, it is important to understand the state itself, and the case for nationalism. After 
reviewing some terminology, I examine the functional origins of nationalism, showing 
how nation-states became the norm because of the efficiency and advantage this model of 
cohesion allowed. Next, I turn to a more recent defense of the nation, developed from a 
liberal perspective in Yael Tamir’s Liberal Nationalism. Together, these arguments help 
set a framework and move towards social cohesion and sameness that multiculturalism 
challenges. 
 First, it is important to clarify the terminology of states, nations, and nationalism. 
By “state,” I mean a society united under a sovereign government with common 
institutions on a defined territory.81 Although I do not attempt to solve the much-
discussed question of how to comprehensively define a nation, I follow Yael Tamir and 
others in asserting it must be marked by some combination of subjective (experienced, or 
identity) and objective criteria.82 Take David Miller’s comprehensive definition, for 
example. He writes, “[A nation is] a community constituted by mutual belief, extended in 
history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and thought to be marked 
off from other communities by its members’ distinct traits”83 Though scholars may object 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See Michael Keating, “So Many Nations, so Few States: Territory and Nationalism in the Global Era” in 
Alain Gagnon and James Tully eds. Multinational Democracies,  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 43 
82 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 66. Also Andrew 
Mason, “Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation,” Ethnics 109.2 
(January 1999) pg. 262  
83 David Miller, “In Defense of Nationality,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 10.1 (February 1993), 306-7 
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to some of these markers, I define a nation as a group or community with a mixture of 
both imagined and ‘real’ ties to one another.  
Regardless of the specific criteria for nationhood one chooses, Tilly points out 
two distinct historical meanings of nationalism: “state led nationalism on one side, state-
seeking nationalism on the other.”84 State-led nationalism is the belief that it is desirable 
or necessary for states to engage in nation building by attempting to create the 
aforementioned subjective and objective aspects of community. State-seeking 
nationalism, on the other hand, is marked by the claim to “autonomous political status,” 
the belief that every ‘nation’ should have recognition and institutionalization as a state.85 
Both, Tilly writes, “shared the principle of national self-determination: that states should 
correspond to homogenous peoples, that homogenous peoples had distinctive political 
interests, that members of homogenous peoples owed strong loyalties to the state that 
embodied the heritage, that the world should therefore consist of nation-states…”86 Thus, 
the ideal of the nation-state demonstrates a belief in universal self-determination: that 
national and state borders should perfectly coincide.  
Nationalism, in both cases, is the belief that the nation-state (that is, a state that 
corresponds to and creates a homogenous people) serves a functional purpose. Though 
typically measures of inclusion appeal to a shared, almost timeless history as a nation, 
such primordialist narratives are unrealistic. As Hobswam, Ranger, and Weber note, 
cultural or national elites often create this common identity as a means of achieving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992,” Theory and Society,  (February, 1994), 
133 
85 Tilly, 133 
86 Tilly, 133 
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social cohesion.87 The functional logic of ‘national’ identity and unity, as histories of 
nationalism show, preceded the modern era of the nation-state. The ruling or governing 
class understood this efficiency. As Linz discusses, “the process of unification” of 
language and law served initially to increase cohesiveness in early republics.88  Often, the 
elite or ruling class led this process, as new governmental and economic cohesion 
benefited them most directly. The state defines itself by exclusion and finds cohesion in 
“demarcating by specific categories who is included and who is excluded.”89 Although 
typically the border of inclusion distinguishes members from foreigners (potential or 
actual members of other nations), Marx notes that the state may even exclude potential 
members, “to serve the explicit requirements for solidifying core loyalty to the nation.”90 
This shows that the ideal of homogeneity has both subjective and objective elements.   
Therefore, scholars, rulers, and national elites have long acknowledged the 
benefits to states that actively seek homogeneity both through a process of exclusion and 
through the dissemination of a national identity, uniform language, and common 
institutions. Still, these arguments often rely on the language of efficiency and advantage, 
not on moral justifications.  
However, recent scholarship has brought renewed interest in the normative 
justifications of nationalism, and a new emphasis on a ‘civic’ (open to all, inclusive) 
rather than ‘ethnic’ nation (“conceived as inherently exclusionary and illiberal”).91 To 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 As summarized by Marx, 105 
88 Juan Linz, “State Building and Nation Building,” European Review 1.4 (1993) He writes of “a slow and 
largely unplanned process of nation building took place in those Western European states,” 361 
89 Anthony Marx, “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions,” Political Science Quarterly 117.1 (Spring, 2002) 
103 
90 Marx, 107 
91 Rainer Baubock, “Beyond Culturalism and Statism,” Eurosphere Working Paper No. 6 (2008), 10 
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better understand the tension between nationalism and multiculturalism, therefore, these 
scholars ask: “On what grounds is nationalism normatively justified?”  
For some scholars, like Yael Tamir, this involves “‘translat[ing] nationalist 
arguments into liberal language.”92 Tamir and others claim that liberals ought not shy 
away from nationalism as anachronistic and anti-modern, but instead see the ways in 
which national identity and, crucially, national unity are inherent in the pursuit of liberal 
values. Liberal nationalism therefore provides a counterpoint to liberal multiculturalism.  
B. The Foundations of Liberal Nationalism 
Yael Tamir’s Liberal Nationalism introduces and develops what she terms liberal 
nationalism, bringing together two concepts that are seemingly at odds. As she puts it,  
Liberal nationalism attempts to capture what is essential to both schools of 
thought, drawing from liberalism a commitment to personal autonomy and 
individual rights, and from nationalism an appreciation of the importance of 
membership in human communities in general, and in national communities in 
particular.93  
 
            Her undertaking is engaging and relevant for scholars of multiculturalism not only 
because she builds upon liberal values, but also because most real-world models of 
multiculturalism often develop within liberal states. Furthermore, as I show in the 
preceding chapter, many proponents of multiculturalism challenge nation building as 
oppressive and inherently biased. Therefore, it is interesting to step back and detail the 
justifications underlying these contested status and action of the state.94  
Tamir frames her argument for nation building by first establishing a framework 
for understanding individuals and nations. She introduces the concept of the “duality” of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Tamir, 14  
93 Tamir, 35 
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the modern individual, who experiences simultaneously “the need to live one’s life from 
the inside and the need to be rooted.”95 She also uses a “cultural rather than a political 
definition of nationalism,”96 and defines a nation as possessing “both a sufficient number 
of shared, objective characteristics – such as language, history, or territory – and self-
awareness of its distinctiveness.”97  
In Chapter 2 of Liberal Nationalism, Tamir focuses on the importance of 
belonging to a national culture. She claims that national membership is “an important and 
constitutive element of personal identity.” She sees access to national culture as 
important both as a context for and a subject of choice. That is, national culture matters 
both in that it enhances individual autonomy (as Kymlicka argues), and also matters 
because people choose to belong to national cultures.98 For Tamir, culture matters as a 
“constitutive choice.”99 By Tamir’s definition of national culture, these claims also add 
moral substance to the ideal of the nation-state as a body of political organization that 
maximally benefits its members.   
 Tamir next contends that the right to culture, despite its appearances, is an 
individual rather than a communal right.100 Once again, she sees this step as crucial in 
establishing a liberal, as opposed to communitarian, justification for nationalism. She 
refutes typical rationalizations of national culture as a collective right, concluding, “The 
right to culture ought to be justified only in reference to its value to members, even if this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 I do not mean to suggest that liberal nationalism is inherently against multiculturalism, but I am 
interested in A) determining the justifications for nation building in liberal nationalism, and B) highlighting 
the tensions between these nation building policies and multiculturalism.  
95 Tamir, 30 
96 Tamir, 57 
97 Tamir, 66 
98 “It is only when we choose to accept our cultural affiliations as well as the values suggested by them, that 
culture can indeed assume its instrumental value.” Tamir, 36 
99 Tamir, 41.  
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value fails to capture the full worth of preserving a culture.”101 On this point, she adds a 
fundamental caveat, and one that is useful to keep in mind throughout this chapter, as 
well as this thesis as a whole. She distinguishes, “matters of principle” and “matters of 
policy.”102 For example, if State Y has 10 rather than 10,000 members of community X, 
the policies enacted (state funding for churches or schools, exemption laws or self-
government rights) may differ drastically, although the right to culture as a moral claim 
remains unchanged.103 This example shows, not so much that we should keep moral and 
political questions completely separate, but how they interact and that we must consider 
each as it influences the other. Rainer Baubock and David Miller articulate a similar 
caveat when they argue that political decisions do not flow naturally from moral 
arguments, and that there is some danger in conflating the two.104 Particularly in the 
context of multiculturalism, which bridges ideology and practice, it is important to 
distinguish between political and moral decisions, even where they intersect.  
 Tamir must then show how these individual rights are best served by an 
organization through nations. She does so by arguing that morality is tied to communal 
life.105 That is, people will inevitably and justifiably feel a more significant moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Tamir, 42-5 
101 Tamir, 47 
102 Tamir, 45 
103 Tamir, 53-56, This realization leads Tamir towards a “multiculturalist” conclusion, though she does not 
label or emphasize it as such. She writes that a smaller community (X) “will get the same number of 
cultural vouchers per capita, but can do much less with them than members of the Y community…If we 
wish to ensure that all cultures enjoy an equal chance, we may wish to supplement the funds granted [on a 
per-capita basis] to members of the X community” Tamir, 55. 
104 Baubock writes, “The flaw is that normative culturalism conflates moral reasons for valuing cultural 
community and diversity with political justifications from institutional arrangements in multicultural 
democracies… There are no cultural reasons that can tell us, which language deserves protection at which 
costs to its members and to outsiders, which nation-building project has a claim to a contested homeland, 
which religious restrictions of liberties for members should be tolerated and which shouldn’t.” 15-6. See 
also Miller, David “Immigration: the Case for Limits” 2005    
105 Tamir, 96-117 
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obligation to those with whom they associate. 106  Though individuals have greater 
obligations to community members,107 this does not imply that they have no obligation to 
non-members,108 nor that associative obligations “hide a chauvinistic agenda…[or] imply 
an objective hierarchy among different forms of life.” 109  Rather, she asserts that 
individuals will experience preferential concern for those with whom they most closely 
associate.  
C. The Liberal Case for Nation-Building 
With this framework, it is possible to re-visit the advantages of social unity, as 
Tamir and others have done, from a liberal perspective. Before reviewing these 
arguments, it is important to maintain the aforementioned distinctions in mind. First, 
some arguments speak of the importance of perceived unity, whereas others note the 
benefits of shared objective characteristics, particularly language.110 Second, though 
political and moral justifications are closely related (particularly so when liberal 
nationalists re-work ‘efficiency’ arguments), these two concepts are and should be 
maintained as conceptually distinct. Thirdly, although liberal nationalism emphasizes 
commonality, it also emphasizes openness and inclusion. Unity, therefore, requires that 
people identify themselves as members of the nation and share formal aspects, like 
language, of the national culture, but not that the state be internally homogenous along 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 She captures the complex relationship between the political (inevitable) and moral (justly) levels in the 
title of her concluding chapter “Making a Virtue out of Necessity”   
107 Of the basis for these ties, she writes, “It is neither love nor sympathy but connectedness, the belief that 
we all belong to a group whose existence we consider valuable. Feelings of shame or anger reflect this 
connectedness as much as feelings of pride or love.” Tamir, 98 
108 Tamir, 112-114 “Caring for Non-members” 
109 Tamir, 101  
110 Of course, characteristics like shared history, to the extent that it reflects both historical events and some 
degree of interpretation, may fall somewhere between the two.  
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racial or ethnic lines in the primordialist sense.111 Finally, it is important to keep in mind 
the two forms of nationalism mentioned above: state-led nation building, and nation-led 
state building. Below, I survey justifications for subjective and objective forms of 
national belonging within a liberal nationalist framework; these arguments provide a 
counterpoint to multiculturalism by showing the benefits of national unity from a liberal 
perspective.  
 One set of liberal nationalist arguments focuses on perceived unity and the types 
of associative obligations that Tamir discusses. Andrew Mason, surveying the liberal 
nationalist literature, notes four such arguments for why “a sense of belonging together is 
a necessary precondition for the realization of liberal values.” Shared identity fosters 
identification with state institutions, improves stability, increases public trust and 
compromise, and is necessary for distributive justice associated with the liberal welfare 
state.112  
Liberal nationalists claim that redistributive justice, belonging, stability, and 
identification are all predicated on the nation as a unit of political organization. As David 
Miller writes, solidarity not only enables distributive justice, but also fosters the feelings 
of membership necessary for individuals to act towards the common good, another 
necessity for democratic politics. “Nationality,” he writes, “is the de facto source of such 
solidarity.” 113  Thus, even within a ‘civic’ nation, a shared identity at minimum 
significantly facilitates cohesion and its many benefits, and may even be necessary for 
their realization.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 One crucial question, which I address below in discussing the challenge of immigration, is the extent to 
which non-members can be expected to adopt the national culture as their own.  
112 Mason, 263-5. He draws these arguments from a number of theorists, including J.S. Mill, David Miller, 
Yael Tamir, Brian Barry, and Roger Scuton  
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The liberal nationalist thesis also argues that nation building is legitimate not only 
as a means of fostering national identity (subjective belonging), but also to impose certain 
types of objective uniformity, particularly language. Common language facilitates 
participation and is a prerequisite for democratic politics. As Brian Barry writes, “For 
democratic politics to work, the citizens must be able to communicate with one another, 
and have access to the same forums of political debate.”114 Will Kymlicka makes a 
similar argument: “Put simply, democratic politics is politics in the vernacular. The 
average citizen only feels comfortable debating political issues in their own 
tongue…[W]e can expect – as a general rule – that the more political debate is conducted 
in the vernacular, the more participatory it will be.”115 He adds that effective political 
participation also involves elements of a shared national culture, and politics has a large 
“ritualistic component.”116  
Nation building, particularly through universal education, helps to instill common 
values, build common identity, and also provide tangible linguistic and economic abilities 
that link the nation together. For example, Ernest Gellner argues that “cultural 
homogeneity’s efficient gains for communicational transparency are indispensable to 
modern industrial liberal democracies.”117 Only a national education system can instill the 
high level of standardized skills necessary for equal access to the labor market. Though 
Gellner focuses on this as an element of interchangeability of the workforce, nation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Miller, “In Defense of Nationality,” 308 
114 Barry, Brian (1991) cited in Arash Abizadeh “Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? 
Four Arguments” American Political Science Review 96.3 (2002), 502 
115 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 213.  
116 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 213 
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building through standardized education can also be justified from a liberal, equality of 
opportunity standpoint.  
The liberal nationalist position affirms the importance of a sense of social 
cohesion, and therefore validates and even encourages state efforts to build a national 
culture through national education, curricula, and shared history. These scholars make 
compelling arguments for a common language and culture as unifying, rather than 
divisive forces; liberal nationalism, in contrast to multiculturalism, uses liberalism to 
justify national unity and homogeneity. Nation building, therefore, has both benefits and 
costs. Despite its inclusivity, liberal nationalism encourages minorities to join, 
participate, and engage largely on the dominant culture’s terms. Furthermore, liberal 
nationalism faces the challenge of how to manage those who are outside or in transition, 
and even those who reject the dominant culture – precisely the challenge raised by 
multiculturalism.  
Below, I discuss how immigrant minorities and national minorities pose distinct 
challenges to the nation-state. In the following section, I examine the case of cultural or 
ethnic diversity in the state caused by migration. Newcomers highlight the challenges and 
limits of the state’s treatment of difference. In the third part of this chapter, I look at the 
case of national minority groups, and their demand for political autonomy through self-
government. Though there are key differences among them, both respond uniquely to 
nation building, and help to expose the challenging balance of ideals multiculturalism 
sets out to achieve. 
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II. Immigration and Integration: Immigrant Minorities and the Nation-State 
 The arguments above show the benefits of homogeneity among the citizens of a 
state, both as a matter of identity (subjective association), and through the practice of 
actual shared traits. Cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity, increasingly a reality for 
modern states, raise both theoretical and concrete challenges to the nation-state, which I 
explore here. In broad terms, immigration policy comprises two parts: one which 
regulates the movement of persons, and another which determines the conditions, 
contracts, terms of membership, and rights of those who arrive. Ricard Zapata-Barrero 
terms the first the “level of accesses to territory” and the latter “the level of 
coexistence.”118 
A. The Level of Access: Inclusion and Exclusion  
The question of inclusion and exclusion is marked on either extreme by either a 
policy of unrestricted “open borders” or a policy of complete exclusion. These 
correspond to two distinct principles: the “ideal of free immigration,” on the one hand, 
and the “ideal of self-determination” on the other.119 Immigration policy, particularly as it 
deals with admission into a given territory, often balances aspects of each of these ideals, 
however it is worth examining each briefly. 
Advocates of free immigration and open borders generally argue that freedom of 
movement is a basic and universal freedom.  The case for free immigration, as articulated 
by Chandran Kukathas, starts from the assumption of full and equal freedoms and sees 
closed borders as a restriction on that freedom; such a restriction he argues, must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “Building a Public Philosophy of Immigration in Catalonia: The Terms of 
Debate,” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero ed. Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels: 
P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009), 144   
119 Tamir, 158  
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justified. It denies freedom of movement (and potential freedom gained by entering more 
just societies), free access to the market, and finally, freedom of association.120 One’s 
place of birth, citizenship status, and even the borders of the international system are 
arbitrary, and have no moral weight to limit freedom. The injustice of such a limitation is 
compounded by the economic disparity between the global north and south, which places 
many in a situation of disadvantage arbitrarily determined by their place of birth, and 
arbitrarily limited by political borders.  
Chaim Gans, likewise, speaks of a ‘globalist’ moral framework, whereby “human 
beings as such…are the primary beneficiaries of justice, and not human beings as 
inhabitants of a particular part of the world.” 121  Rejecting “pure nationality-based 
immigration policies…presuppose[s] that states do have obligations to assist in 
implementing certain values (such as freedom of movement, distributive justice and 
pluralism) not only within their own jurisdiction.”122 Although fully open borders are not 
a practicable reality, as even Kukathas admits, there is a strong case to be made for the 
type of globalist, humanist position to encourage states to accept migrants. States cannot 
claim responsibility exclusively to their own citizens. 
What is open for debate, therefore, is how the state can balance its own need for 
cohesion with the competing demand for global justice. David Miller, in “Immigration: 
The Case for Limits,” disputes claims for open migration from a liberal nationalist 
standpoint, arguing that unrestricted migration should not be considered a basic right. He 
argues that rather than unrestricted movement, individuals have a right only to “sufficient 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Kukathas, “Immigration,” 210  
121 Gans does not argue for fully open immigration policies. Chaim Gans, “Nationalism and Immigration,” 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1.2 (1999), 162 
122 Gans “Nationalism and Immigration,”171 
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freedom of movement…even though the extent of free movement is very far from 
absolute.”123 Except for the case of refugees, home countries generally provide an 
“adequate range of options” of internal movement, even if an individual cannot have his 
or her ideal.124 Miller also argues that an immigrant’s right to enter other societies does 
not follow as a consequence of the right to exit one’s own. If a citizen leaves society A, 
“it seems that [choice] can be exercised provided that at least one other society, society B 
say, is willing to take him.” As Miller notes, many rights (like marriage) cannot be 
exercised without a willing partner. Thus, an individual state has no obligation to accept a 
migrant simply because it may be that person’s first choice. It is the migrant’s prerogative 
to find a willing receiving state. Furthermore, Miller distinguishes between moral and 
political justifications with respect to universal human rights: “accepting that every 
human being is equally an object of moral concern – does not yet tell us what we are 
required to do for them as a result of that equality.” He proposes that we might accept the 
impossibility of ensuring exactly equal opportunities, but strive to ensure that 
“[individuals’] basic rights are respected...to a certain minimum level.”125  
 Miller’s primary defense for restrictive immigration policy builds on the 
justification that “a common public culture…serves valuable functions in supporting 
democracy and other social goals,” as explained above.126 He makes three assumptions 
about immigration and the bidirectional transformation it produces:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 David Miller, “Immigration: The Case for Limits” in eds. Andrew Cohen, Christopher Wellman, 
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 195 
124 He writes, “So although people certainly have an interest in being able to migrate internationally, they 
do not have a basic interest of the kind that would be required to ground a human right. It is more like my 
interest in having an Aston Martin [an ideal choice] than my interest in having access to some means of 
physical mobility.” Miller, “Limits,”196  
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(a) that immigrants will enter with cultural value, including political values, that 
are more or less different from the public culture of the community they enter; (b) 
that as a result of living in that community, they will absorb some part of the 
existing public culture, modifying their own values in the process; and (c) that 
their presence will also change the public culture in various ways.127  
 
These assertions are valid, and appear to be shared by most scholars of immigration. With 
these claims, Miller notes two processes provoked by immigration. The first process 
(point b, above) notes the fluid nature of immigrant culture. As Tamir explains, “Choice 
does not necessarily mean selecting between two well-structured alternatives, but can 
also involve creating a series of variations combining the old and new, which may result 
in a proliferation of cultural alternatives.”128 This notion of cultural fluidity is consistent 
with Anne Phillips’ discussion of culture above. The second process explains that 
diversity necessarily affects pre-existing members of the community, including the very 
identity of the community itself. As Miller aptly notes, this change is inevitable.    
More controversially, Miller defends limiting migration as a means of protecting 
“cultural continuity.” Current members do not care about just any public culture, but their 
own: “they want to be able to shape the way that their nation develops, including the 
values that are contained in the public culture [emphasis mine].”129 He concludes, “So a 
political judgment needs to be made about the scale and type of immigration that will 
enrich rather than dislocate the existing public culture.”130 As a matter of principle, Miller 
contends that, barring explicit racism or sexism131, “receiving states are entitled to 
consider the benefit they would receive from admitting a would-be migrant as well as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Miller, “Limits,” 199-200.  
128 Tamir, 49-50  
129 Miller, “Limits,” 200 
130 Miller, “Immigration: The Case for Limits” pg. 201 
131 Again, these arguments do not apply to refugees  
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strength of the migrant’s own claim.”132 While this makes logical sense, it remains open 
to the criticism that nation-states will seek to minimize the change to their national 
culture through de facto or de jure discrimination among would-be candidates. Why 
would nations not choose to admit only affluent, educated workers liable to contribute 
most or create an easier “symbiosis” with the current national culture? 
Questions pertaining to selection and admission criteria for immigrants reappear 
in later chapters in the context of national minorities’ desire to control immigrant flows. 
In these contexts, many of the same questions about the right to movement and selection 
criteria gain the added element of cultural preservation within a larger state. The 
arguments for inclusion and exclusion at the “level of access to territory,” which I discuss 
here, provide a basic context for understanding my assessment of national minority 
admission policy below.  
B. The Level of Coexistence: Immigrant Integration and Accommodation 
The second interaction between state nationalism and immigrants occurs at the 
“level of coexistence,” which questions what sort of treatment immigrants or non-
members ought to receive and can fairly demand once they have entered. Internal 
diversity, particularly when caused by migration, challenges both subjective and 
objective aspects of national cohesion. The language scholars use to describe policies of 
incorporating immigrants shows how language (e.g. integration vs. assimilation) and 
assessments about the legitimacy of integration practices often conflate with one another. 
The level of co-existence indicates the openness of the state to immigrant diversity, 	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prompting scholars to attempt to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate 
practices of integration. 
From a liberal nationalist perspective, if what matters is national culture, diversity 
will not pose a problem in so far as non-members can be incorporated into that national 
culture. As Yael Tamir writes,  
Once individuals have formally joined a political community they should be 
treated as equals… The political culture should be open to all and members of 
national minorities ought to be encouraged to participate and integrate into the 
political sphere.133 
  
Tamir tries to balance the state’s need for unity with a liberal commitment to the 
individual, even as the two are at odds, by advocating openness. From a liberal nationalist 
perspective, it is justifiable and even necessary for the state to pursue a policy of 
integration to minimize the threat cultural diversity may pose to social cohesion. 
However, there is a high degree of inconsistency from one author to another in terms of 
how the process of immigrant adaptation is described. In particular, scholars often make 
distinctions between proper and improper expectations for how immigrants are 
incorporated or encouraged to adjust to the cultural, linguistic, political, and economic 
life of a new society. Tamir and others follow a common distinction between the 
acceptable ‘integration’ and the undesirable alternative, ‘assimilation’, which connotes 
insensitivity and obligation.  
Rogers Brubaker builds on this distinction between just and unjust forms of 
integration, although he uses the language of ‘assimilation’ differently. One extreme of 
accommodation policies he refers to as “Anglo-conformity.” He refers to historical 
examples of “harshly homogenizing state projects” which derided or shamed outsiders or 
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imposed imperialist expectations, policies, and practices in order to achieve 
homogeneity.134 As Brubaker writes, this model was cast aside in the “differentialist turn” 
of the 1980s and 1990s, which focused on various types of difference (Black Power, gay 
rights, recognition of indigenous people) including immigration.135  
For Brubaker, assimilation is an umbrella term encompassing a range of particular 
adaptation policies. Assimilation can be “general and abstract,” or “specific and 
organic.”136 The difference between the general and specific sense of the word is that the 
former allows for a process and spectrum of change, whereas the latter “implies complete 
absorption.”137 He writes,  
In the general, abstract sense, the accent is on the process, not on some final state, 
and assimilation is a matter of degree. Assimilation designates a direction of 
change, not a particular degree of similarity. In the specific, organic sense, by 
contrast, the accent is on the end state and assimilation is a matter of either / or, 
not of degree.138  
 
He furthermore describes an intransitive and a transitive use (to become vs. to 
make similar), and argues that the only respectable form of assimilation must be both 
intransitive and general. This intransitive form of assimilation, which focuses on the 
process of becoming more similar, closely resembles mainstream use of the terms 
“integration, adaptation, or incorporation.” States have shifted in recent years towards 	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using these terms to replaced “assimilation,” though Brubaker contends this reflects 
mostly a change in discourse, not policy.  
Andrew Mason, too, has sought to define the limits of what is acceptable or 
unacceptable for the state to pursue in terms of encouraging social unity. 139  He 
distinguishes radical and moderate assimilationists, as well as coercive and non-coercive 
means. Moderate assimilation will not require that members of the non-dominant culture 
will “abandon all their distinctive customs [but instead] abandon only those customs and 
practices which are either unjust or in conflict140 with some of the central public customs 
and practices of the non-dominant group.141 Furthermore, assimilation policy must be 
judged by its means of enforcement. He writes,  
Coercive measures might include laws which prohibit members of a cultural 
community from engaging in their customs and practices. In their most extreme 
form, this could involve laws against practicing a particular religion, or against 
wearing certain kinds of dress, or using certain languages in public places. 
Noncoercive measures, in contrast, might include giving the customs and symbols 
of the dominant culture public status and respect…employing the language of the 
dominant culture in public affairs; requiring that state schools teach in that 
language and educate children in the history, geography, and literature of the 
dominant culture; subsidizing the dominant culture in various ways… 
 
Although coercive measures are almost always oppressive (except in the case of 
unjust cultural practices), Mason suggests that a moderate, non-coercive assimilation 
policy could fulfill the nationalist criteria to foster a sense of belonging together, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 In his article, “Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation,” Mason 
details the liberal-nationalist position, offers a reading of assimilation policies, and finally argues that a 
“sense of belonging” may be sufficient grounds for national cohesion, rather than the thicker “sense of 
belonging together.” 
140 To some, the idea that we might allow those behaviors that do not “conflict” reads as hegemonic. See 
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avoiding the oppression that generally goes along with it.142 Clearly, the terminology for 
integration practices differs from scholar to scholar, but each author nonetheless details 
limits for fair adaptation. As with questions of admission, the question of integration 
resurfaces in the context of immigrant integration into national minorities. In this context, 
it is useful to think about the integration policies enacted by the minority as they relate to 
the language above. Do national minorities pursue radical, coercive policies, or are they 
able to treat integration as a matter of degree, chosen by the immigrant herself. Though I 
do not use the terminological distinction between just integration and unjust assimilation, 
it is important to consider the intentions and means of integration policy, as I do with 
respect to national minorities below. 
Multiculturalism poses a distinct challenge in the realm of integration: that states 
must proactively recognize and accommodate difference. However, it is not clear whether 
we should consider multiculturalism as an extension of fair integration policy, or a 
separate demand entirely. Is assimilation a precondition for multiculturalism, or are the 
two perhaps opposed? Many critics of multiculturalism – scholars, social commentators, 
and politicians alike – see multicultural policies as a driving force of separatism that 
undermines a necessary social unity. British Prime Minister David Cameron, for 
example, claimed, “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged 
different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream.”143 
This interpretation sees multiculturalism as a force that counters the process of adaptation 	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and incorporation of immigrants by undercutting the social fabric and national cohesion 
of the nation-state.   
However, supporters of multiculturalism see a response to and improvement upon 
previous policies of integration. Multiculturalism demands that the state be 
accommodating of difference in order to be more inclusive. Kymlicka, for example, 
dismisses critics who “view multiculturalism in isolation,” and do not account for the 
other government policies that encourage integration.144 Even the non-coercive, moderate 
means introduced above affect immigrant’s education, financing, health, professional life 
etc.: “[They] encourage, pressure, even legally force immigrants to take steps towards 
integrating into society.”145 This does not mean, for Kymlicka, that nation building is 
illegitimate or ought to be discontinued. However, it does require that we rethink 
multiculturalism as a legitimate response to nation building that seeks participation on 
“fairer terms,” not isolation. For Kymlicka, recognizing immigrant multiculturalism on 
these grounds requires both understanding that integration occurs slowly over 
generations, and ensuring that public institutions provide the equally respectful and 
accommodating treatment to minorities as they do the dominant group.146  
Kymlicka includes a list of twelve common ‘multicultural reforms’ advanced by 
immigrants. These include affirmative action policies in “major educational and 
economic institutions”, quotas in legislative bodies, culture-specific curricula revision, 
accommodation and recognition of holidays (or exemptions from Sunday-closing 	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legislation), dress code exemptions, “anti-racism educational programs,” anti-harassment 
rules, “cultural diversity training for the police or health care professionals,” “guidelines 
about ethnic stereotypes in the media,” public funding for ethnic or cultural scholarship 
or festivals, mother-tongue services for immigrants, and “bilingual education programs 
for children of immigrants.”147  
He argues that the diverse policies sought under immigrant multiculturalism show 
the importance of participation and inclusion – the very things assimilation policies aim 
for. The first three policies he lists, focused on affirmative action and group 
representation, “are intended to help immigrants enter into mainstream societal 
institutions.”148 All the others, except for the last two, “are intended to make immigrants 
feel more comfortable within these institutions once they are there.” For Kymlicka, the 
fact that these policies focus on inclusion and participation in common institutions readily 
disputes the fear of social cleavages.149 What these policies seek to challenge are the 
terms of integration. He writes, “They are rejecting Anglo-conformity, but not 
integration.”150 Kymlicka’s narrative of these policies may even downplay the gravity of 
what he lays out: exemptions from laws and affirmative action policies, for example, are 
significant, long-term changes.  
 The last two forms of accommodation, mother-tongue services and bilingual 
education, are notably harder for Kymlicka to defend.  He classifies both as “temporary,” 	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and works to portray them as “short-term forms of institutional separateness [which] 
promote long-term institutional integration.”151 Kymlicka and others offer multicultural 
rights as a counter-balance to, not in place of, nation building. This narrative correctly 
refutes the often nativist undertones of the belief that immigrants reject the dominant 
culture and tear apart the social fabric, but it may understate the gravity of immigrant 
demands, and the significant pull these demands place on the state. Once again, I 
consider whether these same concerns immigrants provoke (and the difficulties of 
multicultural accommodation) might be amplified in the context of national minority, 
which seeks cultural preservation in the already unstable context of a larger sovereign 
state.  
As we can see, diversity and the demands that accompany it provoke serious 
challenges to the nation-building model of social cohesion. Still, I do not think that all 
integration is inevitably oppressive, particularly if the nation is able to take the rights and 
interests of non- or new members seriously. What policies best suit these interests is not 
something that we can judge in advance, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
As Brubaker concludes, we must transition from seeing immigrants as “objects” to seeing 
them as “subjects,” members of heterogeneous, multi-generational and fluid groups.152 
This framework reinforces the idea that integration is not an A-to-B transition, but a 
process of reflection, hybridization, and choice. Still, fairness requires a careful balance 
between the needs and demands of non-members and the needs of the state.  
Both of the pertinent questions about immigration and nationalism are ultimately 
questions of degree: How much (and how quickly) can immigrants be expected to 	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integrate? How much can the state accommodate diversity without losing or dramatically 
altering its foundations? What matters most, I believe, is that these questions are asked, 
and options are weighed, in every case. But most importantly, the interests of the state 
must not automatically outweigh those of the immigrants. Below, I detail the demands of 
national minorities. Interestingly, the national minority-state relationship, like the 
immigrant minority-state relationship, also raises questions of inclusion and exclusion, 
and the limits of integration. 
III. National Minorities, Self-Determination, and Multinational States: 
In this section, I show how national minority demands challenge liberal 
nationalism. I engage with two questions here; first, how should states respond to 
minorities within their borders who see themselves as a distinct nation. Liberal 
nationalism advocates self-determination, yet empirically nation and state borders do not 
always overlap. Next, I focus on the major multicultural accommodation sought by 
national minorities: self-government. This right raises difficult questions, particularly in 
the context of the right to cultural survival, which many see as inherently connected to 
minority self-government. I detail these challenges with a critical eye to how the 
arrangements might affect immigrants within nested nations.     
A. Nations within Nations 
Our discussion of immigration and the challenges of diversity presupposed the 
existence of states; however, these units are themselves products of complex political 
processes of state formation, self-determination, or secession. Although we tend to 
conceive of the world as organized by nation states, there are many examples of stateless 
nations. Frequently, minorities within states see themselves as national minorities, 
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possessing what Tamir calls a “national culture,” but lacking an institutional framework 
of self-government. As with immigrants, the existence of national minorities creates two 
points of tension for the nation state. The first, often discussed under the rubric of self-
determination or secession, questions how states ought to respond to demands for self-
government (either autonomy within, or secession from, preexisting states). The latter 
questions the dimensions and limits of this self-government: cultural survival, and the 
policies it supports, is a crucial but controversial dimension of self-government.  
As liberal nationalists argue, individuals who see themselves as members of a 
national culture have a strong interest in living within that culture. Recall from above that 
the “ideal” of the nation-state is legitimated on the premise of its universal application: to 
every state a nation, and to every nation a state. However, as Michael Keating and others 
write, there are many more nations than there are viable states.153 Looking out over the 
global landscape, the reality is, not surprisingly, far messier than this ideal would suggest. 
Even if one could easily define and classify all nations, the “borders” of these groups 
would not fit neatly with geopolitical borders. On this point, Keating speaks of a 
“blurring of sovereignty” noting examples both of diversity within states (Scotland and 
Wales, for example) as well as supranational organizations of states, like the EU.154 As 
Tamir writes, even as globalization pulls states to realize the “advantages of transnational 
cooperation, [this stands in tension with an] increasing concern with the preservation of 
national and cultural uniqueness.” 155  For divided states, national differences are a 
significant challenge to social cohesion. Self-determination through secession would 
seem an ideal remedy to these conflicts. A significant body of literature has addressed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Keating, “So many nations…” 39-64. See also Linz, 356 
154 Keating, pg. 58 
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this question by focusing on justifying the moral and legal right to self-determination 
(often through secession or division) and working to define the groups to whom this right 
belongs.156  
However, for a variety of reasons, secession alone is incapable of solving the 
“problem” of multi-national states. The reality of cohabitating or competing nations 
produces more complex models of belonging and political power distribution than those 
addressed above with respect to ethnic diversity.  David Miller addresses this problem 
directly in his chapter, “Nationality in Divided Societies.” He provides three models of 
divided societies: “ethnic cleavages [not considered multinational],” “rival national 
groups”157 and “nested nationalism.”158 I am most interested in the last one, which 
examines the reality of “two or more territorially based communities…within the 
framework of a single nation, so that members of each community typically have a split 
identity.”159 Miller’s descriptive language of “communities” within a “nation” (rather 
than “nations” within a state) betrays his position; he does not view Spain or Canada as 
“multi-national states” (a term he instead associates with rival nations within a state) 
because, he says, they are defined more by an “over-arching nation-state” and “split-level 
identities” for national minorities within.160 Still, his language is useful in helping to 
conceptualize the presence of national minorities within larger states. Furthermore, his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Tamir, pg. 58 
156 Avashai Margalit and Joseph Raz “National Self-Determination,” Journal of Philosophy 87.9 (1990).  
Tamir, Ch. 3. The question of self-government is widely discussed among scholars of nationalism.    
157 Rival National groups have “mutually exclusive national identities” and often “rival territorial claims.” 
Therefore, the possibility of coexistence or a shared state is slim.  Miller, “Nationality in Divided 
Societies,” in Alain Gagnon and James Tully eds. Multinational Democracies,  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 303 
158 Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies,” 301 
159 Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies” 304 
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idea of split identity (that one can feel Basque and Spanish, for example) is helpful in 
explaining why these groups may choose not to secede despite their national identity.  
National minorities (interchangeably, nested nations) face a difficult situation: 
they are subject to the political power and pressure to assimilate from the state, yet many 
important aspects of their lives, as Margalit, Raz, Kymlicka, and Tamir show, are bound 
up in their ability to live within and have control over their national / societal culture.  In 
order to achieve this, these groups demand self-government; this demand creates both 
practical and theoretical challenges. Much of the justification behind this demand has 
already covered, both in the importance of societal cultures for individual choice and 
wellbeing, and in the liberal nationalist extension of this argument to the nation as a 
meaningful unit of political organization. Furthermore, national minority 
multiculturalism, like immigrant multiculturalism, situates itself in opposition to, and as a 
reaction against state-led nation building. In the following section, I focus on the most 
important aspect of national minority multiculturalism: self-government.  
B. Group Rights, Self-Government, and Cultural Survival  
The critical aspect of national minority self-government is that it counters nation 
building with nation building. That is, the minority government, too, tries to establish the 
subjective and objective aspects of a nation within its territory. There are two aspects of 
minority nation building that I examine in further detail, as both highlight the challenge 
of a liberal multiculturalism for national minorities: First that it is a right held by groups; 
second, that it implies or justifies the right to cultural survival. These two claims seem to 
be mutually reinforcing.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies,” 318. Still, I follow the rest of the contributions in 
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 The question of whether multiculturalism supports (or should support) group or 
individual rights produces no clear answer and much controversy. In the discussion of 
tolerance and autonomy introduced in the first chapter, some liberals focused on 
individuals as the bearers of multicultural rights to emphasize the importance of 
protecting these individuals from coercion by cultural elites. Still, the distinction between 
group and group-differentiated rights is not so neat. Anne Phillips, for example, specifies:  
I am not objecting to either the funding of ethnocultural associations or measures 
to raise the political representation of people from minority groups [either of 
which might be considered group rights]. My objection, instead, is to measures 
that enhance the regulatory authority of a group over its members.161 
 
Similarly, Will Kymlicka offers a nuanced defense of certain group rights, writing 
that what matters more than whether rights are individual or collective is that they must 
supplement, not restrict individual rights.162 Group rights might take the form of either 
“internal restrictions…the right of a group against its own members”163 or “external 
protections…the right of a group against the larger society, designed to protect the 
group…”164 As Kymlicka writes, “given the commitment to liberal autonomy, I argue that 
liberals should be skeptical of claims to internal restrictions.”165 The most significant 
rights demanded by national minorities are group rights surrounding self-government and 
the importance of cultural protection. As such, they are open to the criticism of failing to 
live up to their liberal values.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
use the terminology “national minority” to refer to Catalonia and Quebec. 
161 Phillips, 169 
162 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 22. For another interesting take, see Baubock, who argues that all rights can be 
justified in liberal individualist terms, although they may require “institutional arrangements [that are] 
particularistic and collective as we move from liberty via equality to self-government.” 
163 I would add here that caution with internal restrictions ought to matter equally, if not more, when those 
restricted are not members of the group, but would be nonetheless subject to its dictates.  
164 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 22 
165 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 22 
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To test this claim, I use Kymlicka’s “Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice” in 
Politics in the Vernacular, in which he explains and defends the collective nature of 
national minority rights. He argues that human rights are “insufficient” for protection of 
national minorities, and may require supplementation with minority (group) rights in 
three ways: migration and settlement policies, boundary and territory rights, and language 
rights. Though Kymlicka frames all three of these rights as external protections, I read 
these critically with an eye towards how the exercise of these rights affects members of 
the group, and non-members within or wishing to enter.    
Kymlicka first discusses policies of migration or settlement restrictions, opening 
with the idea that states may use resettlement policy to threaten the national minority 
“both to break open access to their territory’s natural resources, and to disempower them 
politically by turning them into a minority even within their own traditional territory.”166 
Protection against the state justifies land rights, and national minority control over 
immigration policy. Because they must offset the threat of state incursion, a self-
governing minority might demand “lengthy residency requirements” for immigrants 
before they were given voting rights, or mandate its own language in public schools, 
courts, or institutions.167 By focusing on these restrictions as means of protection against 
the nationalist, assimilationist desires of the “dominant” culture, Kymlicka moves quickly 
to self-government rights that limit the very protections he advocates elsewhere for 
immigrants. Moreover, addressing the fear that these restrictions are unjust, he merely 	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draws parallels to the state’s integrationist policy, rather than offering a justification for 
why the national minority’s rights trump those of ethnic or immigrant minorities.168  
Kymlicka has more success portraying the subsequent group right, control of 
“boundaries and powers of internal political subunits,” as an external protection. He 
argues that states may draw borders “so as to disempower national minorities” by 
dividing the nation or allowing the “minority’s territory [to be] absorbed into a larger 
political subunit.”169 However, in the third right, “official language policy,” he again 
transitions from the need for external protections to limiting the autonomy of individuals 
within the society. Defending against claims of illiberalism, Kymlicka parallels the 
efforts of the national minority to ensure language survival with the ‘official’ language of 
the majority’s “government bureaucracy, courts, schools” etc.  
One potential remedy to the language dominance of the ‘majority’ would be to 
legally guarantee the minority’s ability to use its language. Kymlicka sees this as 
insufficient: “But it is difficult to sustain such a predominant status for a minority 
language, particularly if newcomers to the minority’s territory are able to become 
education and employed in the majority language.” 170  Therefore, national minority 
protection may involve illiberal restrictions on immigrants, and rule out the possibility of 
multiculturalism within the nested nation. I believe he finds strong justifications for 
minority national multiculturalism, but does not provide us with a good reason for 
summarily overruling the demands of immigrants.171  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 75 
169 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 75-6 
170 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 75-6 
171 Elsewhere, Kymlicka considers the relationship between immigrant integration and national minority 
autonomy, as I discuss below. I do not mean to misrepresent his argument, but to show how, by his own 
argument, external protections may require internal restrictions.  
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 This defense of national minority self-government as a group right points to a 
related and challenge question: is there a right to cultural survival? Recall Charles 
Taylor’s move to link the politics of recognition with the right to cultural survival: “[the 
goal is to] maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we’re 
concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it never 
be lost?”172 Yet the legitimacy of this right divides scholars. On a practical level, the self-
government rights, particularly those that help secure the national culture through 
language policy and membership restrictions, are fundamental to cultural survival. As 
Dominique Arel writes, in “Political Stability in Multinational Democracies,” the “fear of 
minorization” is a fundamental driving force for nationalism. This fear is even more acute 
for national minorities 173 “Nationalism thrives on the perception that the culturally 
defined nation is in danger of becoming a minority on its ‘own’ territory (the homeland) 
due to birth rate differentials, immigration flows, or assimilation.”174 National minorities 
face a double fear, one from internal minorization, and the other from external cultural 
dominance or assimilation into the supra-national or state culture. The policies they 
institute in self-government and nation building seek to protect against both of these 
fears.  
 But is there a moral reason to secure a nation against minorization? One potential 
response, introduced above, is that individuals benefit from access to their national 
cultures and nation-states help to guarantee this access. Yet Tamir, for example, who 
agrees with this premise, argues that although national cultures are necessary for states, 	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173 Dominique Arel, “Stability in Multinational Democracies” in Alain Gagnon and James Tuly eds. 
Multinational Democracies,  (Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 77 
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there is no strong reason to suggest that a particular national culture’s survival is worthy 
of protection. As she writes, “Defining a political entity as a national community is only 
justified if a substantial majority of its citizens has consented to this definition. This 
implies that the national character of a political entity is to be determined de facto and not 
de jure.”175 Still others argue against this “freedom-based” conception of the nation 
specifically because it cannot account for the importance of cultural survival.176 This 
fascinating debate is all the more complex as we consider that any national culture is 
heterogeneous, and inevitably prone to change over time. The scholarship remains 
divided on this crucial question, particularly because of the seemingly illiberal costs 
ensuring cultural protection incurs, even if survival is seen as a liberal right.  The 
possibility of a right to cultural survival is fundamental to the case studies I review.  
 Nested nations engage in nation building, but do so in opposition to the nation 
building of the dominant state. This framing of minority nation building as protection 
significantly alters the scope of the projects that the national minority may seek, as well 
as the normative considerations surrounding these efforts. The added element of cultural 
survival, or even a fixed cultural identity, invariably shapes policies. Furthermore, self-
government can only be achieved by group rights, and must accept the difficulties that 
accompany these rights.  
 
IV. Minorities within Minorities: Immigration in Nested Nations 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 She continues, “Hence, attempts such as that of Israeli law to bar parties that deny the Jewish character 
of the state from standing for election is unjustified.” Tamir,158. 
176 Gans writes, “The freedom-based argument …cannot explain the historical and inter-generational 
dimension characteristic of nationalist demands and aspirations…the demand to survive through historical 
time is an essential component of nationalism” Gans, “Immigration,” 164-5.   
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Above, I ask whether self-government for nested nations necessarily legitimizes 
illiberal treatment towards minorities by denying the possibility of multicultural 
accommodation. Whereas often these two types of multiculturalism are treated as distinct 
projects, from what we can see in this chapter, they are closely related, and perhaps even 
in tension. However, in the context of nationalism, we see an interesting dynamic. 
Whereas both immigrant and national minority multiculturalism are justified by 
recognizing the importance of culture as it stands in opposition to the homogenizing pull 
of the nation-state, nested nations respond by engaging in their own nation-building 
project. They assume many of the roles of government, ostensibly to protect themselves 
against the assimilation into the state. But they, too, encounter internal diversity in the 
form of immigration to their ‘own’ territory. These immigrants, not surprisingly, bring 
with them demands for recognition, fair terms of integration, and even multicultural 
accommodation. Paradoxically, the very rights national minorities demand as cultural 
protection and recognition may stand in opposition with the challenges of internal 
diversity. What remains to be seen is the extent to which the nested nation is capable of 
balancing its desire to maintain a distinct society with these challenges. 
This question has both political and moral dimensions. First, can national 
minorities create means of integration and belonging that will be open and accessible to 
new members and the demands for accommodation that they make? Second, are these 
responses morally legitimate on liberal grounds? Although I have developed an extensive 
framework for answering this latter question, I cannot proceed without the former. 
Therefore, we must turn to cases of nested nations.  
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In the following chapters, I address the tension between national minority self-
governance and immigrant integration and accommodation through case studies. I am 
interested in developing a case-oriented framework for understanding the various 
dimensions of the immigrant-host relationship in nested nations, and thinking about the 
ways in which these projects might be compatible or incompatible. The normative 
literature I survey in Chapters 1 and 2 sets the backdrop for this relationship by 
establishing a framework for understanding liberalism and multiculturalism, and 
positioning two distinct minorities in relation to the nation-state. The following chapters 
build from this framework to understand how national minorities and immigrant 
minorities interact under national minority self-governance.  
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Chapter 3: Case Methodology 
 
I. Introduction: Why Use Case Studies?  
 
In the preceding chapters, I introduce a normative framework for understanding 
the complexities and contradictions of liberal multiculturalism, and also position both 
national minorities and immigrant minorities in tension with the nation-state. However, 
though each minority interacts with the nation-state in distinct ways, it is still unclear 
how they interact with each other when immigrants seek to settle in the territory of the 
nested nation. Are self-governing national minorities capable of fairly managing new 
internal diversity introduced by immigration, or is immigration inherently a challenge to 
the nationalist project and self-preservation? Can nested nations adopt ‘civic’ means of 
belonging, open to all would-be members, or would doing so contradict their fundamental 
purpose? Moreover, can new members be integrated only on the terms of the majority, or 
is the nation capable of multicultural accommodation for immigrant minorities? Might 
they even be more likely to respect and accommodate internal pluralism? In short – is 
national minority autonomy compatible with immigrant multiculturalism?  
As we begin to think about real-world application of this theoretical puzzle, 
modeling these potential scenarios becomes considerably more complex. As I show, 
political theory does not do enough to explicate the nuances of this relationship. It is 
difficult to try to ascertain the justice of various responses to these two competing claims 
without a clear understanding of the empirical and political dimensions of the 
relationship. How do they seek to manage this ‘new’ diversity? Is the national identity 
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open to would-be members? Is the nested nation capable of accommodation, and on what 
terms?  
These questions merit further exploration through case studies. For this reason, 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 attempt to answer the above questions by focusing on the 
overlooked “triadic relationship…between nation-states, minority nations, and 
immigrants.”177 Only once this relationship is better understood can we readdress the 
normative question, which asks how to judge the justice of various responses to 
competing claims, and what arrangements best achieve liberal values.  
Although case-based research has both clear advantages as well as some 
disadvantages, this approach is particularly suited to this thesis for a number of reasons. 
Real-world examples of self-government have the potential to confirm or challenge the 
assumptions of political theory. Nested nations sit at the intersection of some of the most 
discussed and debated issues of the early 21st century, including multiculturalism, 
citizenship theory, nationalism, and migration. By testing these concepts and events in 
practice, we have a unique opportunity both to advance our understanding of real-world 
experience and to critically test theoretical assumptions. The relationship between theory 
and cases can work in the opposite direction, as well. In addition to providing a means of 
‘testing’ existing theories, there is a strong case for “using actual moral and political 
discourse as the starting point for political theory.”178 That is, cases can highlight 
limitations in existing theories, and shed light on the need for new ones. Furthermore, 	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(Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009), 10 
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though I focus on a specific type of interaction, these results should shed light on the 
enduring challenges liberal democracies continue to struggle with in the face of 
immigration and diversity.  
Case studies provide a context for, and enrich our understanding of the moral and 
political questions scholars grapple with. They may also suggest new directions, or new 
questions that need answers. This thesis attempts to take advantage of both sides of this 
logic, testing theories against the reality, and, ultimately utilizing cased-based 
observations to develop and enhance political theory. This chapter provides a framework 
for case-based research, explaining case selection, identifying dependent variable 
‘outcomes’ with which we can assess the compatibility of national minorities and 
immigrants, and considering variables that are likely to impact this relationship. I also 
develop independent variable ‘conditions’ which I seek to link to these outcomes through 
hypotheses in Chapter 4.  
II. Case Selection and Overview 
Though there are only a limited number of cases of national minority self-
government, one of the most important questions we can ask is, “Where should we 
look?” Given the scope of this project, it is impossible to examine all potential cases; this 
makes choosing cases correctly all the more crucial. The “Multiculturalism Policy 
Index,” run by Queens University, scores only eleven countries (what they term 
‘multinational’ or ‘plurinational’ states) in their index of multiculturalism policies 
directed to national minorities in modern democracies.179 Of these countries, all but Japan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Multiculturalism Policy Index, http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/, (February 21st, 2012). This project scores 
countries on a set list of policy requirements, and provides separate scores for “Immigrant Minorities,” 
“Indigenous Peoples,” and “National Minorities.” 
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are located in North American or Europe.180 Moreover, in the most recent date in which 
they were scored (2010) two countries received flat 0s and another received a 2 on a scale 
of 6. Therefore, there are only a limited number of cases to examine, which have in 
common certain conditions (liberal democracies, first world economic powers, etc.) that 
are relevant to the inquiry at hand. This is not a coincidence, nor is it a bad thing. This 
natural limitation shows that national minorities are more likely to gain state recognition 
and self-government in liberal states – precisely where we would expect to see similar 
recognition and multicultural accommodation for immigrant minorities. 
Nonetheless, even among liberal democracies, where we look determines to a 
significant degree what we should expect to find. Imagine that we discover a case of a 
nested nation whose view and treatment of immigrants is marked by xenophobia, racism, 
and exclusionary policies. What would such a case demonstrate? History is replete with 
examples of protectionism, discrimination, or violence in nation-states, where immigrant-
host conflict is arguably less likely than it would be in nested nations. The presence of 
ethnic or cultural conflict, therefore, would not substantiate more generally the 
incompatibility of multiculturalism and minority self-government. However, a case that 
demonstrated the absence of serious conflict, and even positive steps towards 
accommodation, would show that the two projects could, in fact, be reconciled. 
Furthermore, if we find incompatibility even in the cases where conditions should be 
most favorable to compatability, this finding would also be more noteworthy than in a 
case where compatibility is less likely. With this in mind, I believe it is important to look 
for the cases where the compatibility of nested nation self-government and immigrant 
multiculturalism is most likely. On a practical level, given the narrowness of my focus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 The implications of this finding are explored below in the methodology section.  
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(minority immigrants within a minority nation within a state), it is also useful to find 
nationalist projects that have been well documented and explored in the literature. 
Catalonia in Spain and Quebec in Canada both match these criteria.181 I will briefly 
introduce each case before detailing a methodological approach to study these cases. 
Quebec is a fascinating case for exploring the relationship between immigration 
and self-government because immigration has held such an important place in public 
discourse and academic discussions of Quebec historically, and particularly over the past 
50 years. Quebec gained autonomy by the British Parliament’s Quebec Act of 1774 and 
has long viewed itself as a “founding member” of Canada. Quebec’s distinct status was 
reaffirmed in the creation of Canada through confederation in 1867, which established 
power sharing and “dualism” between English and French Canadians, particularly in the 
eyes of Quebec nationalists. 182 Following the Quiet Revolution, a period of rapid 
modernization and industrialization during the 1960s, Quebec underwent significant 
changes both economically and politically. After the 1976 election of the secessionist 
Parti Quebecois, Quebec instituted its now-famous language legislation, Law 101, which 
made French the official language of Quebec as well as the language of common life. The 
PQ also initiated two failed referenda on secession, first in 1980 and again in 1995.183 
Canada, the state within which Quebec is embedded, has historically been a country with 
high levels of immigration 184  and is generally taken as the pioneer of state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Of course, there are a number of other examples I would have liked to explore with more time to devote 
to this project. Both Multinational Democracies and Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations, 
anthologies that explore multinational democracies, include Flanders in Belgium in addition to these two 
cases. Other notable multinational democracies are the U.K. and Switzerland.  
182 Alain-G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec: Debating 
Multinationalism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 28-30 
183 These two referenda were separated by a period of rule by the labor party, which won election in 1985.  
184 Peter Li, Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002).  
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multiculturalism.185 Quebec, which has a significant amount of control over immigration 
and integration policy, rejects the federal multiculturalism policy in favor of its own 
model of Interculturalism. This model more explicitly states expectations of immigrants 
and clearly defines common values in a way traditional multiculturalism does not, 
although scholars debate the significance of this distinction. The first decade of the 21st 
century has seen a renewed emphasis on the limits of “reasonable accommodation” and a 
fascinating public conversation on the meaning of Quebec nationalism, citizenship, and 
identity. Quebec therefore exemplifies the difficult endeavor of reconciling a 
commitment to the preservation of a unique minority culture with the liberal goal of 
openness to cultural diversity and the integration and accommodation of new members.  
Catalonia is one of 17 autonomous communities in Spain, and along with Basque 
Country and Galicia, one of three regions to have been recognized as a “historic 
nationality” by the 1978 Constitution.  Catalan autonomy has followed a rocky trajectory 
alternating between periods of self-government and extreme cultural oppression from the 
center, under the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) and Francisco Franco 
(1939-1975). Catalonia played a key role in the transition to democracy following 
Franco’s death, and the Spanish Constitution of 1978 establishes Spanish Federalism with 
the creation of the autonomous communities. While the Autonomous Communities 
assume competency over matters such as the institutions of self-government, public 
works, internal boundaries, city planning, and the promotion of culture (Article 148), the 
State retained a significant degree of control. Though Catalonia has had control over 
linguistic policy, the state retained control over immigration among its 31 exclusive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185Augie Fleras, The Politics of Multiculturalism: Multicultural Governance in a Comparative Perspective 
(New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),  
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rights. Spain, historically a net emigrant country, has in the past one or two decades 
begun to receive exponentially higher inflows of migrants, many from North Africa; this 
has fundamentally altered the power dynamic and conversation about immigration in 
Spain and Catalonia. Catalonia’s approved 2006 Statue of Autonomy sought greater 
control over immigrants, but was declared unconstitutional by Spanish courts in 2010. In 
most studies of nested nations, Catalonia is taken as the ideal national minority Spain, 
and is often contrasted with the ‘ethnic’ nationalism of the Basque Country.186 While 
Catalonia has only in recent years sought further control over immigration policies, it has 
historically demonstrated a high degree of openness and willingness to incorporate new 
members into society, despite high rates of both internal and external immigration. This 
makes Catalonia the most likely case within Spain, and an ideal case for examining how 
national minorities address the challenges caused by internal diversity.  
III. Assessing the Compatibility of National Minorities and Immigrants 
Before turning to the specifics of these cases, we must delve further into the 
question of explicitly what we are trying to assess. This requires, not fundamentally 
changing, but re-articulating the central question of this thesis. The research question that 
I develop through the literature asks: “is culturally based self-government compatible 
with multicultural accommodation for non-member immigrant minorities, or does it deny 
this possibility?” Though this question neatly highlights the theoretical tension between 
two seemingly distinct projects for differentiated citizenship, it seems to suggest that the 
question of compatibility might be answered with either a simple ‘yes’ or a ‘no’.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See, for example, Multinational Democracies or Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations. 
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This framing of the question does not provide room to consider that minority self-
governance and immigrant multiculturalism may be compatible in some cases or ways 
but not others, nor does it provide us with a good indication of what ‘compatibility’ really 
means. Furthermore, in turning to the cases, I am interested in linking specific conditions 
of the case to the outcomes I assess. Taking into account this nuanced and variable-based 
approach requires re-articulating, but not fundamentally changing, the central research 
question of this thesis. Adapted to the case-based approach, therefore, I ask: Under what 
conditions, and with what (if any) limitations, is national minority self-governance 
compatible with the integration and accommodation of new members? Reframing the 
question this way allows a more contextual and deeper understanding of the concept of 
compatibility, as it encourages us to think about the many aspects of host-immigrant 
interaction, as well as the factors and conditions that surround and influence these 
interfaces. Note also that I move away from the one-dimensional outcome 
“multiculturalism,” instead speaking of ‘integration and accommodation’. This change 
reflects the need to consider a multiple aspects of compatibility, which I lay out in four 
dependent variables below. It also leaves open the possibility that national minorities may 
engage in a unique form of accommodation, distinct from traditional multiculturalism. 
Though I am especially engaged by the question of whether national minorities are 
capable of multicultural accommodation, we must also consider who enters and on what 
terms they are incorporated or adapted into the nation, before we can fully understanding 
multiculturalism. Furthermore, though this re-stated question is geared towards case 
analysis, I should emphasize that I am still driven by the theoretical puzzle of whether 
liberal multiculturalism can succeed on the liberal standards it sets for itself. 
	   Lipton	  81	  
Answering this re-articulated research question first requires a clear 
understanding of what it would mean for the two minorities to be ‘compatible’. By 
compatibility, I refer to the reciprocal relationship between national minorities and 
immigrant minorities, and view the two as compatible to the extent that the advancement 
of rights for one minority does not infringe upon or unjustifiably undermine the rights of 
the other. This definition focuses on both minorities as they relate to one another– 
weighing them as equally as possible.  
My definition builds on Zapata-Barrero’s assertion that the presence of one 
minority should not harm the situation of another. Though both minorities already find 
themselves in (unconnected) situations of disadvantage187, he asks if, when these two are 
“linked,” the situation for either worsens: “For it to improve the lot of both groups would 
be ideal, but I think it is reasonable to maintain as a standard that it does not worsen it for 
either.”188 Zapata-Barrero rightly emphasizes the need to take into account both parties – 
the national minorities and immigrants. This dual perspective forces us to consider the 
terms of integration and membership from the immigrants’ perspective while 
simultaneously acknowledging how internal diversity threatens the status of the national 
minority within its own region and within the state.  
While I like that he emphasizes the dialectic nature of this relationship (national 
minorities can be a threat to immigrants, just as immigrants can be a threat to national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 See Chapter 2 sections II and III, in this work, for a comparison of immigrant and national minorities 
with respect to the nation-state. 
188 Zapata-Barrero “Setting a Research Agenda on the Interaction between Cultural Demands of 
Immigrants and Minority Nations,” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero ed. Immigration and Self-government of 
Minority Nations (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009), 19 
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minorities), his assessment still does not explain compatibility.189 It seems to suggest a 
clear definition of incompatibility (when the situation of either one worsens that of 
another), but does not articulate clearly enough what it would mean to “worsen” the 
other’s situation, nor relative to what this situation would be deemed ‘worse’. My 
definition, whereby national minority self-government is compatible with immigrant 
integration and accommodation to the extent that the advancement of rights of one 
minority does not infringe upon or unjustifiably undermine the rights of the other, 
attempts to clarify these doubts. It imposes a liberal standard for compatibility (the rights 
of one do preclude or infringe on the rights of the other), rather than simply defining 
compatibility as the absence of some undefined harm. This standard is broad enough to 
encompass the various policies I discuss below, but also attempts to take into account 
how the demands being weighted may differ by situation, even within the same case. I 
also include in this definition some flexibility, by speaking of “unjustifiably 
undermining.” This intentionally imprecise word choice allows for contextual 
assessments of compatibility across different dependent variables, and also leaves open 
normative questions about the justice and fairness until after I have examined the cases.  
Below, I offer four dependent variables (outcomes) which together help to assess 
the relationship between national minorities and immigrants. Together, these provide 
alternate means of assessing the compatibility of national minority self-governance with 
immigrant multiculturalism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Note: Zapata-Barrero is not making an argument specifically about compatibility and does not use this 
word. However, because his essay focuses on the interaction between the cultural demands of immigrants 
and national minorities, I find his assessment here useful.   
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IV. Dependent Variables: Admission Policy, Integration Policy, Nationality 
Policy, and Multicultural Accommodation.  
 
In determining what variables to consider in assessing the compatibility of 
national minority self-governance with immigrant multiculturalism, it is important to 
think broadly about the distinct areas of interaction. A comprehensive approach to 
understanding immigration in nested nations must address the institutional framework of 
the national minority within the state, as well as the policies it enacts. Where does the 
national minority, rather than the state, seek to exercise competency related to the 
management and incorporation of immigrants? Who enters the state and on what terms? 
What role do culture and language play in determining entrance or membership, and how 
does the national minority seek to regulate or normalize language? How is the national 
project defined, and is it open to non-members? Building on these questions, I select four 
dependent variables necessary for evaluating distinct elements of national minority self-
government as it relates to immigration: Admission Policy, Language Policy, Nationality 
Policy, and Multicultural Accommodation.   
A. Admission Policy 
The first dependent variable I consider is Admission Policy. Admission policy 
concerns which (and how many) immigrants are admitted, what criteria are used to 
determine who enters,190 and what (if any) provisions or expectations act as terms of 
entrance. Specifically, I examine how nested nations treat and think about the question of 
population flow and demographic change. Immigration produces conflicting pulls, as the 
national minority must juggle economic needs, political sustainability, and its cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 As Li notes, it is important to consider both “admission” and “selection” of immigrants.  
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distinctiveness amidst the tumultuous pull of globalization.191 Though not all nested 
nations exercise control over immigration, and at times may not even seek to, these cases 
are still stimulating areas for exploration; we must ask when and why the national 
minority seeks competency to control immigration policy.  
Admission policy can also be used as a lens for examining the nation’s position 
and power within the larger state, as well as the developing self-conception of the 
minority. In each case, therefore, history and context play an important role in 
contextualizing the findings. Exploring both how and when the national minority 
perceives, seeks to control, and actually regulates admission, will provide a clear picture 
of the defensiveness or openness of the nationalism to immigration at the broadest level. 
As Joseph Carens writes,  
The degree of openness to immigrants, the criteria of selection and exclusion, the 
kinds of adaptation, and the degree of conformity to the dominant population 
expect of new arrivals and their descendants – all of these factors indicate 
something about who belongs, what is valued, and what membership and 
citizenship mean.192 
 
Carens rightly points out that all polities must make decisions about inclusion and 
exclusion. These decisions reflect matters of identity, as I explore below, but are deeply 
shaped by literal boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and the flows of people through 
them. Therefore, addressing the question, “Who gets in?” is a necessary first step to 
understanding the relationship between immigration and national minorities.  
 B. Integration Policy (Language)   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Steven C. Roach, Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights and Globalization (Burlington, Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2005) 
192 Joseph H. Carens, “Immigration, Political Community, and the Transformation of Identity: Quebec’s 
Immigration Policies in Critical Perspective” in Joseph Carens ed. Is Quebec Nationalism Just? 
Perspectives from Anglophone Canada,  (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 20 
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 The second dependent variable I consider, integration policy, refers to the terms 
of ‘assimilation’ of immigrants. In the cases I review, language policy plays such an 
important role as an assimilationist policy that I seriously considered treating it as a 
separate variable. I chose to use the broader category, integration policy, instead, because 
it speaks more generally to the model of immigrant adaptation and incorporation into 
society; language, to the extent that language policy enhances linguistic assimilation or 
normalization, can therefore be treated as a subset or example of integration policy.193   
Largely, scholars have approached linguistic integration in terms of public 
recognition at the level of government, and from the perspective of individual linguistic 
autonomy. The state must determine which languages to recognize in what spheres of 
public life, and what such recognition entails.194 Though language policies can take 
different forms, nested nations often seek to “normalize the use of their language in the 
public sphere” through what Alan Patten terms the “language maintenance model.” 195 As 
Kymlicka explains above in his discussion of language rights, even official 
multilingualism (two or more equal-status languages, with free choice between them) is 
insufficient to ensure language survival. Language normalization policies in the 
“maintenance” model take positive steps to ensure the viability of a given language, 
generally within a set territory.196 Where do we see national minorities pursuing policies 
of language normalization and protection? What restrictions or policies does this model 
entail?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 This also allows me to consider how language policy works as a term of admission or a feature of 
nationality policy – its importance spans across the dependent variables.  
194 Alan Patten, “Political Theory and Language Policy,” Political Theory 29.5 (2001), 692 
195 Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten, “Language Rights and Political Theory,” Annual Review of Applied 
Linguistics, 23.3 2001.  
196 Patten, 705-6  
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Appraisals of the ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’ nature of language policies mostly focus 
on the rights of the national (linguistic) minority within the state, or alternately the 
concern that language policies they enact do not negatively affect ‘majority’ members 
within the minority territory (e.g. Anglophones in Quebec). However, it is also interesting 
to consider the impact of language policies (where present) on immigrants. Language 
may be used as a condition for admission (here considered under ‘admission policy’), but 
it may also be treated as a term of entrance and a significant form of integration. Of 
particular interest are the ways that language may be used as a proxy for culture in nested 
nations, and what policies this substitution produces at the level of integration and 
language normalization.  
More broadly, integration policy applies to the way that the national minority 
government approaches the question of integration – and where it has control of doing so. 
Though there are many bureaucratic aspects of integration that the national minority 
might control (e.g. residence permits, work authorization, initial reception etc.), I am 
more interested in the philosophy of integration advanced by the nation. What areas of 
assimilation seem to matter most, and how radical or moderate are the assimilation 
policies they enact? Though I pay particular attention to language policy, I also consider 
the other ways that the national minority integrates immigrants, and especially its 
philosophy for doing so.  
C. Nationality Policy (National Identity) 
Third, I focus what Ángel Castiñeira terms nationality policy, which deals with 
how membership is defined in the nested nation. As he explains, nationality policy deals 
with the questions, “Who belongs to the demos? Who can definitely become a 
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citizen?”197 Though I am interested in the question of official processes of membership 
(national minorities do not often exercise an officially recognized citizenship policy), I 
pay particular attention to how the national identity is defined at various levels of society. 
Nationality policy also indicates something about the integration policy of the national 
minority, to the extent that definition of the nation determines who can be a member or 
not.  
The key issue of nationality policy, as it relates to my research question, is 
whether the nation defines itself, or is capable of redefining itself in a way that both 
maintains the critical elements of distinction and is open to new members. Is it possible 
to define nationalism in a way that is both cultural and “civic,” or are these contradictory? 
Though these elements seems incongruous, no modern immigrant society can “survive” 
without fostering membership among new arrivals. While Castiñeira, who is Catalan, 
focuses primarily on the nationality policy from the perspective of the national minority 
(asking, “Who should form a part of our demos,”), I see membership as a matter of both 
perception and status. A second test of the successful integration of immigration is 
whether immigrants believe they are, or are capable of becoming, members of the nation. 
Recall that, by my definition of compatibility, it is important to consider any arrangement 
or policy as it affects both immigrants and the national minority, to see how each affects 
the other. Therefore, I am interested in exploring how the national government and elite 
define membership, and how it is perceived and experienced by both ‘members’ and 
immigrants.  
D. Multicultural Accommodation:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Ángel Castiñeira, “Immigration in Multinational States: The Case of Catalonia,” in Ricard Zapata-
Barrero ed. Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009), 164 
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Lastly, I consider the possibility of multicultural accommodation. 
Multiculturalism, as I discuss in Chapter 2, challenges traditional models of integration, 
although scholars continue to debate whether this challenge weakens assimilationist 
policies or builds on them.198 For this reason, it is important to consider both integration 
and multiculturalism. In isolation, the presence or absence of multiculturalism (as 
ideology, policy, and practice) does not give us sufficient evidence to determine the 
openness of the nested nation. However, when coupled with the measures of integration 
above (particularly language policy and nationality policy), the presence or absence of 
multiculturalism provides a missing dimension to the interface of immigration, national 
minorities, and cultural politics. The tantalizing question I ask is whether nested nations 
can themselves recognize internal diversity and pluralism. I term this variable 
Multicultural Accommodation, and assess both policy elements as well as the public 
discourse. Though the term “accommodation” may have a narrow connotation, I use it to 
refer to all policies or ideologies that respond to and recognize difference and internal 
pluralism. The extent of multicultural accommodation, both at the level of discourse and 
in practice, is the ultimate test for determining the openness of national minority. If the 
national minority cannot or will not accommodate the demands of internal pluralism, then 
it follows that the cultural accommodation of one group (in the form of national minority 
self-government) precludes the possibility of similar accommodation for another. This 
may be the case even where the national project is ‘open’ in its admission, integration, 
and nationality policy.  
 E. The Role of Competency  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 See Chapter 2, Section IIB in this work.  
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A thorough examination of the potential conflict or compatibility between 
national minorities and immigrants must take into account four variables: admission 
policy, integration policy, nationality policy, and multicultural accommodation. Each of 
these outcomes highlights an important dimension of the question of whether national 
minorities are capable of fairly managing new internal diversity introduced by 
immigration. Distinguishing the various dependent variables of each case, as I do, allows 
for a nuanced approach that considers the possibility of a wide range of outcomes present 
in a single case, which may sometimes conflict with one another, but as a whole provide 
a clear and multifaceted depiction of the cases.  
Still, not all of these variables are of the same type; I consider admission policy 
and integration policy distinct in that the institutional framework of the state significantly 
affects the degree of control that the national minority exercises over these policies.  I 
therefore group admission and integration policy as “competency-conditional” variables, 
as opposed to nationality policy and multicultural accommodation, which I term 
“competency-neutral.” This differentiation is significant because control may be as 
important if not more so than the specifics of the policies themselves. Competency is 
determined by the constitutional right to manage a given area of governance, as well as 
the structural and institutional mechanisms that make exercising this power possible. 
Whereas admission and integration policy in nation-states are questions of policy alone, 
in nested nations we must also consider the institutional framework of the state, and what 
competencies the nested nation enjoys within that framework. Though they are related, 
competency should be treated as analytically distinct from policy, which refers to how the 
nested nation actually exercises control through its activities, values, and actions.   
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Moreover, it should be emphasized that competency in federal states is not an 
either / or proposition but rather a matter of degree. Federal states are defined by the 
existence of mixed, and even overlapping, jurisdictions: the presence of “two spheres of 
government that combine the principles of self-rule plus shared rule, in other words, the 
principles of self-government and shared government.” 199  A given capacity of 
governance might be held exclusively by the state, exclusively by the minority, or be 
subject to joint sovereignty. This complexity is important to keep in mind, particularly as 
it relates to admission policy and integration policy, two dependent variables for which 
competency and policy play equally vital roles.  
Therefore, in multinational states, the institutional and legal framework of the 
state structure matters a great deal in determining the basic structural competencies of the 
nested nation. Though I do not treat the general institutional framework as a separate 
dependent variable, I am interested in the role that competencies play in moderating the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables. Though any policies at the 
national minority level are to a certain extent contingent on the national minority’s 
competency in these areas, control over immigration and integration are typically the 
domain of sovereign states. Therefore, there is considerably more variance in how much 
control the national minority can exercise over these two policies relative to nationality 
policy and multicultural accommodation.  
I turn now to independent variables in each case that I believe will be likely to be 
associated with of the dependent variables I lay out here. My intention is to consider 
which variables will be most likely to be associated or impact the four dependent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Ferran Requejo, Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism: The Spanish Case, (London: Routledge 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 55 
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variables that I develop above: Admission Policy, Integration Policy, Nationality Policy, 
and Multicultural Accommodation.  
V. Independent Variables 
 
Above, I develop four dependent variables to assess the compatibility of national 
minority self-governance with immigrant integration and accommodation. I now seek to 
develop a conditional understanding for these outcomes by drawing out what I consider 
to be the most relevant aspects of each case. It is important to consider conditions 
(independent variables) in addition to outcomes (dependent variables), for a number of 
reasons. Principally, we must understand the conditions of each case so as not to consider 
in isolation an immigrant-host interaction that is unquestionably contextual. The state 
structure matters, as does the national minority’s history, status, and power within it. 
Similarly, ‘immigration’ differs drastically from case to case, and within the same case 
over time. We must take into account the rate of flow, the origin of the migrants, and the 
demographic, economic, linguistic etc. qualities of the receiving society as well. 
Considering these variables allows us to better understand (or, at least hypothesize), 
about the relationship between the real world and these four outcomes.  
I am interested not only in measuring these outcomes, but also in linking them to 
conditions present in the case. To do this, I follow Charles Ragin’s configurational 
approach to casework. 200  This method differs from conventional variable-oriented 
methods in that it treats variables as contextual: the significance of a single variable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Charles Ragin, “Studying Cases as Configurations,” Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), 64-88  
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changes depending on other aspects of the case.201 Furthermore, this approach treats each 
case as a configuration of multiple interrelated variables.202 Rather than consider the 
impact of a single condition (e.g. high rates of immigration) the configurational approach 
might explore whether a configuration of high rates of immigration, low birth rates, and a 
relatively robust economy will interact to associate with certain outcomes (DVs). This 
approach, as Ragin argues, allows the researcher to see how various parts of the case 
interconnect with one another, and allows the possibility of drawing conclusions from a 
single case by using case-specific knowledge more effectively, in perspective. This 
allows the researcher to classify cases as “types” created from a specific combination of 
variables. When developing hypotheses for the relationship of conditions to cases, as I do 
in Chapter 4, therefore, I consider many of these variables simultaneously.  
The challenge of Ragin’s configurational approach is that it requires the 
researcher to identify and determine the relevant variables in order to create these 
configurations. Moreover, as Gerring demonstrates, we must not only define the key 
concepts clearly, but also determine a reliable measure that reflects real-world 
occurrences. 203  This chapter attempts to clearly define and, wherever possible, 
operationalize key variables in each case.  
 One limitation of this inquiry is that I examine only two examples of nested 
nations, each of which displays considerable variability across time. Furthermore, there 
are a number of important conditions built into the selection of cases, whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 By contrast, traditional statistical models treat each variable as an independent element with self-
contained meaning.  
202 As Ragin writes, “The principle that ‘context matters’ is central to the configurational approach to 
cases…To view each case as a configuration, it is necessary to examine relevant aspects of a case all at 
once, as an interpretable combination of elements,” 66  
203 John Gerring, “Concepts: General Criteria,” Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework,  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 35-65.  
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intentionally or not. There is no suitable way to measure the impact of these variables, as 
they are built into the natural selection of cases, including those not examined here. 
Moreover, though selecting “most likely” cases maximizes the possibility of 
compatibility, it may also weaken the empirical validity of hypothesis testing, because 
outcomes are seemingly restricted.  
 I take these limitations very seriously, but believe that the two-case comparative 
approach selected here represents a trade-off rather than an outright failure. I have 
already explained why choosing ‘most-likely’ cases will yield more significant findings: 
if it is unclear whether A and B can ever co-exist, it is important to look for cases where 
the two are most likely. In these instances, either a positive finding (A and B are both 
present) or a negative one (B cannot occur where A does) is more significant than either 
of these findings would be in other scenarios. Furthermore, one advantage of the small-N 
case-study approach is that it allows specificity and attention to detail in a way that large-
N studies do not. While I attempt to distinguish and clearly define both dependent and 
independent variables, focusing narrowly on one or two cases allows for a nuance 
examination of these. Moreover, it allows for the possibility of detecting and categorizing 
changes within each case. For this reason, I am not content to focus only on how each 
case exists now, but how the conditions and outcomes have evolved over time.  
 The remainder of this chapter enumerates a list of variables that I believe will be 
relevant to outcomes in question. Wherever necessary, these definitions attempt to clearly 
define the concept that they are trying to convey, as well as specific measures we would 
see in the real world.  
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Table 3.1: Overview of Relevant Independent Variables 
A. Demographic Variables 
1. Population Size 
2. Population Growth 
3. Source of Change 
B. Migration Variables 
1. Rate 
2. Percentage of Total Population 
3. Mix and Type: 
4. Historic Sending or Receiving State? 
C. Linguistic Variables  
1. Level of fluency 
2. Recruitment Potential 
D. Historic and Political Structure 
1. Type of Federation / Structure of Government 
2. Historic Status 
3. Level of Distinctiveness 
4. Contestation 
5. Economic strength / size 
 
A. Demographic Variables: Size, Growth, and Source of Change 
 
Demography is an important variable for understanding the position of the 
national minority within the state, and within its own territory. The population size and 
growth of the nation can be seen as a measure of strength, stability, influence, and even 
power. As Sigler explains, “Historical demography is a powerful explanatory tool for 
interpreting minority situations.”204 He argues that changes in population size are a key 
determinant in shifting power relations between the minority and the state. As Danielle 
Conversi notes, “the more numerous the population, the more strength the nation 
has…”205  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Jay Sigler, Minority Rights: A Comparative Analysis, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 17 
205 Conversi, 191 
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In addition to absolute and relative size, growth and change in population also 
seems significant. Consider Conversi’s prediction that “a declining nation is a bad omen 
for every sincere nationalist.” 206  This relates to the forward-looking element of 
demography. Not only do population growth rates foreshadow the long-term viability of 
the nation (what Quebeckers call “la survivance”), but they also indicate the future 
demographic relationship between the minority and the state. The minority may fear that 
a shrinking or negative growth rate will forebode diminished political power, or see 
growth as an opportunity to re-open negotiations with the state. From the state 
perspective, as with absolute / relative population size, growth rates may inspire efforts to 
integrate the national minority or provoke the fear that the minority’s power is growing 
out of proportion. These hopes and fears will inevitably effect the minority’s status within 
the state, as well as their self-conception. I consider growth rates of the minority both in 
absolute terms, and relative to the state. I also look for the primary source of any change. 
This last question considers birth and death rates, and immigration and emigration. It is 
important to understand what factors most account for any change we see in the 
population size of the national minority.    
B. Migration Variables 
 
At the level of the nested nation, trends in migration matter significantly. While 
this is partially accounted for by population growth, rates of migration are a significant 
variable in their own right. There are three major aspects of immigration: migration rate, 
total proportion of the population, and type. 
1. Rate of Migration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization 
(Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997), 191 
	   Lipton	  96	  
One of the most common ways of measuring migration is to consider the rate of 
migration. This provides a number that indicates the net flow of migrants (either inwards 
or outwards) per 1,000 people. To the extent that immigration is a threat (even if it is a 
manageable one) to the culture of the nested nation, greater quantities may magnify the 
challenge. However, at the same time, the nested nation may have economic or social 
reasons for desiring immigrants. For example, immigrants may fill vital roles in the 
economy and add (to the extent that they become members of the nation) add to the 
demographic strength of the nested nation relative to the state. This leaves open the 
possibility of contradictory needs for the nation to juggle – regardless, it is clear that the 
actual flows of people relative to the size of the nested nation will certainly be important.    
2. Immigrants as a Percentage of the Population 
Similarly, we can measure the total percentage of the population that was born 
outside of the territory of the nation.207 This gives us a more longitudinal sense of the 
population make-up, and also helps contextualize changing responses to migration over 
time by highlighting the indistinct line between immigrant and ‘member’. Schiffauer 
even argues that perhaps this process of transition (from immigrant to member), which 
blurs ‘us / them’ divisions, may be more disquieting for the “host” society than the mere 
presence of immigrants.208 This is a useful reminder of what common knowledge and 
current events readily demonstrate: perception matters in immigration politics as much as 
(if not more than) reality does. Therefore, though both rates of migration and the number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Unavoidably, measuring population size or proportions involves making judgments about who is 
included and who is not. Ironically, this is precisely the question that I consider, but it is impossible to 
avoid drawing the line somewhere if we wish to be able to use and understand the data. 
208 Werner Shiffauer, “Enemies within the Gates: The Debate about the Citizenship of Muslims in 
Germany,” in T. Modood, R. Zapata-Barrero and A. Triandafyllidou eds. Muslims Multiculturalism and 
Citizenship (London: Routledge, 2006), 94-116.  
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of immigrants as a percentage of total population provide quantifiable measures of the 
presence of immigrants in the nested nation, we should also consider how members of the 
nation view immigrants.  
 3. Internal or External Migration  
Thirdly, it is important to consider the origin of these migrants and the traits they 
bring with them. While all we would expect all immigrant receiving societies to care 
about the language, culture, race, religion, and economic status of immigrants, the most 
pressing condition in the case of nested nations seems to be whether the immigrants enter 
from a foreign country, or are internal migrants who relocate within the same state. For 
nested nations, given the triadic relationship with the state, the major question is whether 
immigration comes from internal migration (other regions of the same country) or from 
foreign countries. While we might pursue a far more complex classification system, the 
major concern for the nested nation is its status and security within the state.209 For this 
reason, internal migrants represent a distinct challenge from external migrants. Those 
who migrate from within the state not only decrease the territorial concentration of self-
defined members of the nested nation, but also may prefer to speak, work, and live in 
accordance with the dominant language and culture. However, foreign migrants are more 
likely to demonstrate a higher degree of distinctiveness from the national minority in 
terms of race, religion, and culture. It is not clear which type, then, poses a bigger 
challenge to the national minority. While I include data related to countries of origin, 
mother tongue, religion, economic status, skill (and others) in my findings, I focus on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Dominique Arel, “Stability in Multinational Democracies” in Alain Gagnon and James Tuly eds. 
Multinational Democracies,  (Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 77 
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internal-external migration as the major variable of migrant ‘type’ because this seems to 
be the most relevant, easily identifiable, broad distinction.  
4. Historic Migration  
We should also consider, as context, the history of immigration in the state and 
nested nation. Whether the state historically sent or received migrants affects the 
importance of immigration in the collective conscience. Where the state has always 
received high rates of immigrants, this fact may profoundly shape the way that 
individuals and the government view current migratory trends and management thereof. 
In countries of net emigration, or very low levels of immigration, the policy questions of 
immigrant management may not retain the same degree of salience. For example, though 
Spain retained control of immigration in the 1978 Constitution, the issue of whether the 
state or autonomous communities would regulate immigration was hardly debated. Ángel 
Castiñeira claims that Spain’s history as an emigrant country led to a lack of debate over 
immigration-related powers with respect to the Autonomous Communities. This power 
was centralized, he shows, almost by default. 210 Historic levels of migration may also 
influence the way that the national minority government perceives new migrants, either 
as a continuation of historical patterns, or a distinct break and novel challenge.  
C.   Linguistic Variables 
As I show above, language is generally an important demand for national 
minorities, though the way that they exercise control over language policies changes over 
time. In order to clearly distinguish between conditions (independent variables) and 
language policy, which I treat as part of the dependent variable integration policy, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Ángel Castiñeira, “Immigration in Multinational States: The Case of Catalonia,” in Ricard Zapata-
Barrero ed. Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009), 164 
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attempt to distinguish between variables of the national minority’s linguistic situation and 
policy, which I treat as a dependent variable [see footnote].211  
1. Fluency 
Rates of fluency are likely to determine the perceived need for language policies, 
as well as the place of language in the national project. While language policies intend to 
increase rates of fluency, it is also likely that how widely spoken and understood the 
language is within the territory impacts the perceived need for and application of 
language policy, and perhaps also how centrally language figures into nationality policy. 
Interestingly, we must consider, for both of these outcomes, whether relatively high or 
low levels of language ability – measured through comprehension, spoken, and written 
ability – are most associated with an emphasis on language politics. Any assessment here 
must also take into account what languages are actually spoken: while the minority 
speaks a distinct language in both of these cases, it is important to determine as well 
whether members of the national minority are also bilingual in the dominant language of 
the state (if one exists).212 Along the same lines, we should also consider the state 
language policy. Is it officially monolingual or bilingual? Where it recognizes minority 
languages, does this recognition extend across all state institutions, or is it territorially 
restricted? Though these latter questions may overlap with what I term competency over 
language policy (included as a subset of integration policy), it is important to consider the 
state treatment of language as an important factor.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Later, I discuss the possibility for ‘feedback’ whereby so-called dependent variables may influence 
‘independent’ variables over time. This is true for language policy, where the presence and strength of 
normalization or a language maintenance model will influence the levels of fluency once implemented. 
Similarly, admission policies, if implemented, will determine the rates of entrance as well as the ‘type’ of 
migration.  
212 “Minorities at Risk Project” (2009)  
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2. Potential for Recruitment 
One condition that seems to precede and influence control over immigration and 
integration policy is whether or not the language of the national minority is widely 
spoken outside of the national minority territory. Put another way: are there potential 
immigrants who are linguistically compatible with the nested nation? Though this might 
seem to be a narrow consideration, it stems from a much broader question of the 
recruitment potential of the minority. Population flows and linguistic assimilation are 
critical to the strength and security of the nested nation, particularly when language is 
taken as a key marker of the national culture.213  
As discuss in the context of admission policy above, who enters the territory and 
by what criteria are important criteria for determining the openness and content of the 
nationalism. As Christian Joppke shows, nation-states are interested in managing 
immigrant flows in their own self-interest. It is likely that migrants who are linguistically 
compatible with a minority-language nested nation will be appealing candidates for 
migration, as would diaspora ‘members’ of the nation, if any such exist. This latter 
category, termed “coethnics,” is perceived as lastingly stranded or separated members of 
the nation; they have been the subjects of controversial positive recruitment policies (like 
the Israeli “Law or Return”), as it is hotly debated whether ethnicity, race, or religion are 
justifiable determinants of admission policy. 214  
 Of course, the calculations of the minority in terms of its aspirations for migration 
are multifaceted, and may take into account the country of origin, race, culture, economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Glanville Prince, “The Present Position and Viability of Minority Languages,” in Alcock, Taylor, and 
Welton eds. The Future of Cultural Minorities (London: The MacMillan Press LTD, 1979), 30-44 
214 Christian Joppke, “Resilience versus Demise in the Diaspora Constellation: Israel and Germany,” in 
Selecting By Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).  
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skill, family relations, or any number of features. These are by no means trivial 
considerations, but they do not seriously distinguish the migrant pool of one country (or 
nested nation) from that of another to the same extent that language or coethnic roots 
would. I focus on ethnically or linguistically compatible potential migrants specifically in 
order to ascertain how their presence or absence might affect the immigration policy or 
integration policy of the minority. What I term ‘potential for recruitment’ does not 
include the dependent variable – admission policy – but whether there are linguistically 
or ethnically compatible potential immigrants outside of the state.  
 
D.   Historic Context and Political Structure 
 
Thus far, the independent variables above touch on the demographic, linguistic, 
and migratory factors of the nested nation – all critical variables in determining the 
position of the nested nation within the state and in gauging what particular features of 
the nested nation and flows of immigration are likely to be associated with influencing 
the openness of this interaction. This final grouping brings together a number of distinct 
variables that generally reflect the historic context and political structure of the state, or 
do not fit neatly into the categories I detail above. They help to add context to how the 
national minority fits into the state and what historic features of the state-minority 
relationship are most likely to be important.    
1. Type of Federation / Structure of Government: 
 
Structure of Government refers particularly to the form of federalism present in 
the state. While we might assume that all of the cases should necessarily be of the same 
type (democracies with self-governing nested nations), there are number of systems of 
classification in the literature that help us conceptualize the similarities and differences 
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between these cases. Lijphart differentiates between ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruent’ 
federations: in incongruent, federations political borders coincide with ethnic or cultural 
borders. 215  But as Baubock writes, “all multinational federations are by definition 
incongruent.” 216 He suggests that the formation of the multinational federation, whether 
the confederation of previous independent states, or the decentralization of a single state, 
should be more important.   
Ferran Requejo builds on this distinction in Multinational Federalism and Value 
Pluralism. Requejo introduces four basic types of federal states: regional states, 
symmetrical federations, asymmetrical federal agreements, and confederations. Regional 
states, like the UK, are defined by a federalism that develops out of the legislative and 
executive (not judicial) decentralization of a single state. Symmetrical federalism, as in 
the case of the United States, is defined by the fact that all federated units related more or 
less equally to the central government. In asymmetrical federalism, however, each 
federated unit negotiates its own areas of competency with respect to the state, and there 
is a fair degree of heterogeneity between the various agreements. The fourth type, 
confederations develop through “an international accord between previously independent 
states that decide to join together” for economic or military integration. The 
confederation, dependent on its constituent parts, has only limited effect on the citizens of 
each country. By this approach, there are four types of federalism (though centralization 
should also be considered as a fifth, non-federal, structure of government).217 This 
approach re-states much of the same ground covered by Lijphart and Baubock, but adds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Arend Lijphart, cited in Rainer Baubock, “Why Stay Together? A Pluralist Approach to Secession and 
Federation,” in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman eds. Citizenship in Diverse Societies:  
216 Rainer Baubock, “Why Stay Together,” 368 
217 Requejo, 55-60 
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that the presence and status of other nations within the state is likely to impact the 
relationship between any one national minority in the state.  
2. Historic Status 
In addition to classifying the federal structure as a whole, it is also important to 
consider how ‘bound up’ the particular nation is within the state; a variable I call historic 
status. By historic status I refer to the status of the minority as a distinct but built-in unit 
in the process of state creation and constitution drafting, and its continuous role in state 
history. I operationalize ‘Historic Status’ in the following three questions, which I 
address below.  
a. Was the nation a founding member of the state?  
b. Did the Minority Play a Role in the Negotiation and Drafting of the 
Constitution? 
c. Has the Minority’s Self-Government been Continuous since it Gained 
Autonomy?  
 
Founding membership is defined as the presence of the national minority as a pre-
existing entity both incorporated and distinguished in the original formation of the state. 
This variable firmly situates the nationalism of the minority in relation to the process of 
state-creation. It also re-articulates the issue of how the multinational federation came to 
be: whether through confederation or decentralization. Where the state was created 
through federation, I predict that national minorities will have more significant historic 
status, but may also be more likely to see themselves as deserving of a high degree of 
self-government or even secession. 
 The role of the minority in the drafting of the Constitution similarly underscores 
the historic situatedness of the nested nation, and adds a closely related dimension to 
founding membership. These variables are significant for a number of reasons. First, their 
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presence or absence allows us to pinpoint not only the roots of minority nationalism 
(when the nation became a nation), but also to situate the minority nationalist project 
firmly within state development and see how closely the two are related.  
The presence or absence of a founding role likely affects the self-definition of 
the nation, particularly in how it views with relation to the state structure. For Quebec, 
for example, the Confederation of 1867 established “power-sharing formula” that laid a 
framework for subsequent events and negotiations of its status within Canada. Similarly, 
Catalonia’s pre-existing Statue of Autonomy (along with those of Basque Country and 
Galicia) became the foundation for the creation of the Autonomous Communities in 
1978.  
As, Gagnon and Iacovino explain, when national minorities co-found the state and 
are party to the creation of the Constitution, their role and status as a community is 
fundamentally altered. Whereas other social groups exercise political power through state 
institutions, founding nations do not merely seek distribution, but create and dictate the 
parameters of the state itself. When a national minority cooperates to determine the 
content of the constitution and the structure of the state itself, it acts as “a historically 
self-determining entity, already constituted, and the constitution would be the result of an 
evolving set of agreements that are acceptable to all parties.”218  
Continuity, as James Tully shows, is one of the key foundations of nation-to-
nation relations in multinational states. I am interested in whether the national minority 
has exercised continuous self -government within the state from the time of the national 
minority’s first self-rule. While the elected party or competencies of the government may 
change, I am measuring the uninterrupted existence of a governing body from the time of 
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creation until the present.  As a single variable, Historic Status can help to contextualize 
the permanence of the nested nation with respect to the larger state.  
The exact impact of historic status (to the extent that the questions I ask measure 
this concept) is difficult to know. In most nested nations we see secessionist movements 
(although with varying degrees of public support). It is not clear whether historic status 
makes secessionism more likely or less likely – do the questions I ask reflect the 
likelihood of the national minority to see itself as a nation, to see itself as part of the state, 
or both?  
3. Cultural or National Repression  
The concept of cultural repression reveals the negative side of historic status. I am 
interested in measuring, particularly in a historical perspective, if and to what extent the 
national minority culture has undergone repression. While I call this ‘cultural’ repression, 
I consider broadly if there have been either political or military limitations on the 
expression and practice of the minority culture / religion / practice / language. Examining 
historical and present repression capture the tensions of the relationship between the 
minority and majority in a way that simply examining political competencies or 
structures cannot. As Scott suggests, cultural repression may consolidate ethnic 
identity.219  This may affect language as well, where the importance of language will 
strengthen as a result of repression.  
4. Level of Distinctiveness:  
I believe it also important to consider how distinct the national minority is from 
the larger state. As the literature review in Chapter 1 shows, this exercise requires 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Gagnon and Iacovino, Federalism, 27. See also James Tully, Strange Multiplicity.  
219  
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imposing fixed categories (e.g. race, custom) over what we know to be blurry lines. With 
any such measures, of course, subjective (perceived) difference is likely as meaningful as 
“actual” difference, even if we assume that such difference could conceivably be 
measured. However, it is far more elusive to try to label perception. For this reason, I 
follow the measures used by the Minorities at Risk project, which classifies the 
distinctiveness of the minority culture based on four variables: Language, Belief, Race, 
and Custom.220 I rely on the Minorities at Risk data-set, from which I borrow four 
“markers of difference’. This dataset “monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of 
politically-active communal groups in all countries with a population of at least 
500,000.” 221  This project usefully standardizes all markers in order to allow for 
comparison, which I use to consider how distinctive the national minority is.    
5. Economic Strength:  
Like population size, the economic strength of the nested nation provides a 
concrete measure of the economic strength of the minority in the nation state. 
Historically, when the nested nation is an industrial power, this heightens the political 
tension on both sides. Most importantly, the greater the economic strength of the 
minority, the greater their political clout becomes. This likely increases the pull for 
secession (as the minority views itself as more self-sufficient, and perhaps even burdened 
by federal taxes), while simultaneously increasing the central power’s interest in 
maintaining the minority as a member of the state. Moreover, economic strength will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Minorities at Risk Project. (2009) "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ on 
February 22, 12. PDF: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf. For details on the 
coding of these variables, see pg. 6. I would like to thank Professor Senem Aslan for referring me to this 
dataset.  
221 Minorities at Risk, “The MAR Project,” http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ 
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likely determine how attractive settling in the nested nation’s territory will be both to new 
immigrants and internal migrants. The economic strength of the national minority, as well 
as the presence of unique industries or advanced development are critical for 
understanding the position of the national minority within the state. As Shafir speculates, 
economically advanced minorities are more likely to be open to immigration, which is 
inevitably a force of modernization.  
VI. Conclusion:  
Table 3.1 [Duplicate]: Overview of Relevant Independent Variables 
A. Demographic Variables 
1. Population Size 
2. Population Growth 
3. Source of Change 
B. Migration  
1. Rate 
2. Percentage of Total Population 
3. Mix (Internal vs. External) 
4. Historic Sending or Receiving State? 
C. Linguistic Variables  
1. Level of fluency 
2. Recruitment Potential 
D. Historic and Political Structure 
1. Type of Federation / Structure of Government 
2. Historic Status 
3. Level of Distinctiveness 
4. Contestation 
5. Economic strength / size 
 
This chapter introduces a list of independent variables – aspects of the case most 
likely to be associated with the outcomes I measure. Together, these variables highlight 
various aspects of the state, the nested nation, and the migrants themselves that should be 
most closely associated with the outcomes I measure. In the following chapter, I bring the 
	   Lipton	  108	  
independent and dependent variables together to formulate hypotheses about the 
interaction between national minorities and immigrants.  
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Chapter 4: Hypotheses and Hypothesis Testing 
I. Introduction to Hypothesis Formation  
Having fully mapped both the pertinent dependent and independent variables, it is 
possible to begin developing hypotheses that link the two. I test the theory that nested 
national minority autonomy will be maximally capable of openness, integration, and 
accommodation through a unique model of “intercultural nationalism.” By this model, 
national minority control over competency-conditional policies is necessary for 
establishing the openness of the national minority to new diversity. These same policies, 
however, also clearly define some limits to accommodation.  
I begin by exploring the classic models of nationalism, defensive / ethnic and 
open / civic, and examining how the four dependent variable outcomes might differ in 
each case. However, these models do not seem capable of capturing an approach to 
immigrant integration which balances the distinct needs of the host society / culture with 
internal diversity222, or the role of what I term “competency-conditional” policies in 
shaping this relationship. Following Couton and Blad, I classify a third model, 
“intercultural nationalism,” which I believe will represent “most likely” cases of 
compatibility in nested nations. I then hypothesize about the conditions under which we 
would expect to see intercultural nationalism arise, and what this model might entail for 
the outcomes I consider. 
A. Defensive and Open Models of Immigrant-Host Interaction 
Before developing specific hypotheses about the cases themselves, it is helpful to 
imagine what types of scenarios, or models, of immigrant-host interaction are possible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 We would expect to see this type of balancing in “most likely” cases.  
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Here, we could imagine both a maximally open and a maximally closed national model 
of immigrant management. As Gershon Shafir speculates, a defensive nationalism 
“favors excluding immigrants or viewing them as a separate ethnic minority.” 223 This 
model is contrasted with modernizing nationalisms, which he says, “tends towards 
assimilation of immigrants or is ready to tolerate multiple cultures.”224 For Shafir, 
therefore, assimilation and multiculturalism necessarily move together, and stand in 
opposition with exclusion and preservation. Below, I plot each of these models, using 
Shafir’s general distinction between defensive and modernizing (here labeled ‘open’) 
models, and my own dependent variables.  
Table 4.1: Two Basic National Models of Immigrant Management  
 Defensive Model 
(“Ethnic”) 
Open225 Model (“Civic”) 
1.Admission Policy Exclusionary Liberal 
2. Integration Policy Radical, Coercive or 
Separatist 
Moderate, Noncoercive226  
3. Nationality Policy Closed to non-members 
(“ethnic”) 
Open to new members (“civic”) 
4. Multicultural 
Accommodation 
Impossible Likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Shafir distinguishes between “corporate” and “hegemonic” nationalisms, although I do not include this 
terminology. I prefer to employ more intuitive language of ‘defensive’ and ‘open’ nationalisms. Gershon 
Shafir, Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, Latvia, and Estonia (Albany: State University of New York, 1995), 5.  
224 Shafir, 5 We should consider, of course, that all nations have elements that are both “ethnic” and 
“civic.” I plot these as ideal cases.   
225 Shafir focuses on the economic development of national minorities as it relates to immigration. He sees 
‘modernizing’ nations as embracing the economic benefits of modernity, embodied in immigration.  
Cultural adaptation and assimilation are consequences of this economic perspective. As he says, 
“immigrants usually arrive as a direct result of the regions’ industrialization, and therefore, become 
emblematic of modernity.”  While I agree with this thesis, I choose to call the latter model ‘open’ to focus 
on national / cultural aspects of immigration, rather than economic modernization, although I recognize that 
the two are linked.  
226 Adapted from Andrew Mason, “Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of 
Assimilation,” Ethnics 109.2 (January 1999). See Chapter 2, Section 2B above.  
	   Lipton	  111	  
Note: General models adapted from Shafir (1995), measured and elaborated upon with 
own variables  
 
Table 4.1 presents two models of immigrant management in nested nations. The 
first model is defensive, and expresses “permanent opposition” to immigration, consistent 
with the view that immigration is always and inherently a threat.227 This model would be 
marked by exclusionary policies that seek to preclude or limit the entrance or status of 
non-members. With respect to language policy and integration in general, Shafir argues 
that the concept of ‘integrating’ new members contradicts the exclusionary, closed-off 
nature of ethnic nationalism. That is, any policies that aim to incorporate difference are 
inherently inconsistent with a defensive model. For the most part, this assessment seems 
accurate, at least in an archetype of ethnic nationalism. However, I speculate that when 
faced with diversity, the defensive national model of immigrant management may 
sometimes adopt aggressive assimilation policy, in addition to, or in lieu of, exclusion. 
Where necessary, they may use what Mason refers to as ‘radical’ and ‘coercive’ 
assimilation measures, which could prohibit or outlaw minority culture, religion, and / or 
language.228 Therefore, though we would generally not expect an ethnic nation to take 
steps or commit funding to facilitate integration, it is possible to classify either a policy of 
separatism or radical assimilation as consistent with this model. This radical assimilation 
model necessarily denies the possibility of multicultural accommodation. Similarly, we 
would expect that the nationality policy would be closed, based in conditions of blood or 
birth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Shafir, 19 
228 Mason, 267 
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An ‘open’ national model of immigrant management, in contrast, would be 
marked by an attitude of integration and incorporation to immigrants, who themselves 
become members who define and change the national project. Admission policy in the 
open model would be consistent with the policies enacted in liberal democracies – though 
the criteria and application of admission policy differs widely from state to state, these 
models are typically marked by non-discriminatory entrance criteria, acceptance of 
refugees consistent with international norms, and, of course, a consideration of the 
economic skills of the migrant as they relates to the demographic and economic needs of 
the state. This model does not imply the nation is laissez-faire with respect to culture and 
language (recall that all nation-states engage in nation-building to some degree). 
However, it does reflect a maximal degree of openness to cultural, religious, and 
linguistic diversity, at least to that citizens are not discouraged or prevented from 
participating in their “own” practices. Most of all, we would expect decisions about 
language and culture to be open to continual revision and consistent with the changing 
demographic and linguistic landscape. We would also expect to see accommodation 
where it was needed or demanded by a sizeable minority. In the open model, the nation is 
defined in a way that is accessible and open to revision – it employs clearly civic 
definitions of belonging. Lastly, the open model allows for the possibility of multicultural 
accommodation, though it does not require it.  
 The defensive and open models provide, across dependent variables, a best- and 
worst- case scenario for the compatibility of national minority self-government with 
integration and accommodation for immigrants. However, neither model offers a 
possibility that balances between the cultural demands of the national minority and those 
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of the state, as we would expect in cases that are most likely to be compatible. 
Furthermore, neither model accounts for the fact that admission policy and integration 
policy are both contingent on the institutional framework of the state. So while we could 
test nation-states according to these models of immigration, (nation-states have 
sovereignty over all of these areas), these models are not sufficient, because they assume 
competency and ask how this competency is exercised. Below, I explain how I account 
for these hitches, by treating immigration and integration policy as competency-
conditional variables as part of Cory Blad and Philippe Couton’s third model of 
immigrant management, “intercultural nationalism.”     
Cory Blad and Philippe Couton develop the model of intercultural nationalism, 
which combines “relative openness to globalizing social forces, particularly international 
migration, with a commitment to the maintenance of a coherent national community.”229 
This model combines cultural and civic nationalism in a way that neither the defensive / 
ethnic nor open / civic model can account for. In this model, the society offers 
intercultural accommodation, by which new arrivals are “integrated into an existing 
cultural, economic and political context. They are encouraged to retain their traditional 
beliefs and values; however the pre-existing dominant public milieu is institutionally 
protected.”230  
Moreover, if these scholars are correct, the openness of the nation to integration 
and accommodation is dependent on the national minority’s ability to exercise 
competency over immigration. In the context of the national minority / state relationship I 
describe in Chapter 2, Section III, it is clear that the national minority takes the matter of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Cory Blad and Philippe Couton, “The Rise of an Intercultural Nation; Immigration, Diversity and 
Nationhood in Quebec,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35.4 April 2009, 645-6 
230 Blad and Couton, 652 
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competencies very seriously. I expect that the exercise of these competencies shapes the 
model of immigrant management the national minority follows. I am interested in 
exploring the proposition that the conflicting goals of preservation and openness can only 
be balanced – without the so-called ‘clash of cultures’ – to the extent that a national 
minority feels secure in its place within the state, and able to dictate the terms of 
admission and integration. The more institutional and policy control the nested nation 
has, the more capable it is of incorporating or integrating new members. However, 
national minorities seek these powers in order to manage migratory flows with the goal of 
institutionalizing, and often preserving, a national culture (and often language). This 
suggests that, ironically, the very structures that allow the national minority to be open to 
immigration and integration (by increasing a sense of security and control) also by 
necessity limit the possibility of accommodation.  
In “Minority Nationalism and Immigration,” Will Kymlicka articulates precisely 
paradoxical proposition.231 He refutes the claim that minority nationalism is inherently 
incompatible with modernity (see “Defensive” model above), briefly enumerating the 
liberal and modernizing tendencies in Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, and others.232 He 
contrasts the ‘ethnic’ view of minority nationalism with post-ethnic / civic nationalism, 
arguing that the “clear trend in most Western democracies is towards a more open and 
non-racial definition of minority nationalism.”233 Still, he claims, “it may be that special 
circumstances must be in place for such a post-ethnic multicultural form of minority 
nationalism to arise;” he lists control over admission policy, integration, and language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Will Kymlicka, “Minority Nationalism and Immigration,” Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, 
Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275-289.  
232 Ibid, 280-283 
233 Ibid  
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policy as essential circumstances. Neither the open nor the defensive model accounts for 
the post-ethnic nationalism Kymlicka describes: what Blad and Couton call “intercultural 
nationalism.”  
This third model, intercultural nationalism, combines elements of cultural 
nationalism in a civic framework. The intercultural model differs both in that it accounts 
for a balancing of interests, and speculates that national minority competencies play an 
integral part in this facilitating and defining how the needs of the national minority can be 
balanced with those of immigrants into their territory. In this sense, it provides a “most 
likely” case for compatibility.  
However, it is not clear what we should expect to see in this model. Below, I 
develop two hypotheses: one about the conditions most likely to produce a model of 
intercultural nationalism, and another about how this model relates to the four outcomes I 
develop. First, however, I explain how admission policy and integration policy function 
as both dependent and moderating variables in these hypotheses. 
B.  Competency-Conditional Policies as both Dependent and Moderating Variables 
My hypotheses stem from the distinction I introduce in Chapter 3 between 
competency-conditional and competency-neutral dependent variables. Admission policy 
and integration policy, I claim, are fundamentally different from nationality policy and 
multicultural accommodation in that the institutional framework of the state qualifies the 
former two. For this reason, a national minority may have varying degrees of control of 
these policies relative to the state, quite separate from the question of how the policies 
themselves are or would be exercised.  
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I believe that these competency-conditional policies can be seen both as 
dependent variables, and as moderating variables. As dependent variables, admission 
policy and integration policy can be clearly connected to the conditions of the case; to 
understand this relationship, I simply ask, “under what conditions would we expect to see 
the national minority gain and exercise competency over admission policy and 
integration policy?”  
As moderating variables, however, these competency-conditional policies alter 
the association between conditions in the case, on the one hand, and nationality policy 
and multicultural accommodation on the other. To understand these variables as 
moderating, or intermediate variables, we take as given the presence or absence of 
national minority control over admission and / or integration policy (as it exists 
empirically), and ask how the exercise (or lack thereof) of these competency-conditional 
variables moderates the conditions of the case, the other dependent variables (nationality 
policy and accommodation), and most importantly the relationship between the two.  
Treating admission policy and integration policy only as dependent variables 
would prevent any hypotheses from reflecting the role these policies play in shaping the 
so-called ‘independent’ case conditions, particularly as it concerns levels of fluency, 
migration rates, and population size. After all, the nested nation has a strong interest in 
exercising control over immigration and language precisely in order to shape 
demographic and linguistic circumstances. Qualitative case analysis is particularly useful 
for understanding variables in this way. 
When dealing with only a few variables, the ideal approach would be to map all 
possible combinations and see how they relate to a single outcome. However, I have 
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identified a significant number of independent variables and focus on four distinct 
outcomes. This chapter, therefore, lays out a broad-strokes hypothesis of the relationship 
between case conditions and the four dependent variables I assess, and then addresses this 
hypothesis in two parts.  
These more narrow hypotheses build configurations of only the most relevant 
variables for the outcome in question. This is not to discount other aspects of the case, but 
to identify the most salient features related to given outcomes and speculates about how 
they relate. A single hypothesis will select a number of variables to consider in 
combination. 
To further streamline, it is also possible to build a single larger concept that 
incorporates or any number of distinct variables. For example, in asking what variables 
are most likely to increase demands for competency over admission policy, I hypothesize 
that a the fear of minorization precedes such a demand. High rates of migration, low birth 
rates, high rates of emigration, and / or slow relative growth (to name just a few) could 
produce this fear. Therefore, I group multiple variables into broader categories that can 
highlight many dimensions of a similar, clearly defined concept (in this case, “fear of 
minorization”). The advantage of the configurational approach is that it allows for 
hypothesis testing that incorporates the complexity of real-life scenarios in this way.  
Nevertheless, not all of the independent variables are alike in kind; they mix 
quantifiable measures, historical fact, and broad concepts. This range of measurement 
contributes to the richness of the cases, but also is open to the critique of inconsistency, 
particularly when these variables are mixed and matched in a single hypothesis. Though I 
distinguish in these explanations between concepts and their measures, I see no reason 
	   Lipton	  118	  
why various conditions of a case should not be drawn into a single hypothesis. Reality is 
complex, and this complexity is best accounted for in an approach that works with 
history, policy, data, and concepts together.  
 Once again, the question I ask is: under what conditions, and with what (if any) 
limitations, can self-governing nested nations integrate and accommodate new members? 
This question probes the openness of the national minority to assimilate immigrants, and 
moreover, whether it is capable of becoming internally pluralist by accommodating 
difference. I expect that compatibility is most likely in the model of interculturalism – 
where integration and accommodation occur within a clearly defined and institutionally 
protected public culture. I test the broad hypothesis that national minority control over the 
terms of admission and integration is both a necessary and limiting factor for the 
integration and accommodation of immigrants within the national minority – consistent 
with a third model of immigrant management, intercultural nationalism. 
I begin by developing a hypothesis about the conditions that are most likely be 
associated with the national minority gaining or increasing its competency over 
admission and integration policy. Hypothesis 1 posits a configurational approach likely to 
be associated with national minority competency over immigration and integration 
policies. This hypothesis concretely links conditions of the case to the degree of national 
minority legislative, political, and structural control over immigration and integration.  
Next, I consider the impact of these policies in influencing competency-neutral 
variables. Hypothesis 2 address two related questions: first, how do immigration and 
integration policies affect the conditions (demographic, economic, linguistic etc.) present 
in the case; second: how do these policies moderate the relationship between these case 
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conditions and the outcomes I measure in terms of national identity and multicultural 
accommodation? How do national minorities exercise control over immigration and 
integration, and how does the presence or absence of these policies influence the 
likelihood of the three models of incorporation? Overall, I test the hypothesis that 
competency over immigration and integration policies will maximize the openness of the 
national minority, but within the limits of intercultural nationalism. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I build two hypotheses, which I then address through case studies in Chapter 
5. 
 
II. Hypothesis 1: Conditions Associated with Competency over Admission 
and Integration policies.   
The first hypothesis I develop treats competency over admission policy and 
integration policy as dependent variables. I ask, “under what conditions would we expect 
to see the national minority gain and exercise competency over admission policy and 
integration policy?” Though admission policy and integration policy are distinct from one 
another, and may occur separately, they highlight core aspects of the larger concept of 
immigration management – in keeping with the broad hypothesis that certain 
competencies and policies are necessary for national minorities to become open and 
‘post-ethnic’. The configurations for each are similar enough that it is worth considering 
them together. Finally, viewing them together shows how they interact. In examining the 
variables most likely to lead to control over admission and integration policy, I consider 
separately factors likely to increase demand by the national minority, and factors likely to 
increase the state’s openness to these demands. I address each of these aspects of these 
topics separately.  
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A. Demand for Competency over Immigration Policies 
Hypothesis 1a: Nested Nations are likely to demand competency to control admission 
and integration policy when they experience linguistic and demographic instability, have 
the potential to recruit immigrants compatible with the national project, and where they 
generally seek or expect a high degree of self-governance. 
 
Graph 4.1a: Conditions Likely to Increase Demand for Competency over 
Immigration Policies 
 
 
 We would expect nested nations, as a general rule, to demand control over 
immigration to the extent that they view uncontrolled or state-controlled migration as a 
threat, and believe that gaining competency over migration will allow them to minimize 
the harms, or even benefit from migration. I also consider the possibility that national 
minorities generally seek to increase sovereignty over issues of governance (apart from 
some exceptions, like the military and defense). This hypothesis, therefore, connects 
three key concepts: demographic and linguistic instability, a general demand for 
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increased self-governance, and the potential to recruit immigrants consistent with the 
national project.  
The first condition likely to produce a strong demand for increased competency is 
demographic and linguistic instability.  Low birth rates, low growth, or high rates of 
immigration all provoke fears among the national minority about the survival of the 
nation. This fear has both an absolute and a relative dimension. In absolute terms, low 
birth rates and high levels of immigration contribute to a fear of minorization – of being 
made a ‘minority’ even in the designated territory. Low birth rates intimate the decline of 
the nation, and the fear that over time the nation will cease to exist if there are not enough 
members of future generations to carry on the national identity. High rates of immigration 
may heighten these fears.  
In relative terms, demographic strength and stability are also indicators of the 
status of the nested nation within the state. Declining population size or slowing growth 
forebodes a lack of importance within the state, and the worry that the national minority 
will lose political power or perhaps the power of self-government altogether.  In cases 
where a national language is taken to be a key marker of national identity (true in all 
cases I consider here), linguistic instability also becomes a threat to the minority. The 
nested nation may seek to minimize and counteract linguistic instability by selecting 
linguistically compatible migrants, wherever possible, or by making language acquisition 
a clear term of integration.  
 The nation’s position within the state, both in terms of its historic importance and 
its structure of self-government, will also play a role in determining what competencies it 
demands. This connection seems reasonable – presumably nations with a high degree of 
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historic importance within the state may see themselves as more deserving of increased 
competencies, and may also feel that they are more likely to be accommodated.  
Furthermore, nations who are racially, culturally, or linguistically distinct from the 
majority may be more likely to feel they have a truly “distinctive” society to protect, 
though the source of migration certainly influences this fear.234 I speculate that these 
features, Historic Status and Level of Distinctiveness, connect to a general demand for 
increased sovereignty.235 
 Thirdly, the nation must feel that it will benefit by gaining competency over 
immigration. As a general rule, when a national minority (or any state, for that matter) 
controls admission and selection, it is able to balance and maximally fulfill its own needs 
(demographic, economic etc.). While national minorities will always (perceive 
themselves to) benefit from controlling migration, this benefit is especially clear when 
the national minority has the potential to recruit migrants who are compatible (usually 
linguistically) with the nation. These could either be diaspora members of the nation, 
potential migrants who already speak the language of the region, or those who are 
deemed more likely to acculturate. Interestingly, the very idea of ‘suitable’ potential 
immigrants is determined by how the nation defines itself, but typically, same-language 
migrants seem to have a particular appeal to the national minority. Particularly in the 
presence of same-language potential migrants, control over immigration appears to be a 
solution to fears of minorization, not simply a way of minimizing it. Still, it should be 
added that immigration in general is a complex balancing act: the nested nation must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Of course, fear of minorization is a perceived, rather than explicitly quantified phenomenon. 
Furthermore, though I do not have space to address this hypothesis here, it may also be true that nations 
with a high degree of distinctiveness will in general be more likely to enjoy greater powers of self-
government.  
235 The presence and strength of a secessionist movement also may be important in this regard.  
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consider its demographic, political, and economic needs in addition to the potential 
ethnic, linguistic, and/or cultural needs of the national project. These needs and the 
relative importance of each are fluid and change over time.   
 Finally, the demands of national minorities will be influenced by their perceptions 
of how likely they are to actually achieve their demands. Though ‘demand’ and 
‘responsiveness’ are treated as distinct variables, they clearly interrelate. Perceived 
likelihood of concessions increase the likelihood of demands, just as demands are 
instrumental in shaping the receptiveness of the state.  
 B. State Receptivity to Demand for Competency Immigration Policies 
With this demand-centered hypothesis fleshed out, we must turn to the question of 
what circumstances are most likely to lead to openness to conceding to national minority 
demands.  
Hypothesis 1b: The state is most likely to be receptive to national demands for 
increased competency over immigration policies when the nested nation has significant 
bargaining power (measured in demographic and economic strength, political 
representation at the state level, and strong asymmetrical self-governance), coupled with 
a historic status likely to make the state more responsive to the minority’s demands. 
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Graph 1b: Conditions Likely to Increase State Receptiveness to Nested Nation’s 
Demands for Control Over Immigration Policy 
 
 Hypothesis 1b distinguishes a number of elements that affect how receptive the 
state will be to minority demands. I broadly distinguish between conditions that increase 
the national minority’s bargaining power relative to the state (the ability to make the state 
do something it would not otherwise do), and conditions that make the institutions of the 
state more prone or more likely to concede to the nested nation’s demands. 
 I present this hypothesis broadly following the assumption that as the nested 
nation’s ‘power’ increases, so does its ability to influence the processes of the state. It’s 
also worth considering that the opposite might be true: if the national minority and state 
engage in control for power, the state may feel threatened if the national minority 
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becomes too big or too powerful. Despite these competing hypotheses, I hypothesize that 
national minority with large populations and economies, state-level representation,236 and 
asymmetrical status will be more likely to achieve their demands for competencies. I 
view all of these as indicators of bargaining power.  
 In addition to bargaining power, I consider the historic conditions of the nation 
within the state. Distinctiveness, historic status, and contested development position the 
nation within the state in a way that will render the state and its institutions more 
responsive to minority demands. I hypothesize that states are more likely to be responsive 
to demands for preservation of a ‘distinct’ society when that society is demonstrably 
distinct from the larger state. Second, I consider the historic place of the nation within the 
state. In many cases, the histories of the national minority and the state are intimately 
connected for centuries, sometimes pre-dating the foundation of the state itself. Where 
nations are firmly rooted in the structure and history of the state could be more likely to 
be seen as instrumental, indissoluble members of the union. However, here we encounter 
a competing dilemma: national minorities with significant historical status (for example, 
in multinational states created through confederation) may also be more likely to view 
themselves as sovereign. In the case of strong secessionist movements, it is not clear 
whether we would expect the state to be more or less likely to relinquish competency. 
However, I hypothesize that where nations enjoy significant historical status, this status 
will influence the sympathy of the state to minority demands.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Multinational Federalisms often provide national minorities with the political powers to influence and 
shape federal policies, including guaranteed seats in federal legislative bodies and veto powers. I do not 
consider veto power here, although it is an indicator of political power, because it does not influence the 
devolution of powers so much as prevents legislation that the national minority would find oppressive.  
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 I also suggest that a history of contestation may influence the responsiveness of 
the state to national demands. Once again, there are competing hypotheses for how a 
cultural oppression might relate to the responsiveness of the state. It is not clear whether 
such contestation would this make increased devolution of power more or less likely. We 
might assume that in states with historic or current contestation, the national minority has 
less status or continues to be perceived as a threat to state-wide unity. However, it is also 
possible that states with histories of violence or repression are more likely to compromise 
and agree to minority demands as a result of the historical contestation. I consider both of 
these hypotheses. As all three of these variables suggest, the historic position of the 
national minority within the state clearly influences its ability to achieve its demands for 
competency. While the causal relationship is complex in all cases, I assert that the state is 
more likely to be responsive to the demands of highly distinct national minority with 
significant historic status within the state, although it is not clear how  cultural repression 
affects this relationship.  
 Below, I bring together Hypotheses 1a and 1b to develop a broader hypothesis for 
when the nested nation is most likely to gain structural competency over immigration 
policy. Recall that each structural outcome is not clearly a yes-or-no but a degree of 
control.  
Hypothesis 1a: Nested nations are likely to demand competency to control admission 
and integration policy when they experience linguistic and demographic instability, have 
the potential to recruit immigrants compatible with the national project, and where they 
generally seek or expect a high degree of self-governance. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The state is most likely to be receptive to national demands for increased 
competency over immigration policies when the nested nation has a significant 
bargaining power (measured in demographic and economic strength, political 
representation at the state level, and strong asymmetrical self-governance), coupled with 
a historic status likely to make the state responsive to the minority’s demands. 
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Hypothesis 1 (Combined): The nested nation is likely to gain structural competency 
over immigration policy where it exercises a strong demand for control (likely where it 
experiences linguistic and demographic instability, the potential to recruit ‘compatible’ 
migrants, and a general demand for increased competency) and the state is receptive to 
these demands (based on a combination of bargaining power and responsiveness).  
  
 
Graph 1 (Combined): Conditions Likely to Increase the Likelihood that the Nested 
Nation will have Structural Competency over Immigration Policies 
 
Hypothesis 1 develops a configuration most likely to increase the nested nation’s 
control over immigration policies – admission policy and integration policy. Here, I treat 
these outcomes as dependent variables. Recall however, that structure is distinct from 
policy – the manner in which that competencies are exercised. Similarly, it is important to 
keep in mind that competency is a matter of degree in nested nations – therefore the first 
‘measure’ of this outcome involves determining the relative control of the nested nation 
and state over both admission and integration policy.  
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III. Hypothesis 2: Competency-Conditional Policies and Intercultural 
Nationalism 
Above, I treat admission and integration policy as dependent variables in order to 
understand how they evolve in relation to the conditions of the cases. Now, I turn to the 
question of how the presence or absence of these competencies affects the openness of 
the national minority across all four variables – including the exercise of admission and 
integration policy. I hypothesize that a model of intercultural nationalism can only arise 
when national minorities have competency over admission and integration policy. 
Hypothesis 2a articulates that the exercise of these competency-conditional policies is 
necessary for an inclusive and accommodating model of immigrant management. 
Hypothesis 2b shows the way that the exercise of these policies also limits, perhaps 
illiberally, the extent of integration and accommodation possible within the nested nation.  
Hypothesis 2a: National minorities are most likely to demonstrate openness to 
incorporating and accommodating immigrants under circumstances where they exercise 
meaningful control over admission and / or integration policy. The exercise of these 
policies shapes the demographic, cultural, and linguistic conditions of the case, helping 
to secure the national minority’s viability. Competency over these policies, and the 
exercise thereof, is a necessary precondition for the inclusion (via a civic nationality 
policy) and accommodation of immigrants.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Competency over admission and integration policy helps establish an 
institutional framework that protects and promotes a common national culture. 
Admission policies will favor nationally ‘compatible’ migrants and impose some cultural 
terms of entrance and a significant degree of integration on migrants who wish to enter. 
These policies will give shape to a nationality policy that emphasizes culturally ‘civic’ 
means of belonging and accommodation within a pre-determined culture.   
  
 Hypotheses 2a shows how competency over, and the exercise of admission and 
integration policies allow the national minority to affect the case conditions in a way that 
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ensures the stability and security of the national minority within the state. I hypothesize 
that the exercise of one or both of these policies is a necessary precondition for the 
national minority to move away from a “defensive” national model of immigrant 
management towards a more open one. Without substantial control in at least one of these 
areas, I predict that national minorities will be most likely to be marked by defensive and 
ethnic nationalism. In the absence of competency, high rates of immigration and 
demolinguistic insecurity are likely to lead to ethnic entrenchment.  
Hypothesis 2b links the exercise of admission and integration policies to the 
model of intercultural nationalism. Intercultural nationalism is a public philosophy that 
emphasizes integration and accommodation “into an existing cultural, economic and 
political context.” This context, according to Blad and Couton, is “institutionally 
protected” even as the preservation of other cultures is promoted. I postulate that, across 
all four variables, openness towards immigrants occurs with some fixed limitations. The 
model of intercultural nationalism is most likely to make the demands of the national 
minority compatible with those of immigrants into that territory. This model is most 
likely to demonstrate openness to the integration and accommodation of immigrant 
minorities. However, it is able to do so precisely because the national minority regulates 
immigration, enforces clear terms of integration, and defines a nationality policy that, 
while civic, clearly promotes a form of cultural nationalism. Furthermore, by promoting a 
common public culture, it allows for accommodation, but with clearly demarcated limits.   
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Table 4.2: Intercultural Nationalism: A Third Model of Immigrant Management? 
  
Model:  Defensive / Ethnic 
Model 
Open / Civic237 Model “Intercultural 
Nationalism”238 
1.Admission Policy Exclusionary Liberal *Management of 
admission and 
selection 
2. Integration Policy Radical, Coercive Moderate, Non-
coercive 
*Integration into an 
existing context 
3. Nationality Policy Closed to non-
members (“ethnic”) 
Open to new members 
(“civic”) 
Culturally civic 
4. Multicultural 
Accommodation 
Impossible Likely Accommodation within 
a protected common 
culture 
(*) Indicates that the national minority exercises some or total control over this 
competency-conditional variable. The words in the table indicate how we would expect 
such policies to be exercised.  
 
Table 4.2 plots this hypothesis as it fits into Blad and Couture’s model of “intercultural 
nationalism,” with my own variables. In the following chapter, I test both of my 
hypotheses through case studies of Quebec and Catalonia. I summarize my general 
hypothesis below:  
General Hypothesis: National minority control over the terms of admission and 
integration, which should arise under the conditions presented in Hypothesis 1, is both a 
necessary and limiting factor for the inclusion and accommodation of immigrants in the 
national project and multicultural accommodation – consistent with a third model of 
immigrant management, intercultural nationalism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Shafir focuses on the economic development of national minorities as it relates to immigration. He sees 
‘modernizing’ nations as embracing the economic benefits of modernity, embodied in immigration.  
Cultural adaptation and assimilation are consequences of this economic perspective. As he says, 
“immigrants usually arrive as a direct result of the regions’ industrialization, and therefore, become 
emblematic of modernity.”  While I agree with this thesis, I choose to call the latter model ‘open’ to focus 
on national / cultural aspects of immigration, rather than economic modernization, although I recognize that 
the two are linked.  
238 Blad and Couton 
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Chapter 5: Quebec: The Archetype of an Intercultural 
Nationalism? 
 
I. Francophone Ethnic Nationalism: Confederation Through the Quiet Revolution 
II. Devolution of Powers: Quebec’s Evolving Competencies 
III. Intercultural Nationalism: Preservation and Pluralism 
IV. Enduring Challenges: Belonging and the Crisis of Reasonable Accommodation 
 
As Chapter 4 reviews, I am interested in testing the compatibility of national 
minority self-governance with immigrant integration and accommodation. I approach this 
relationship through two specific questions: First, when are national minorities likely to 
gain competency? Second, how does the exercise of competency affect the conditions of 
the case and moderate their impact on national identity and multicultural 
accommodation? Chapters 5 and 6 test the hypothesis that immigrant-host interactions 
are most likely to be compatible under a model of intercultural nationalism.   
 Though I “tell the story” of each case, (and do not systematically map each case 
out by variables), I do so with my hypotheses and viewing the interactions between them. 
Wherever possible, I consider both the empirical elements of the case, and how they 
correspond to the variables and broader concepts I develop in hypothesis formation.   
Organizationally, I elect to examine each case as a whole, testing hypotheses 1 
and 2 across time. This organization works best because it allows me to show how the 
hypotheses interrelate. Hypothesis 1 concerns circumstances that are likely to be 
associated with devolution of power, whether initially or to a greater degree. Not 
surprisingly, these competencies and the specific policies change considerably over time. 
Furthermore, because Hypothesis 2 asks about the impact of these policies, considering 
them separately would involve hopping back and forth over time, treating each “case” as 
novel every time there was a change in the institutional framework or application of 
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immigration / integration policy. This back-and-forth approach would not only require a 
significant amount of repetition, but it would also detract from the over-arching 
hypothesis that I am interested in testing: that national minority control over the terms of 
admission and integration is both a necessary and limiting factor for full integration into 
the national project and multicultural accommodation – consistent with a third model of 
immigrant management, intercultural nationalism. Testing this hypothesis, as I show, 
requires considering competency over immigration and integration both as dependent and 
moderating variables. Still, when applied to real case studies it becomes clear that these 
policies function as both dependent and moderating variables simultaneously; control 
over immigration and integration can be viewed as outcomes even as they influence the 
conditions of the case moderate the impact thereof on the competency-neutral outcomes: 
nationality policy and multicultural accommodation.  
 In this chapter, I examine the case of Quebec, which Blad and Couton consider 
the archetype for their model of intercultural nationalism. Quebec is widely regarded as a 
liberal national minority, known both for its embrace of interculturalism as a public 
philosophy and for its controversial language laws. Here, I consider the development of 
Quebec nationalism, from the defensive, exclusionary model it exhibited from its 
foundations into the early 20th century, to the Quebec’s pioneering model of 
interculturalism, beginning during the of the Quiet Revolution. The case of Quebec 
shows the co-occurrence of dramatically increased competencies with a significant 
transition away from intercultural nationalism.  
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I. Francophone Ethnic Nationalism: Confederation through the Quiet 
Revolution 
Since before Canada’s foundations, Quebec nationalists have emphasized the 
Francophone community’s unique status in North America, and sought to preserve and 
protect the so-called “French fact.” However, it is worth noting that this ‘fact’ itself is 
somewhat of a re-imagination of reality. Demographically, Quebec has always been 
marked by social, linguistic, and national diversity.239 Montreal, for example, has been 
characterized by its cultural diversity and French-English bilingualism from the time of 
its conquest by the British in 1760, until the Quiet Revolution nearly two centuries 
later.240 In addition to native Canadians, the French, British, Irish, Scotts, and even 
fleeing Loyalists first settled Quebec and Canada.  
Still, as a matter of governance and history, nationalists find evidence of their 
important historic status. As far back as 1774, the Quebec Act established partial 
autonomy for French Canada with protection of Catholicism, French, and historic civil 
laws. In 1791, the province of Canada was divided into majority-Anglophone Upper 
Canada and majority-Francophone Lower Canada. Nearly a century later, the British 
North America Act of 1867 (BNA) established Quebec as one of four provinces, dividing 
the Province of Canada into Ontario and Quebec.241 Therefore, though Canada was 
created through confederation, this act required dividing “two very different cultural, 
linguistic and religious communities.”242 Under this agreement, provinces gained control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Alain-G. Gagnon, “Immigration in a Multinational Context: From Laissez-faire to an Institutional 
Framework in Quebec,” in Ricard Zapata-Barrero ed. Immigration and Self-government of Minority 
Nations (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009), 39  
240 Marc V. Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 7-38 
241 The British North America Act, 1867, http://www.ccrh.org/comm/river/docs/1867.htm, §5-6 
242 Michael D. Behiels, “Quebec and the Question of Immigration: From Ethnocentrism to Ethnic 
Pluralism, 1900-1985,” (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 3 
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over education, health, and the justice system, among other competencies. Provincial 
autonomy from the start acknowledged the special status of Quebec and recognized the 
equal status of French and English in the Federal parliament, and court. While today 
Canada has 10 provinces and three territories, Quebec nationalists have widely rejected 
the idea of provincialism, instead insisting on Quebec’s status as a “distinct society” as 
one of two territorial majorities in Canada. For Quebec nationalists, these early 
documents emphasize the distinct status of the Francophone Canadians as one of two 
founding peoples. With respect to historic status of Quebec in Canada, its founding role 
and participation in constitutionalism seem critical; it seems this founding status, as well 
as Quebec’s high level of distinctiveness (cultural, linguistic, religious, and arguably 
racial) have solidified, in the minds of Quebecois nationalists, Quebec’s strong claim to 
autonomy.   
 Demographically, Quebec was and continues to be a significant minority within 
Canada.243 The 1901 census recorded Quebec’s population at 1,648,898: approximately 
1/3 of Canada’s 5,371,315 total.244  This placed Quebec as Canada’s second most 
populous province, where it remains today. The population was divided between urban 
centers and rural areas, and the economy combined agriculture, trade, and small-scale 
production.  
Quebec’s early demographics indicate that the ‘problem’ of immigration present 
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, despite the fact that Quebec remained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 One interesting point here is that the descriptive words scholars use to describe Quebec’s status indicate 
frames of reference for viewing the nation’s position within the state. Viewed as a founding member, 
Quebec’s demographic position seems insecure – at just 1/3 of the total population. However, when viewed 
as one of many provinces, Quebec’s position appears strong. This semantic difference belies deeper issues 
of framing. 
244 Statistics Canada, “Population of Canada, by province, census dates, 1851 to 1976,” 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/pdf/5500092-eng.pdf 
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linguistically stable (at approximately 80% francophone245) and declined only slightly in 
relative population size. In the early 1800s, the arrival of Irish, Scotts, Americans, and 
English tested nationalists’ vision of two distinct, homogenous peoples. During this 
period, continuing immigration fueled the already existing separatist, ethnically defined 
nationalism, which combined traits of language, ethnicity, and territorial belonging.246247 
As McAndrew writes, Anglophones and Allophones (speakers of neither French nor 
English) were viewed as a distinct element – functioning almost as a separate community 
within Quebec, and particularly in Montreal.248 Religion, language, and origin were 
treated as the major demarcations of identity. In this way, the French-Canadian national 
identity, imparted at birth, created “fixed, narrow, and impermeable [boundaries].”249 
 It seems likely that this ethnic nationalism rose in order to distinguish and defend 
a “homogenous” nation from the perceived threat of immigration, and the fear that the 
Francophone Canadians would be unwillingly integrated into the larger Anglo-American 
community. From the time of Confederation through the mid-1900s, the concerns of 
internal diversity and assimilation into Anglophone Canada were closely linked. As 
Hypothesis 2 predicts, early Quebec separatist nationalism grew in response to the 
uncontrolled growth of an Anglophone minority within Quebec, leading to some 
incidents of racism and violence and a high degree of ethnic tension in the mid 1800s.250 
Moreover, English-Canadians exerted a high degree of influence over development 	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projects, finances, and political power in Quebec and Canada as whole. The new waves 
of immigrants in the early 1800s were mainly American or English, and therefore by 
necessity strengthened, from a Quebecois nationalist perspective, the power of the 
Anglophone majority. Moreover, industrialization in other parts of Canada and the U.S 
led to the emigration of approximately 400,000 French Canadians between 1860 and 
1900.251, Despite this demographic insecurity, the francophone population remained 
stable for much of the 19th Century through to the Great Depression.  
The turn of the 20th century saw a significant increase in rates of immigration in 
Canada as a percentage of Canada’s population, from around .5% (immigrants admitted / 
Canada’s population) in the 1890s to a peak of 5.3% in 1913.252 This was spurred by the 
growth of Industrial Capitalism, starting in the 1890s up until the 1930s. Quebec, at this 
point subject to Federal immigration policy under article 91 of the BNA, diversified 
alongside Canada.253 The BNA in theory established shared jurisdiction between the 
Federal and Provincial governments with respect to immigration, though in practice the 
Federal government exercised this competency.254 Though French was recognized, it was 
co-official along with English, and the education system was dual-confessional.  
Not surprisingly, Quebec underwent a demographic and ethnic transformation as 
a result of the broader trend of foreign immigration to Canada: between 1896 and 1914, 
Quebec received over 700,000 new immigrants. During this same period, an additional 
800,000 Quebecois left. Once again, the Quebecois nation (defined by ancestry) was 
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doubly undermined. This process of social and linguistic diversification elicited, as we 
would expect, “hostile reaction of Quebec’s francophone élites to the immigration 
policies of the national government” across various nationalist organizations.255 The 
response to immigration was almost always critical and defensive, with the exception of 
the Liberal party (federal and provincial), who linked immigration with the necessity of 
modernization and the industrialization of the economy.  
 In sum, Quebec arose as a distinct society with a foundational role in the 
confederation and constitution drafting of Canada. Since Confederation, it has enjoyed 
uninterrupted governance, although more radical iterations of Quebecois nationalism 
were frustrated by the provincial structure of the state and Anglophone dominance within 
it. Quebec’s economy, centered on agriculture and artisanship until the advent of 
industrial capitalism in the late 19th century, was generally less industrialized than 
Ontario. Moreover, what financial or development projects existed were controlled 
primarily by Anglophones. During this period, it experienced dramatic demographic 
instability, although linguistic separatism, particularly in schools and churches, between 
the Anglophone and Francophone community lessened the impact of linguistic change.  
Up to and including WWII, “the prevalent attitude towards immigration among 
French-Canadian leaders remained that of open hostility.”256 Quebec’s ‘ethnic’ self-
conception, for nationalists, was all the more necessary in the face of British and 
European immigration, as embodied in divided spheres of religion, education, business, 
and even settlement. The closed national identity and attitude of fear and hostility 
indicate clearly the absence of compatibility of immigrant integration or accommodation 	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and national minority self-government in this period. As Juteau summarizes, “French 
Canada was thus constructed as a nation, as an ethnically defined national community 
that was economically and politically subordinated to English Canada, and that strived 
for greater autonomy.”257 This relationship, as well as the ethnic nationalism associated 
with it, remained true until the mid-20th century.  
From the time of its foundation, Quebec fits the defensive, ethnic model of 
nationalism. Although it did not exercise control of admission, at the institutional level 
(e.g. schools) and in public discourse, it practiced a policy of exclusion and separatism. 
Quebec’s primary response to immigration was to prevent integration by allowing almost 
all immigrants, Anglophone and Allophone, to integrated into the Anglophone context. 
Moreover, with the exception of some economic arguments, immigrants were widely 
viewed as a demographic, socio-cultural, and political threat. This view of hostility, I 
believe, confirms what we would expect to see with high rates of immigration and 
demographic instability in a country with significant historic status. Many of the 
conditions that I hypothesize will lead to an increased demand for competency also 
associate with a mostly closed and defensive ethnolingusitic nationalism. For many 
scholars, the Quiet Revolution is the (re)defining moment in Quebec’s history, for 
reasons that I discuss below.  
II. Devolution of Powers: Quebec’s Evolving Competencies 
  
The Quiet Revolution marks a critical turning point in the history of Quebec, 
where simultaneous social, political, and ideological change fused to fundamentally 
redefine Quebecois society. Rapid industrialization, government expansion, and 	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demographic concerns led to a significant increase in demand for control over 
immigration policy – particularly control over admission and recruitment. Through 
negotiations at the Federal level, Quebec made a series of agreements under which it 
gained almost total sovereignty over admission, selection, integration, and language 
policies. Concurrently, the Quebec government, and many civil society organizations 
rethought the issue of immigration, placing an emphasis on creating members and re-
articulating nationality policy in a way that, for the first time, expanded the horizons of 
membership. Language policies became a critical measure of this integrationist effort, 
and began a significant debate about the prospects and limits of integration and the role 
of French language and culture in Quebecois identity.  
Even before the Quiet Revolution itself, various political, social and religious 
associations the level began to rethink the question of demography. In 1952, Pierre 
Dumareau drew attention to differential birth rates (between Anglophone and 
Francophone Canada) and immigration to project that Quebec’s demographic future, 
particularly with respect to its place and proportional size in Canada, was in serious 
jeopardy.258 The previous model of defense and exclusion had led to a system where 
immigrants integrated into the Anglophone community almost by default. This 
separatism of immigrants from the francophone public sphere is consistent with an 
exclusionary ethnic nationality policy, as Shafir predicts, but also demonstrates choice by 
immigrants to gravitate towards English as the language of prestige and economic life in 
Canada.  
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However, beginning in the 1950s, the Quebecois neo-nationalists, the Church, and 
the government began to believe that their survival depended integration.259 This change 
coincided with a growing rate of immigration following the Great Depression.  
260 
As the tables above indicates, the arrival of “more than 420,000 immigrants [after 
WWII]…significantly altered the composition of the province’s non-francophone 
population.”261 In particular, note the significant rise of Italian, Jewish, Greek, and Asian 
immigrant groups that far outpaces the growth of ethnically French Canadians. This 
demographic change provides an important context for the rapid transformation of the 
Quiet Revolution, particularly as it concerns Quebec’s increasing competency over 
immigration policies.  
 What is called the Quiet Revolution in fact comprises a series of changes across 
nearly all aspects of Quebecois society, state, and economy. This was a period of rapid 
industrialization, in which the Quebecois government drastically expanded in its control 
of the economy (e.g. nationalizing private companies), established a welfare state, and 	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increased its presence in language, education and immigration control. All at once, 
Quebec underwent interrelated developments of neo-nationalization (including national 
re-definition), economic industrialization, and the renegotiation of Quebec’s status within 
Canada. While all of these broader societal changes influence the position of immigrants 
within Quebec, Behiels argues that two factors are particularly salient in producing this 
new demand: a staggering drop in birth rates, triggered by economic development, and 
“longstanding integration of allophone immigrants into the Anglophone community.”262  
In 1900, Quebec had a birth rate of 39.5 births per thousand. By 1950 this rate 
hovered around 30 per 1000, and by the 1970s it was consistently between 14 and 17.263 
It has remained low since, to the point that in 1995 Quebec’s birth rate was “the lowest in 
the industrialized world.”264 Not surprisingly, this fact instilled the fear of shrinking 
population size (due to low rates of growth) within Canada. This was coupled, as 
Dickinson shows, by an aging of the population consistent with fewer new workers 
seeking employment.265  
This outward facing fear compounded an inward-facing one: the fear of 
minorization of the Francophone community within Quebec, and specifically the 
community of Montreal, where the vast majority of Allophone immigrants settled and 
continue to do so today. Although many earlier immigrants – Scottish, Welsh, Irish, 
British, and Americans – already spoke English and naturally assimilated to the 
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Anglophone system, even new waves of Allophone immigrant children opted for 
English-language schools nearly 75% of the time.266  
  However, during the Quiet Revolution, neo-nationalists, particularly in the 
middle class, changed their perspectives towards this demographic and linguistic 
insecurity. Marc Levine describes this pro-secular, pro-national, pro-francophone group 
as a modern, economically oriented new class: 
This was not the defensive nationalism of la survivance that encouraged isolation 
and underdevelopment as the keys to French-Canadian cultural survival. For the 
technically competent, Francophone middle class, these ideas were anathema. To 
the new class, the survival and epanouissement of the Francophone community 
depended on effectively reconciling Francophone identity with the reality of 
modern, urban society.267  
 
Here, we see not the abandonment of nationalism, but rather its adaptation to modern 
economic, demographic, and political circumstances. This movement achieved 
significant ends in the realms of immigration policy and integration policy that I review 
below.  
 Quebec developed, through a series of negotiations, four separate agreements with 
the federal government between 1971 and 1991, each of which increased the province’s 
control over immigration. According to Kostov, during the Quiet Revolution, Quebec 
began taking an active interest in controlling immigration both to “counteract the 
birthrate and to strengthen the economic vitality of the province.”268 It established a 
Ministry of Immigration in 1968, which continued to grow over time.  The agreements 
demonstrate a slow but substantial increase in competency, which corresponds to ever-
increasing demands. The first agreement (Lang / Cloutier, 1971) allowed Quebec to place 
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representatives in federal immigration offices abroad. The 1975 (Andras / Bienvenue) 
expanded this authority to allow Quebec to make non-binding recommendations to visa 
officials.269  
  However, “[the] demands of the provinces significantly increased,” as they began 
to desire a more active role in recruitment and decision-making capacity (to counteract 
declining population).270 The nationalist politician Jacques Couture, for one, insisted on 
complete control, declaring federal immigration selection process as “unable to take into 
account the economic, cultural, and demographic disparities of the provinces.”271 
 The Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978 achieved most of these demands, which 
were built upon even further with the Canada-Quebec Accord of 1991. Quebec acquired 
both the ability to set its own quotas, and to establish its own point system for evaluating 
immigrants (which is still in place).272 In addition, it acquired the ability to actively 
recruit and select immigrants, and even powers of positive and negative veto with respect 
to Canada. By these powers, granted in the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978, Quebec 
could both permit an immigrant to enter who met its own criteria and not Canada’s, and 
deny entry to an immigrant who met Quebec’s criteria but not Canada’s criteria (in effect 
overruling the Constitutional provision of freedom of movement in Canada).273 Though 
these powers primarily affected selection of “independent” immigrants,” Quebec could 
now “determine its own objectives…while respecting the framework of the Canadian 
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Immigration Act.”274 With respect to non-voluntary immigrants, who fall into a number 
of different categories under Canadian law, we can say as a general rule that in terms of 
family reunification and refugees, powers of selection remained mostly with Ottawa. 
Neither the Liberals nor the Parti Quebecois demanded executive power over the 
processing of these refugee or non-voluntary claimants.275   
 Quebec’s powers were expanded further in the Canada-Quebec Accord (1991), 
which gave Quebec exclusive power over quota, selection (with the exception of refugees 
and those applying for family reunification), and management and enforcement of 
commitments for permanent migrants. It also obtained significant consultative authority 
(Canada must obtain its consent) across categories of temporary migrants.276 Under this 
framework, Quebec is still limited to the overall immigration quotas and categories 
chosen by Canada, but can exceed the quota limit by up to 5% “for demographic 
reasons.”277  Kostov makes it clear that demand played a significant role in these 
concessions, 
At the beginning of the period, in 1971, the government of Canada had all the 
jurisdiction in the area of immigration under its control, and by the end of the 
period, with the last immigration agreement of 1991, the federal immigration 
control over Quebec had become symbolic. Every new agreement led to 
additional powers for Quebec. While the federal government generally preferred 
to preserve the status quo, it always gave in under the consistent pressure by 
consecutive Quebec provincial cabinets, regardless of their political colors.278 
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In terms of policy – that is, how these competencies are exercised – there are a 
number of noteworthy points. First, the evaluation system adopted by Quebec differs only 
marginally from that of Canada.279 The notable exception to this general assessment is 
that Quebec includes additional points for knowledge of French rather than English. As 
Carens points out, this preference cannot be “a cover way of reintroducing racist criteria,” 
because it generally facilitates the entry of immigrants from Asian or African ex-French 
colonies.280 Moreover, Quebec, like Canada, actively commits to a policy of non-
discrimination. Another notable point is the contested “likelihood of adaptability” score, 
at the discretion of Quebecois immigration officers (a similar subjective scale is used in 
Canada). Though initially even its defenders conceded “room for improvement” in 
ensuring non-biased application of this score, more recent immigration policies have 
decreased the number of points allocated and defined clearly market-oriented criteria for 
its evaluation.281 
 Second, Quebec has actively sought to increase the number of immigrants it 
admits. It might seem counterintuitive that a national minority would seek to increase the 
entrance of immigrants if we take it to be primarily concerned with cultural survival. 
However, Quebec’s desire to increase its target numbers of immigration is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, in that as Quebec developed mechanisms for immigrant management, 
it was able to expand immigration to fill a demographic need without jeopardizing its 
cultural survival. I intentionally avoid specific hypotheses about the exercise of 
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competencies to allow for this type of finding. Although lack of knowledge of French 
does not bar one from admission, the use of knowledge of French differentiates Quebec’s 
immigrant pool significantly from that of Canada. In 1991, more than a decade after the 
Cullen-Couture accord, 37% of immigrants reported knowing French when they arrived. 
This number has risen to 65% by 2010.282 Active recruitment shows the way that 
admission policies and the “intercultural” framework (as I discuss below) manage and 
benefit from difference. In 2007, Quebec selected a full 70% of those admitted.283   
The second important area of increased competency-conditional policy is 
integration policy. With respect to immigration in Quebec, the most significant 
integrationist policies Quebec enacted came in the form of language policy. Across 
parties, Quebec began employing a series of contested language normalization policies 
which sought to regulate the use of French in business and the economy, address the 
demo-linguistic challenge of Anglophone immigrant assimilation, and maintain French as 
a key identifier of Quebec.  
 By the 1970s, existing federal law recognized bilingualism, and Bill 63 had begun 
and failed effective reform at the provincial level. One challenge with language 
legislation is that, federal constraints aside, policymakers had to consider how any 
legislation would affect the Anglophone, Allophone, and Francophone communities. 
Moreover, official bilingualism protected and recognized equally the rights of 
francophone minorities in majority-Anglophone provinces, just as it protected the rights 
of Anglophone minorities in Quebec and particularly Montreal. As Levine compellingly 	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demonstrates, the Liberal government under Robert Bourassa was torn between the 
increasingly impassioned demands of neo-nationalist Francophone, the business interests 
and political power of Anglophones, and the individual rights of the Allophone (and 
Anglophone) community.284 Furthermore, it was bound by the limits of federal language 
policy. The Liberal Party’s Bill 22 passed in 1974, establishing French as the official 
language of Quebec, not surprisingly fell subject to criticism from all sides.285  
 Partially as a result of the fiasco of Bill 22, the Parti Quebecois won election in 
1976 on a platform of ethnic pluralism and linguistic unilingualism, soon after passing 
Bill 101, “The Charter of the French Language.” As Behiels writes, “Bill 101 was much 
tougher than Bill 22…[it imposed] a policy of francization of all local institutions such as 
municipalities, school boards and health and social clubs… [and] streamed all immigrants 
and children entering Quebec from other provinces into French-language schools.”286 
This legislation demonstrates compelling Quebec’s newfound emphasis on integration, 
and was coupled with a new public philosophy of immigration and nationalism, as I show 
below.   
The goal of linguistic integration grew teeth with the implementation of Bill 101, 
which within a decade had dramatically shifted enrollments of immigrant children into 
French-language schools. In 1978/9, French Catholic schools enrolled 27.3% non-French 
students; 72.7% were enrolled in English schools. “Within a decade, the numbers had 
changed to 65.19% in the French sector and 34.82% in the English sector.”287  
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Moreover, Bill 101 took extensive measures with the aim of “language status 
planning; that is, with improving the status of French in Quebec society in order to make 
it the dominant and preferred language of business, government and education.”288 Not 
surprisingly, there have been extensive debates about the necessity or appropriateness of 
these policies, particularly as they concern limiting the freedom of immigrants and 
Anglophone minorities. While certain aspects of the law were overturned (for example, a 
French-only signage requirement and mandatory French-language schooling for Anglo-
Canadian inward migrants289), it is clear that these laws attempt to impose perhaps-
illiberal restrictions on the use of language in order to ensure its protection and status.  
With respect to Hypothesis 1a, Quebec’s developing demand confirms many of 
the interactions I speculate. As the previous section reviews, Quebecois already exercised 
a general demand for increased autonomy, which I relate to its role as one of two 
“founding peoples” in Canada. Demographically, demand for control over immigration 
seems clearly linked to the linguistic and demographic variables I consider: in particular, 
high rates of immigration coupled with a devastating drop in birth rates, elevating 
demographic and cultural survival to the public consciousness. One variable that seems to 
be significant, that I do not explicitly map out, is the high rate of immigrant integration 
into the Anglophone community. While this might fall under the variable “fluency rates” 
or even the more general concept of “linguistic insecurity,” long-term trends of 
integration seem critical in the increase in demand. Furthermore, as I speculate, the 
presence of French-language potential migrants had significant appeal to Francophone 
Quebecois nationalists.  	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With respect to Canada’s receptivity to these demands, where my hypotheses are 
less clear cut, Hypothesis 1b nonetheless seems to provide a convincing account of the 
relevant conditions. Bargaining power seems most important here, as Quebec articulated 
unambiguous and weighty demands. During this period, Quebec was at the height of its 
economic power, particularly relative to Canada. Demographically, by 1976 Quebec 
represented a little over 27% of Canada’s population as a whole.290 This decline, though 
just a few percentage points, proved far more significant in increasing demand than it did 
in decreasing bargaining power, if, as I assume, population size is a relevant indicator.  
Quebec’s status in Canada also seems important in understanding the high degree 
of devolution of powers. First, because Canada is an asymmetrical federation, it was able 
to devolve powers to Quebec without necessarily according similar competencies to all 
provinces. Quebec’s unique status arguably derives not from its economic or political 
importance, but from the fact of its linguistic, cultural, and religious distinctiveness in 
comparison to Anglophone Canada. Finally, Quebec’s guaranteed representation in 
federal parliament may have also played a role in influencing the devolution of powers, 
though this role is harder to determine. By the 1974 “Amalgam” formula, Quebec’s 
designated seats in the House of Commons increased by 10 (from a steady 65 since 
1867). However, it is not clear whether this increase in seats increased, or mere reflected, 
Quebec’s bargaining power.291 
Overall, the devolution of powers in Quebec during and following the Quiet 
Revolution seems consistent with what we would expect from the configurations in 	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http://www.elections.ca/scripts/fedrep/federal_e/red/representation_e.htm Accessed March 22, 2012.  
 
	   Lipton	  151	  
Hypothesis 1, both in terms of increasing demand and state receptivity. I turn now to test 
Hypothesis 2, exploring Quebec’s changing nationality policy and model of 
multiculturalism, focusing on how these outcomes evolved over the course of the Quiet 
Revolution and beyond.  
III. Intercultural Nationalism: Preservation and Pluralism 
 
Above, I discuss the evolution of Quebecois power over immigration policies, and 
the increasingly prominent role Quebec played during the Quiet Revolution. Throughout 
this time, nationality policy and national identity changed dramatically, as did the 
dialogue surrounding accommodation. This section details these changes as they relate to 
the changing case conditions and competency-conditional policies; it explores the 
development of a model of interculturalism, as well as the modern challenge of 
“accommodation.” 
 In 1990, the Ministrére des Communautés Culturelles et de l’Immigration 
(MCCI) published Let’s Build Quebec Together: A Policy Statement on Immigration and 
Integration. This policy statement presents Quebec’s agenda with regard to immigration, 
and also takes steps to set out a normative vision for integration in Quebec in the 
framework of interculturalism. As Carens notes, [this document] is truly remarkable…for 
a government publication” in that it “offers a sophisticated, self-conscious articulation of 
the goals of Quebec’s policies and some of the normative presumptions underlying 
them.”292 The fundamental basis of this document is the establishment of a “moral 
contract” between immigrants and Quebec, based on three principles: 
- A society in which French is the common language of public life 	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- A democratic society where everyone is expected and encouraged both to 
participate and contribute 
- A pluralist society that is open to multiple influences within the limits 
imposed by the respect for fundamental values and the need for intergroup 
exchanges293 
 
These three points speak volumes about the expectations and vision of Quebecois 
society as it regards immigrants, and expresses obligations for both the immigrants and 
the host society. As McAndrews sees it, these three points tare directed to different 
audiences within Quebec: “The first principle [French language] represents the effort 
required from newcomers, whereas the second principle is directed primarily toward the 
Francophone community, which might give in to a temptation to exclude…”294 In her 
view, these principles reflect specific elements of a social contract that imposes 
obligations on immigrants and hosts equally.  
The third point, which applies to society as a whole, merits closer examination. It 
speaks of pluralism and openness, but also limitations and fundamental values; these are 
the hallmarks of Quebec’s model of interculturalism. This model can be defined by the 
idea of “exchanges within a Quebec culture,” employing the symbolism of “convergence” 
in contrast with the Canadian multiculturalism’s imagery of a mosaic.295 This distinction 
is intentional. In fact, interculturalism is generally treated as an explicit rejection of pan-
Canadian multiculturalism (which dates back to 1971). Quebecois nationalists view the 
official policy of multiculturalism, which holds all cultures as equals, as an affront to 
Quebec’s unique identity and status in Canada.296  	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Though Let’s Build Quebec Together is often treated as the definitive statement of 
interculturalism, this public philosophy and terminology traces back to the initial focus 
on integration within a francophone framework which crystalized during the 1960s. The 
Ministry of Immigration, from its foundation, offered language courses with the goal of 
linguistic assimilation, but also funded ethnic organizations and helped Allophones 
preserve their cultural and linguistic heritage.297 Interculturalism, as the policy statement 
above makes clear, simultaneously emphasizes pluralism and commonality through the 
French language. As Rocher et al. summarize, “In Quebec, […] the French language is 
presented as a centre of convergence for diverse groups which can nevertheless maintain 
and let flourish their specificity.”298 Though I address competency-conditional policies 
above, it is clear that these policies evolved along side and in relation to Quebec’s 
increasingly open and accommodating view of diversity.  
The development of interculturalism, and the open model of nationality policy 
and accommodation it suggests, is intimately linked to Quebec’s practice of admission 
policy (selecting or favoring francophone candidates) and integration policy based on 
linguistic assimilation. By the time of MCCI’s 1990 policy statement, Quebec had 
developed three elements of integration policy, combining a recognition and commitment 
to pluralism within a Francophone context. As Marie McAndrew summarizes, the 
MCCI’s approach involved three components: 1) developing and promoting French as 
the language of common life through language-learning programs and French-language 
education, 2) “increasing support for the openness of the host society the full 	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participation of immigrants,” and 3) facilitating harmonious intergroup relations.299 That 
is, though Quebec officially and actively promoted French as a primary identifier of 
belonging, it did so while consciously “extending the boundaries of the community.”300 
As Juteau writes, “belongingness was redefined, at least in governmental discourses and 
official documents.”301  
The Ministry of Immigration began implementing recruitment with the goal of 
increasing the overall number of immigrants to Quebec, while maximizing the proportion 
of Francophone immigrants among this group. Correspondingly, at the level of 
nationality policy, Quebec took significant strides to foster membership among new 
arrivals; this demonstrates both a new official conception of de-ethnicized Quebecois 
identity from the top-down and the bottom-up. As Labelle and Rocher write, 
A minority ethnic identity, that of French Canadian, has been taken and another 
identity, the Quebecois citizenship and political identity, has been superimposed 
on it or chosen exclusively. This citizenship identity is inclusive: it recognizes the 
internal diversity of the political community and leaves room for ancestral 
identities [while trying bridge that gap between them].302 
 
What stands out, in the context of Hypothesis 2, is the co-evolution of 
competencies and openness. In fact, it becomes hard to distinguish between the MCCI’s 
policy goals and the normative vision of society that they reflect. One of the potentially 
confusing elements of the model of intercultural nationalism is that it speaks both of a 
public philosophy and of institutional arrangements that support this philosophy. The 
competencies Quebec enjoys are not just a necessary pre-condition to a model 
intercultural nationalism; they are an element of it as well.    
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The model of interculturalism has remained constant since its inception, although 
iterations and language have changed. In particular, Quebec has demonstrated an 
inconsistent approach to the language of citizenship and the concept of Quebecois 
nationalism. Following the failed 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty, which many 
took as a sign of the failure of measures intended to foster belonging among non-ethnic 
Quebecois, the government changed tactics. Quebec official discourse stressed the notion 
of citizenship, attempting to “rebuke the notion suggesting that it is soley a state for 
Francophones.”303 However, under the Liberal government, which came to power in 
2003, Quebecois identity was “re-ethnicized,” according to Labelle and Rocher.  
Summarizing this fluctuation, they write, “Quebec policy is the result of a 
crossover between a citizen perspective and a communitarian discourse, with a 
divergence in underlying political interests…This requires managing a fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of…[the] political community.”304 These alternations show 
Quebec struggling to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable – its national identity with its 
commitment to pluralism.  Still, it seems clear that the significant shift to a more open, 
though still-contested, nationality policy and a model of intercultural accommodation are 
closely associated with Quebec’s increasing competency over admission and integration. 
The linguistic stability it enjoyed as a result of its language policies and selection criteria 
seem to provide the stability and security necessary to transition Quebec from an ethnic 
to a de-ethnicized model of nationalism, as Hypothesis 2 predicts.  At the level of official 
discourse, therefore, Quebec seems to exemplify the model of intercultural nationalism, 
as Blad and Couton suggest.   	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IV. Enduring Challenges: Belonging and the Crisis of Reasonable 
Accommodation 
 
At the level of individual identification and practices of accommodation, the 
intercultural model reveals some unresolved difficulties. Part of this problem is the 
distinction between official and subjective markers of belonging. For example, on the 
question of Quebecois sovereignty, considered by many neo-nationalists to be a 
preponderant identifier of Quebecois identity, 60% of French-Canadians favored 
secession while “95% of non-French Canadians” voted against the 1995 referendum.305 
As Premier Jacques Parizeau addressed the crowd, he infamously blamed the narrow 
defeat on “money and the ethnic vote.” Juteau sardonically summarizes, “The strategy to 
woo immigrants and ethnic groups in Quebec did not swing their vote; it did not bring 
them to embrace the nationalist project.”306  For both immigrants and nationalists, it 
seems, an us/them dynamic persisted despite largely civic terms of belonging. 
This is consistent with Handler’s findings where respondents openly acknowledge 
a distinction between what makes one Quebecois, “in theory” (any person residing) and 
in “popular mentality” (francophone, nationalist, culture, customs, traditions, etc.).307 
These popular definitions often included by-birth Quebecois and may have excluded 
people who actually live and work in Quebec. From the perspective of immigrants, too, 
studies have shown lower levels of identification with Quebec.308 As Juteau concludes 
“Official discourses don’t necessarily create bonding and their performative power can be 
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limited.”309 Still, others find cause for optimism. For example, a 2004 survey of young 
people born abroad or to immigrant parents found that “28% identify themselves first as 
Quebecois, compared with 34% as Canadians first. Moreover, 67% of the people 
surveyed acknowledged the existence of a Quebec nation.”310  
These results together point to the complexity of belonging in nested nations, 
which by Miller’s definition combine both a particular (Quebecois) and overarching 
(Canadian) nation identity. For immigrants, integration and self-identification are further 
complicated as they are encouraged to adopt competing, yet overlapping, identities 
simultaneously. This adds yet another dimension to the already-complex question of 
integration, as we must consider how the national minority and state may engage in a 
“fight for primary / secondary allegiance among newcomers.”311  
Finally, we must ask how accommodation actually functions in practice: debates 
about interculturalism often attempt to compare interculturalism with multiculturalism. 
For McAndrews most of the distinction – emphasis on language and a pluralism within a 
common culture – is semantic: “[Quebec] carried a very de facto multiculturalism…in 
line with the Canadian model…with, perhaps, the slight exception of the stronger 
emphasis put on the promotion of a common language.”312 Nonetheless, based on her 
extensive fieldwork, she concludes, “Quebec interculturalism has given a weaker 
recognition to the persistence of interethnic inequalities and to the role of racism in this 
regard.”313 
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 Since 2005, issues of accommodation have risen to the surface, and re-opened 
debates about the limits of accommodation. Interestingly, despite Quebec’s emphasis on 
language acquisition and interculturalism within a francophone society, the majority of 
new controversies stem from religion, not language.314 Beginning in 2006, a series of 
events related to religious accommodation sparked a considerable public debate, the 
general tenor of which was that “society had become too tolerant of difference, too 
willing to compromise.”315 Though tolerance of illiberal cultures featured significantly in 
these discussions, most commentators are quick to point to Quebec’s “anxieties about the 
gradual erosion and eventual erasure of Francophone identity and culture,” as a 
significant factor in this outcry.316 The public frenzy over incidents of accommodation 
was amplified by media attention and eventually led the government to establish a 
commission to assess accommodation practices, analyze the relevant issues, and make 
recommendations to the government.317  
As the final report of the Bouchard-Taylor commission states, tensions 
surrounding issues of accommodation above all reflect a crisis of perception; this crisis, 
they conclude, though related to the insecurity of Francophone identity, also has much in 
common with similar public debates occurring elsewhere in the world.318 Still, this crisis 
suggests that issues of accommodation, particularly religious accommodation for 
Quebec’s growing Muslim population, continue to pose challenges to the largely secular, 
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Francophone community. For example, at the time of the commission, “two-thirds of 
Quebecois believed there should be no accommodation of religious and cultural 
minorities in public places such as schools, hospital and government buildings.” 
Furthermore, 81% claimed to be ‘opposed’ or ‘somewhat opposed’ to the idea of 
providing prayer spaces in public facilities.319 To be sure, the very existence of this report 
and widespread participation in the public forums demonstrate the willingness of the 
Quebecois, at the institutional and individual level, to grapple with issues of 
accommodation and identity. This indicates astonishing progress for nation that less than 
a century before was defensive and exclusionary and defined belonging in ethnic terms. 
Still, as this most recent crisis showed, despite the commitment to pluralism offered 
under the model of interculturalism, Quebec continues to struggle with accommodation in 
the public sphere.    
 In sum, the characterization of Quebec as a model of intercultural nationalism 
seems accurate. Quebec represents the general hypothesis that I test, where competencies 
are associated with increased openness. Through the use of selective immigration policies 
and strong linguistic assimilation, Quebec has negotiated a framework of pluralism 
within the host society that continues to struggle with how to define belonging, though it 
does so in almost exclusively civic terms. The conditions surrounding the devolution of 
powers to Quebec during the Quiet Revolution seem consistent with my first hypothesis, 
both in terms of demand and receptivity. Furthermore, it seems clear that the security 
Quebec gained through competency over admission and integration coincided with a 
transition from an ethnic to a culturally civic definition nationality policy. These policies 
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also facilitated, but also formed a part of, Quebec’s model of interculturalism as an open 
and pluralistic model of integration.  
  However we can also see the limitations on this openness. Even as Quebec has 
tried to transition away from a cultural definition of the nation to a discourse of 
citizenship, new waves of migrants, particularly Muslims, have challenged its ability to 
do so. In particular, the Bouchard-Taylor commission shows underlying unresolved 
questions regarding the public culture and public values of Quebec. These shortcomings 
are reflected in the identities of immigrants, and the continued ambivalence on behalf of 
native Quebecois towards questions of accommodation.  
 Quebec encapsulates the key elements of the model of intercultural nationalism, 
and seems to confirm the configurations I suggest are most likely to produce this model. 
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Chapter 6: Catalonia - A Challenge to the Intercultural 
Nationalism Hypothesis? 	  
In this chapter, I focus on a second ‘most likely’ case, Catalonia. Examining a 
second case here is critical in order to draw distinctions between the two cases, and help 
to determine what conditions might be necessary to maximize the openness of then 
national minority. The case study of Quebec largely confirms the hypotheses that I 
develop, but much of the literature I use both in plotting my variables and even in 
developing these hypotheses is influenced by Quebec. Exploring another ‘most likely’ 
case of compatibility is necessary to test the generalizability of the findings in Chapter 5.  
 Catalonia differs from Quebec in a number of ways that make it a valuable case to 
study. First, Catalonia’s position in Spain, as one of many Autonomous Communities, 
differs from that of Quebec, which, at least in the mind of the Quebecois, is one of two 
peoples of Canada. Second, and more importantly, Catalonia exercises no competency 
over admission policies, and has far less control over integration and language policies 
than does Quebec. Nonetheless, Catalonia has always displayed a significant degree of 
openness to the incorporation and inclusion of immigrants, even in circumstances we 
would expect to produce conflict. Moreover, over the past decade or so, Catalonia 
appears to be entering a stage of intercultural nationalism consistent with what we find in 
Quebec, but unsupported by control of admission; I explore this case here as a challenge 
to the hypothesis that competencies are a necessary precondition to intercultural 
nationalism.  
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I. Civic Nationalism Under Fire: Catalonia through Franco  
 
Throughout most of its modern history, Catalonia has avoided ethnic national 
definitions, and has demonstrated a remarkable ability to integrate immigrants. Perhaps 
most surprisingly, the same held true during the cultural oppression Catalonia 
experienced under Franco’s dictatorship. The first section of this chapter provides a 
historic context for, and then attempts to explain these surprising findings, tracing the 
development of Catalan nationalism from its foundations through the end of the Franco 
dictatorship.  
Scholars often point to the 19th century emergence of the ‘Catalanism’ movement 
as an important predecessor for Catalan nationalism. Catalan industry and culture 
bloomed together, and Catalanism combined economic self-interest with an emphasis on 
culture. One typical historical interpretation sees Catalanism as the “confluence of four 
distinct strains: cultural revival, traditionalist Carlism, Republican federalism, and 
industrial protectionism.”320 The Renaixenca (1840s to 1870s) saw a dramatic surge in 
the creation and emphasis on the restoration of historic Catalan culture. Though 
intellectual elites produced much of the new poetry and theater during this period, the 
populace as a whole “was caught up in the movement” as it spread from Barcelona into 
other cities and rural Catalonia, as well.321 Soon after, Modernisme (1890-1910)322 
focused on the production of new culture, rather than celebration of the past. Both of 
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these movements, and the corresponding standardization of Catalan, produced the sort of 
“collective consciousness” which characterizes the origins of nationalist movements.323 
Catalan nationalism was born as this consciousness became politicized in the 
form of republican federalism. As Kenneth McRoberts notes, Catalan nationalism 
developed “rather late,” only being formalized at the end of the 19th century.324 Valentí 
Almirall was the first to articulate an “explicit nationalist programme… [that] outlined 
the transition from regionalism to nationalism...” 325 The First and Second Catalan 
Congresses, (1880, 1883) focused on standardizing Catalan, economic protectionism, and 
maintaining Catalan civil law – in essence merging cultural and political Catalanism.326 
Interestingly, these early movements advocated powers for Catalonia within a federal 
framework. Though some advocated secessionism, most believed that federalism was the 
appropriate structure.327  
However, as Pierre Vilar argued, Catalan history “was animated by one coherent 
thought, to construct a nation by and for industry.”328 Under the concerted efforts of a 
financial elite, Catalonia developed as, “the most modern and industrial” region of 
Spain.329 Therefore, to the extent that 19th century Catalan elites imagined Catalonia’s 
role in a Spanish state, the Spanish market may have been a significant motivation. This 
odd pairing, whereby Catalan elites kindled a cultural revival, while simultaneously 
wedding their economic fortunes to of Spain, “created a seesaw pattern of political 
expression: an aspiration to become the bourgeoisie of all of Spain combined with the 	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desire to attain regional autonomy.”330 This implies that Catalonia, in terms of its historic 
status and self-conception in Spain, displayed cultural distinctiveness concurrently with 
political and economic motivations for association.  
In 1914, Spain granted Catalonia a commonwealth government, the 
Mancomunitat, at the demand of the nationalist Catalan party, la Lliga Regionalista, 
likely demonstrating Catalonia’s bargaining power with the central government as the 
most industrialized region. The Mancomunitat united the four provinces of Catalonia and 
focused on social and economic reforms, including institutionalizing the “revival and 
protection of Catalan culture.” Nonetheless, in the first decades of the 20th century, the 
lower class of Catalonia – many of whom were internal migrants attracted to Catalan 
industry – could be described as apathetic to Catalanism or even “anti-Catalan.”331 Class 
issues, particularly the prevalence of anarchism, distanced the lower class (and acutely 
non-natives) from the regionalist and nationalists goals of the Catalan industrial and 
political elite. During this period, then, immigrants and nationalists divided over 
economic, rather than cultural boundaries.   
 The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, who came to power in 1923, quickly ended 
this period of autonomy. In the name of national unity, the state dissolved 150 Catalan 
nationalist organizations, banned the Catalan language and flag, and eventually ended the 
Mancomunitat in 1925. 332  Despite this crackdown, many upper class Catalans 
nonetheless supported the dictatorship, fearing increasing class violence and anarchy in 
the region. Though the government was briefly re-established in 1932, the cultural 
repression was to be repeated again under Franco. During the Second Republic (1931-	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1939), a Catalan Statute of Autonomy was approved by the plebiscite.333 This period laid 
the groundwork for autonomy arrangements affirmed in the 1978 constitution.  
Under Franco, Catalonia and other non-Castilian cultures experienced “the most 
radical politics of assimilation in modern Spanish history.”334 Some scholars view the 
policies of the dictatorship as the first substantial nation-building program undertaken by 
modern Spain.335 The Fascists and Francoists were driven by national unity and anti-
regionalism. They began a brutal crackdown on Catalan culture that continued throughout 
Franco’s regime.  
[Franco] abolished all Catalan institutions, re-imposed the ban on public use of 
the Catalan language, and set out to purge the region of Catalanist influences by 
deporting, imprisoning or executing anyone with even the slightest link to 
political Catalanism… Education, censorship, and the Church were all used to 
convince Spaniards that Spain was a single nation with one national culture and 
language.336 
 
This process, termed “cultural genocide” by Salvador Giner, inevitably shaped the course 
of federalization and self-government in the fledgling democracy that followed.337 Under 
Franco, Catalan elites fled abroad en masse, and many who stayed were executed. At the 
same time, other members of the Catalan bourgeoisie, fearing the spread of anarchism or 
communism, supported the dictatorship as a means of protection.338 Still, as history has 
shown, Catalan nationalism was dramatically suppressed, but not eliminated. The growth 
of Catalan nationalism, in sum, combined the seemingly contradictory goals of economic 
development and cultural revival. Its status as a nation was far from secure, as these 
fluctuations in autonomy demonstrate.  	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 Despite this political instability, Catalan nationalism was by and large open and 
inclusive. During this time, and throughout most of the 20th century, as well, there was 
hardly any foreign immigration to speak of – most immigrants to Catalonia came from 
less-developed regions of Spain and spoke either local dialects or Castilian Spanish. The 
number of immigrants as a percentage of the population steadily increased from the end 
of the 19th century until the Great Depression, rising from 1.25% on 1887 to 4.22% by 
1900 and 14.03% in 1920. 339  Though rates of immigration slowed following the 
Depression, immigrant inflows surged again in the midst of Franco’s cultural oppression 
in the 50s and 60s. During this period, Catalonia industrialized considerably, prompting 
unprecedented waves of immigration from other parts of Spain, particularly Andalusía. 
Between 1951 and 1970, approximately 1.16 million immigrants arrived in Catalonia.340 
As Saéz notes, immigration accounted for a much larger proportion of the population 
growth than ‘natural’ growth through birth: 65% vs. 35% in 1965.341 Although figures 
differ, estimates place the percentage of Catalan residents borne outside the region at 
above 47% in 1970.342  
 The conditions seem poised to reinforce or spur an ethnic, defensive nationalism. 
As George Scott suggests, national identities should form all the more strongly in the face 
of opposition: “the greater the opposition – economic, political, social, religious, or some 
combination thereof – perceived by an ethnic group, the greater the degree to which its 
historical sense of distinctiveness will be aroused, and hence the greater its solidarity or 
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the more intense its movement will be.”343 This theory suggests that immigrants should 
be viewed as a threat, especially because Catalonia lacked any formal institutional or 
structural powers to manage the new immigrants. As Conversi writes, “Francoist 
prohibition made impossible the immigrants’ cultural integration at the very moment 
when a massive in that direction was most needed.”344 As Hypothesis 1 predicts, these 
circumstances should lead to a strong demand for control over immigration, which, when 
unfulfilled, would be likely to turn against and define itself in opposition to immigrants.  
 But this hypothesis fails to explain Catalonia’s inclusive national identity under 
Franco and before. Modern Catalonia has always defined itself by openness and 
inclusivity, even though it is culturally distinct from the other regions in Spain. Not 
surprisingly, there was a significant degree of debate within Catalonia about how to 
address the ‘problem’ of immigration. To be sure, some Catalan intellectuals responded 
with racism and ethnic definitions of what it means to Catalan. However, the scholarly 
consensus seems to be that the majority of Catalans rejected the “fiercely negative, and 
exclusivist, reaction to the 1950s and 1960s wave of immigration,” preferring more 
inclusive definitions of belonging.345 Consider Jordi Pujol’s widely cited affirmation:  
Our central problem is immigration, and hence, integration. The basic objective is 
to build up a community valid for all Catalans. And I would add that by Catalan I 
mean everybody who lives and works in Catalonia and who makes Catalonia his / 
her home and country, with which he / she incorporates and identifies.346 
 
At a time where no mechanisms existed with which to regulate immigration, Catalonia 
largely opted for a definition of citizenship based on residence. Even under a Francoist 
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regime where “[Catalan] integration policies would have been considered a contradiction 
in terms in a supposedly uni-cultural state,” Pujol’s proclamation shows that Catalonia 
had always engaged with the question of integration and its ‘differentiated reality’.347   
Still, it should be noted that even within this civic national identity, common 
culture, and particularly language, was central. As almost all scholars stress, language has 
always been a decisive factor in defining Catalan-ness. As Pujol says, “Language is the 
decisive factor in the integration of immigrants to Catalonia. It’s the most definitive. A 
man who speaks Catalan, and speaks Catalan to his children, is a Catalan through and 
through.”348 Though his definition of national belonging certainly contains elements of 
culture, the nation is defined in way that is accessible to any potential migrant.  
 Nevertheless, this culturally civic nationality policy does not explain why the 
ethnic reaction my hypotheses predict never arose. Relatedly, why didn’t Catalan 
nationalism disappear entirely during nearly four decades of “cultural genocide?” I think 
three points interrelated points are particularly salient in explaining this puzzle: language 
status, the origin of immigrants, and cultural repression. From the case of Quebec, above, 
it is clear that one of the principle determinants of immigrant linguistic assimilation is 
language status. Regardless of origin (or native tongue), immigrants are not likely to 
work to learn a language unless they see it as being beneficial to themselves. For this 
reason, Quebec’s oft-debated language polices aim at raising the status of French by 
making it the language of social services, education, business, and daily life. These 
efforts seek to combat the tendency of immigrants to choose to learn the majority 
language (as they generally prefer to do, given the free choice). 	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Unlike pre-1960s Quebec, migrants were attracted to Catalonia for its advanced 
industry, and the Catalan language already enjoyed “high prestige.”349 The Catalan elite 
controlled and managed the flourishing regional economy; as such, linguistic 
assimilation, acted as a “tool for integration and social mobility,” as well. That is, 
immigrants actively wanted to become part of Catalan society.350 As Woolard shows, 
even once Catalonia enacted its language policies, these policies merely supported and 
maintained the already high status of Catalan.351 Even in the absence of linguistic 
integration policies, language prestige made immigrants more likely to learn Catalan and 
employ it in daily life, such that by 1981, approximately half of Catalonia could still 
speak Catalan, despite a multi-decade ban.352 The configurations I propose in Hypothesis 
1 do not account for the importance of language prestige. In both the case of Quebec and 
Catalonia, therefore, we have seen relevant aspects language that are not accounted for by 
fluency rates alone – linguistic integration (into the Anglophone context in Canada) and 
language prestige. Given the importance of language as a key aspect of national and 
cultural identity in both cases, it may be necessary to go explore language more deeply.   
Furthermore, language acquisition may have been facilitated by the fact that 
almost all immigrants were internal migrants, who already spoke and understood 
Castilian, a closely related language. While Shafir cautions against the “ease-of-learning” 
hypothesis (which posits that Castilian-speakers could almost effortlessly adopt Catalan), 
it is clear that internal migrants who speak the dominant state language are not faced with 
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the same choice as Allophones in Canada, for example. In the case of Quebec, it is 
assumed that immigrants will learn either English or French – they must chose between 
the language of the majority, or the language of the nested nation. The presence of this 
choice has led Quebec to mandate French-language education to counteract immigrants’ 
tendency to learn English, which they have typically seen as more beneficial. Internal 
migrants, though nonetheless faced with the difficulty of learning a new language, would 
only have to learn Catalan to be fully competent in a bilingual milieu, unlike an 
Allophone in Quebec. This has interesting implications for whether internal or external 
migrants pose a greater challenge to national minorities, a question my hypotheses leave 
open, though I do not think we can draw definitive conclusions based on this case 
alone.353  
Moreover, some scholars surmise that cultural oppression may actually have 
strengthened Catalan nationalism. Following Scott, we would expect what he terms 
‘opposition’ to strengthen Catalan nationalism in opposition to all outsiders, including 
immigrants; however in the case of Catalonia, it seems that opposition from the 
dictatorship actually facilitated immigrant integration. Cultural repression “works for 
Catalonia because oppression validates the status and legitimacy of the Catalan identity in 
contrast with Spain.” This oppression, surprisingly, may have actually heightened the 
appeal of cultural assimilation and self-identification with Catalonia among immigrants. 
As McRoberts writes, opposition to the Franco regime increased the status of Catalan 
language and culture while simultaneously causing Catalan elites to “see immigrants as 
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allies, and even potential members of the Catalan nation.”354 This helps to explain why 
Catalonia developed a civic national self-conception while simultaneously emphasizing 
its cultural distinctiveness, particularly through language.  
 To review, Catalonia developed as a late-blooming nationalism, built on the 
pairing of a distinctive culture and language with industrial and economic strength. 
Throughout this time, Catalonia still did not enjoy autonomy within democratic Spain. 
Still, Catalonia demonstrates a remarkable openness despite experiencing demographic 
instability, cultural repression, and no control whatsoever over massive waves of 
immigration. Does this openness indicate that my hypotheses fail to account for the 
development of Catalan national identity (the only ‘dependent variable’ to speak of 
before 1978)? Only partially: I stand by the hypothesis that demographic instability, high 
rates of immigration out of the minority control will lead to demand for control of 
migration (and by extension, indicate that the notion of uncontrolled or state controlled 
immigration is a “problem” for the national minority). However, in Catalonia, because of 
the economic strength, linguistic prestige, and status of Catalan culture (relative to 
Spain), immigrants arguably demonstrated a higher degree of willingness to assimilate. 
This points to a broad concept that should be incorporated into future models – the 
willingness of the immigrant population to integrate: language prestige, economic 
development, and cultural oppression may all play a role in defining this concept.  
Furthermore, Catalonia’s relatively civic definition of nationalism comes with the 
territory of case selection that includes only ‘most likely’ cases. Given this selection bias, 
we should expect compatibility even in conditions that in other cases would produce 
conflict. As Shafir notes, of the four cases he reviews, “Catalonia is the exception in that 	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immigration has not generated sustained opposition or served as the trigger of 
nationalism,” but instead advanced attempts at assimilation and inclusion.355 This finding, 
anomalous though it might be, suggests that institutional competencies may matter less 
than the integrative power of the national minority, however enforced. Still, though 
Catalonia articulated an inclusive nationality policy during this period, we have yet to see 
how its position towards immigration changed as it gained self-government within a 
democratic society.    
II. Democratization and Devolution: Integration without Competencies  	  
The decentralization of the Spanish state and the establishment of Catalonia as an 
Autonomous Community accompanied the period of democratization after the fall of the 
dictatorship. However, the autonomy arrangements established in Spain maintain power 
at the federal level for many of the competencies that we see in Quebec. Notably, 
Catalonia exercised no competency over admission policies, and had to balance its own 
efforts at cultural and linguistic normalization with the constraints of overlapping 
jurisdiction with the Spanish state. Moreover, demographically, the significant proportion 
of immigrants who now formed part of the Catalan populace posed challenges for 
defining national identity. During this period, once again, we see Catalonia work to 
define an open and inclusive national identity, though belongingness still required a 
significant degree of assimilation. This section discusses the limitations on devolutions of 
power in Catalonia, and considers how Catalonia nonetheless demonstrated a significant 
willingness to incorporate immigrants into the nation, albeit on culturally civic terms. 
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 Franco’s death in 1975 culminated a period of uncertainty and brought about 
Spain’s transition to democracy. Popular support in national elections heavily favored 
autonomy, and the new Spanish President Adolfo Suárez reestablished the Generalitat 
with Joseph Taradellas as its president in 1977, though it still lacked a formal statute of 
autonomy. McRoberts shows that for many politicians and civilians, decentralization and 
regional autonomy was treated as question of political necessity; the support of the 
regions was essential. “Like it or not, and many Spaniards didn’t, the goals of 
democratization and Catalan autonomy were intimately linked.”356 One of the key 
variables I identify above is the role of the nested nation in the formation of the state and 
drafting of the constitution. In the climate of uncertainty and pressure for a democratic 
break, Catalonia (and other ‘historic nationalities’) played a key role in the process of 
democratization and decentralization, albeit with mixed sympathy.357 As Oriol Pi-Sunyer 
affirms, “There is no question that in the Spanish context democracy and devolution have 
to be viewed as related elements of the same political transformation.”358 Of course, 
democratization, though it marked a dramatic break with Spain’s recent past, is not 
technically foundation of the Spanish state. Spain’s federal arrangement came about 
through decentralization, in contrast with Canada’s birth through confederation.  
The two most important documents that solidified Catalan self-government were 
the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and Catalan Statue of Autonomy of 1979. Together, 
these laid the groundwork for Catalonia’s self-government in democratic Spain. The 
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Spanish Constitution reflects the tension and balancing act achieved by institutionalizing 
forms and procedures for autonomy, while simultaneously declaring “the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards.”359 
Prieto de Pedro notes the complex cultural identities embodied in the Constitution: on the 
one hand, it makes reference to common culture, official language, and the Spanish 
nation; on the other, it subtly models an “integrative vision of the plurality of cultures.” 
For example, it speaks of multiple Spanish ‘peoples,’ ‘languages,’360 and ‘nationalities’ 
and gives overlapping powers to the State and the Autonomous Communities with 
reference to culture.361  
Articles 143-158 detail the right to self-government, authorities granted to, and 
procedures for establish the Autonomous Communities. 362  While Galicia, Basque 
Country, and Catalonia were given ‘fast track’ status based on their pre-Franco statues of 
autonomy, the Constitution also established process for granting autonomy to other 
territories seeking it.363 In total, 17 regions were granted autonomy between 1978 and 
1983, making Catalonia one of many nations or cultural communities within a 
heterogeneous Spain. Though the specifics of each governmental arrangement were 
negotiated independently, and therefore asymmetrical, the Constitution provides the basis 
for the rights of the State and those of the Autonomous Communities.  
Despite the radical break with Francoism, many (particularly Catalans) viewed 
the powers delegated to Catalonia as insufficient. While the Autonomous Communities 	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assume “competency” over matters such as the institutions of self-government, public 
works, internal boundaries, city planning, and the promotion of culture, the Spanish state 
retained 31 exclusive rights.364 The notable centralization of powers has led some to 
question whether Spain qualifies as a federation. Ferran Requejo shows how the Spanish 
model differs from traditional federations, lacking both institutional and procedural 
elements such as clearly decentralized division of power, regional fiscal powers (e.g. 
taxation), and control over the judiciary or constitutional reform.365 Moreover, rather than 
a continuous process of devolution, as we saw in Quebec, Catalonia and the other regions 
have experienced fluctuating devolution of power, where central political parties 
attempted to restrict autonomy at some points, but curried favor when they viewed the 
regions as necessary for electoral success. According to Requejo, the erratic nature of 
devolution and centralization from the 1980s to today reflect a fundamental discord and 
confusion between the perspectives of “decentralization and multi-nationalism.”366 Since 
democratization, Catalonia has engaged in a process of continued negotiation in Spain, 
and still lacks many of the competencies we would anticipate. As Oriol Pi-Sunyer writes, 
“It should be stressed that it is the nature of the post-Franco structure of politics that 
many issues of particular importance to Catalans cannot be voted on.”367 This insecurity 
suggests that Catalonia may not have had the authority or ability to exercise greater 
demands, as it struggled to maintain its distinctive status. 
With respect to culture and immigration, Catalonia demonstrates concerted efforts 
towards the promotion of a common culture in which the Catalan language was central  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Articles 148-9  
365 Requejo, Multinational Federalism, 83 
366 Requejo, Multinational Federalism, 83-5 
367 Pi-Sunyer, 11 
	   Lipton	  176	  
From its foundation, the Generalitat de Catalunya saw the revival of national 
culture and language as paramount. Under Convergéncia i Unió (CiU), which came to 
power in the first provincial election, Catalonia pursued a process of nation building and 
cultural restoration that sought to undo the traumas of the Franco dictatorship by focusing 
on language, literature, popular culture, and more modern forms of culture, like public 
media and journalism. But, as McRoberts writes, “the tasks to be faced were little short of 
staggering.”368  
During the 1980s and 1990s, Catalonia experienced relatively low rates of 
immigration, and focused on cultural revival, the development of strong civil society, 
education, media, and a welfare state. The Department of Cultura slowly began receiving 
funds from the central government and developing an internal organization and strategy 
for cultural policy. Simultaneously, however, the Spanish Ministry of Culture continued 
operation with powers over culture and heritage state-wide. According to Crameri, “this 
means that any competencies accorded to the autonomous communities in the area of 
culture run concurrently with the state’s own cultural institutions.”369   
Language policy quickly became the cornerstone of the CiU’s cultural agenda.370 
Under the first Catalan Statute of Autonomy, Article 3, Catalan was declared the “llengua 
própia” (own language) of Catalonia, co-official with Castilian.371 This phrasing is 
consistent with the framework of the Constitution, which declared Castilian the official 
language of the state, adding that “all Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to 
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use it,” with the provision that other languages could be made, at most, co-official.372 In 
comparison to Quebec, we see considerable overlap of competencies with the Federal 
government with respect to cultural and language policies.   
Within this framework, Catalonia’s declaration shows momentous progresses 
relative to the Franco years, but also a fundamental inability to sufficiently address the 
question of linguistic normalization373 Yet despite debate and protestation, the Linguistic 
Normalization Act of 1983 worked within these limits to extend the official status of 
Catalan (as a llengua própia) to education, local administration, public media, and other 
institutional contexts.  
The extent of this legislation “quite modest in scope” compared to Quebec’s Bill 
101; Catalan normalization operates within an officially bilingual status (as mandated by 
the Constitution), and it does not cover the private sector.374 Despite the goal of making 
Catalonia the de facto language of public life, the language normalization act “establishes 
not exclusiveness [as in Quebec] but parity.”375  
Nonetheless, normalization has been reasonably effective. In 1981, 75% of 
Catalans understood Catalan, 53% spoke, and only 15% were able to write (a result of the 
lack of formal education under Franco). By 2001, these figures had reached 95%, 75%, 
and 50% respectively.376 As the discussion of language above suggets, these policies may 
have only reinforced already significant language status; nonetheless they represent 
remarkable progress given the constraints.377 However, the extent of use both in business 
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and at home has been more modest. As I discuss below, perceived limitations to linguistic 
normalization led to a new language law passed by the Catalan parliament in 1997.  
Cultural policy for the remainder of the 20th century began with a focus on 
linguistic normalization based on the “entrenched position on the link between languages 
and cultures which informed virtually all cultural policy decisions.”378 Though the CiU 
pursued revitalization of literature, museums, history, and the arts, language policy was 
its core cultural focus – albeit within the limits of the 1978 Constitution. As Crameri 
summarizes, “CiU effectively advocated a strong form of cultural normalization which 
was actually predicated on a weak form of linguistic normalization.”379  
However, with respect to immigration, Catalonia exercised no competency over 
admission, and shared competency over integration. In the negotiations related to the 
Constitution of 1978, immigration remained exclusively under the power of the state. 
Given Catalonia’s experience with immigration under Franco, it is all the more surprising 
that this demand did not play a larger role in negotiations leading to the Constitution: 
“There was never any real debate on the distribution of immigration-related powers in the 
Spanish framework of institutions and autonomous communities.”380 Immigration policy 
is only passingly mentioned in the Catalan Statue of Autonomy. Even the 2006 Statute of 
Autonomy (later ruled unconstitutional), sought exclusive control only over integration 
and reception, and shared control over quotas, rules, and international accords. Therefore, 
with respect to immigrant management, Catalonia displays a notable absence of 
competency. As Zapata-Barrero writes,  
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If we focus our argument on an analysis of the actions and institutional output of 
the Generalitat in matters of immigration, and we try to identify those aspects 
related to self-government, it will not be surprising if we find nothing. This 
indicates that Catalonia is really at the beginning of a stage where it has not even 
begun to construct an institutional framework suitable to its own identity. In 
political terms, we have not yet entered into the ‘operational phase.’381  
 
This notable lack of competency (and immigrant-directed policies) makes 
examining how Catalan public philosophy of immigration evolved over time a 
worthwhile test of Hypothesis 2, particularly as it concerns national identity and 
multiculturalism. In this context, we can see the complex attitudes towards integration, 
particularly in reference to the question, “who is Catalan?”  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the CiU pursued a national project defined in civic 
terms that are intentionally open to immigrants (at the time, still non-Catalan Spaniards). 
Pujol’s affirmation that anyone who lived in Catalonia was Catalan held constant 
throughout CiU’s governance, until the turn of the century. But as Davis notes, “while 
predominantly civic in nature, [the Pujolian approach] also imposes a large measure of 
assimilation into the nation-building process.” This can be seen in the gradual efforts at 
linguistic assimilation, particularly in the process of standardizing Catalan education, as 
well as the notable lack of immigrant-specific services.382 This last point, the absence of 
immigrant-specific services, supposedly indicates the philosophy “that all residents of 
Catalonia should be treated equally…[with] equal rights and equal responsibilities.”383 
But this absence also indicates that the openness of the Generalitat occurs within a pre-
defined framework, based on formal non-differentiation.  
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 Despite its attempts at openness, Catalonia continued to grapple with remaining 
challenges from 1950s and 60s waves of internal migrants. First, as a matter of identity, 
most of these immigrants and their children, continued to identify themselves primarily 
as Spanish rather than Catalan.384 This points to the challenge of a nationality policy that 
is technically open but may still fail to absorb new members. As McRoberts writes 
(echoing Juteau’s similar claim about Quebec), “the predominant Catalan nationalist 
discourse may be deliberately inclusive and designed to embrace immigrants, but this is 
no guarantee that they will in fact adopt it.”385 Second, despite success at teaching 
Catalan, the Generalitat found more difficulty in expanding its use in daily life. These 
issues persisted and resurfaced anew in the 21st century, as I discuss below.  
 Why did Catalonia not gain or seek competency over immigration policies during 
this time? Following Hypothesis 1, we should look both at the level of demand, and at the 
state structure and Catalonia’s place within it. Turning to the demand side, Catalonia 
displays the demographic and linguistic concerns I consider likely to motivate demand. 
Still, it is important to consider the specifics of this immigrant population: internal 
migration in a state (Spain) that was an historic net exporter of migrants. In the early 
years of democracy, the status and powers Catalonia, Galicia, and Basque Country had 
been granted were already under assault. The overturned Organic Law to Harmonize the 
Autonomy Process (LOAPA), which sought to reduce the powers of these three historic 
communities, reflects the insecure position of the Autonomous Communities. Catalonia 
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could not be expected to demand more extensive sovereignty during this period, despite a 
demonstrably pressing need.386  
More importantly, it seems that Catalan politicians did not see themselves as 
having much to gain in establishing control over admission policies. Spain was a historic 
migrant exporter, and even extensive competency over admission would not allow 
Catalonia the ability to restrict internal migration. Furthermore, then and now, Catalonia 
does not have the luxury of speaking an international language the way that Francophone 
Quebecois do. That is to say, its potential for linguistic recruitment and selection is 
almost zero other than bordering regions and exiles.  
At the federal level, devolution was complicated by the structure of the state: 
multiple Autonomous Communities saw themselves as historic nations; gains by one 
community would, and did, have repercussions across the state. Though Catalonia had a 
historical claim to some sovereignty in the form of pre-existing Statutes of Autonomy 
under the Second Republic, the fact that it was but one of many distinct communities 
within a multinational state likely impeded devolution of power.  
 In conclusion, during the period following its autonomy, the Generalitat, under 
the CiU, dealt with the seemingly insurmountable challenges it confronted at the end of 
the Franco dictatorship. It faced the problem of recovering an oppressed culture and 
language, while managing a population whose composition had changed dramatically 
during a period where Catalonia lacked any mechanism for integration. Once again, 
Catalan nationalists, politicians, and the majority of its citizens refused to revert to an 
ethnic or defensive nationalism. As Pi-Sunyer appraised the situation in 1991, 
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What we have in Catalonia is not the defense of the ‘traditional’…but the 
reworking of values, usages and institutions to meet the needs of the present. It 
follows that ‘the culture’ is not a unified, homogenous system, but rather a 
dynamic sphere in which beliefs, objects, and ideas are being constantly 
manipulated and changed. That this makes for tension inside the society is not to 
be doubted, but it is also true that this tension is a manifestation of vitality.387  
 
The tensions Pi-Sunyer describes refer to Catalonia’s evolving status in Spain, as well as 
the challenges it encountered in terms of reviving an oppressed language and culture and 
defining belonging in a society where “immigrants and their children far outnumber 
natives.”388 Despite this model’s shortcomings and the high degree of assimilation it 
mandated, Catalonia was able to define an officially civic national project with respect to 
the unprecedented levels of immigration it received in the 20th century.  
III. New Immigration and the Via Catalana (2001-Present): Backlash or 
Interculturalism?  	  
The 21st century brought new diversity to Spain and Catalonia that raised both 
new still-unresolved questions about the place of immigrants within Catalonia, and the 
place of Catalonia within Spain.389. The past 10-15 years have been marked by a 
fascinating evolution and challenge to Catalonia’s seemingly unflappable readiness to 
accommodate and integrate immigrants through the promotion of Catalan culture and 
language as part of an official civic nationality policy. During this period, we can detect 
the seemingly incongruous trends towards ethnicization and defensiveness, as well as 
moves towards accommodation and recognition of diversity. In essence, Catalonia seems 
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to be at the precipice of developing a model of interculturalism, based on a clearer 
definition of a public culture and the recognition of pluralism.  
 As the table below demonstrates, foreign immigration increased substantially in 
Spain at the turn of the century, and affected Catalonia especially, probably due to the 
strength of the Catalan economy.  
 
390 
 Foreign immigrants represent a different challenge entirely, and this period not 
surprisingly represents a new epoch in Catalan immigrant-host relationships. It should be 
noted that, as this graph indicates, foreign immigration to Catalonia did not begin entirely 
in 2000, although it did increase dramatically. McDonogh’s 1990 article, “Reflections on 
New Immigration in Catalonia,” for example, details the economic and social condition 
of various groups of immigrants in Catalonia in first decades of democratization. During 
this time, when foreign immigrants comprised around 2% of the population, McDonogh 
shows how social perceptions of immigrants differed by the their country of origin, which 	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almost presupposed their expected roles in society. During this time, external migrants 
represented a separate task, particularly with respect to linguistic assimilation: “Castilian, 
as a statewide language, can appear more valuable to them than Catalan…”391 Though 
Catalan still holds considerable prestige, Maghrebis, North Africans, and Filipinos faced 
a binary choice (Spanish or Catalan?) that recalls the situation of Quebec. These 
immigrants, even in small numbers, pose considerably different challenges in terms of 
language, culture, identity, and accommodation than non-Catalan Spaniards.  
 Not surprisingly, these challenges amplified as Spain quickly became an 
immigrant-receiving state. State immigration policy, previous operating under the poorly-
enforced 1985 Ley de Extranjería, evolved with the Law of Rights and Freedoms of 
Foreigners in Spain and Their Intergation (2000) which shifted focus from regulating 
admission to integration and social rights.392 This law was supported by a broad coalition, 
including the CiU. At the institutional level, Catalan language policy was strengthened by 
a 1998 law mandating Catalan as the primary language of instruction for all students, 
Castillian-speaking or not.393 The Catalan Institute for the Cultural Industries (ICIC), 
created in 2001, focused on production of culture in the 21st century, through mediums 
like television and cinema.394 Yet by 2003, the new left-wing government sought to 
decouple what it saw as “the unhealthy link between language and culture.”395  
Not surprisingly, this new model corresponded with an increased demand for 
competency. The Catalan Statute of Autonmy of 2006, approved by the Catalan 	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parliament, included provisions making Catalan the “preferential” language, as well as 
establishing exclusive control over integration and consultation powers over admission 
policies.396 However, in 2010, the Spanish courts over-ruled both of these changes, re-
affirming the primacy of the state in issues related to immigration, and the co-official 
status of Catalan and Spanish.397  
 The new challenge for the 21st century, as Crameri persuasively argues, involves 
positioning Catalonia and Catalan nationalism in relation to globalization and 
hybridization. With respect to its place in an increasingly interconnected world, Catalonia 
has sought to clearly define itself, to protect against a homogenizing global culture. This 
involved attempting to package or “brand” Catalan nationalism in a way that essentializes 
what it means to be Catalan, in order that it might be protected and projected globally. 398 
This effort, not surprisingly, replicates the process of cultural preservation Catalonia has 
grappled with in Spain, but in a broader scope.  
The newest challenge, spurred by immigrants who are visibly, culturally, and 
linguistically distinct, is what this global challenge indicates for Catalonia locally. As 
Crameri asks, “Does the preservation of singularity in the face of global homogenization 
presuppose the need to limit internal cultural diversity?”399 This question, though still 
unresolved, is a fascinating re-articulation of my research question herein. The answer, 
however, remains to be seen.   
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Recent trends in immigration policy show the Generalitat adopting a contractual 
approach, clearly articulating what has consistently been the core of its integration policy:  
Immigrants were therefore told that they must see their presence in the region as 
dependent on entering a pact: the Generalitat would provide the necessary help 
and advice to allow immigrants to settle in Catalonia, but in return they had to be 
willing to respect Catalonia’s “fundamental values” and “learn Catalan, the 
country’s language.”400 
 
 This pact matches in many ways Quebec’s “moral contract,” and similarly, raises 
a number of challenges. This vision was articulated under the Interdepartmental Plan of 
Immigration in the early 2000s, which expressed a “Catalan Approach” (Via Catalan) to 
integration, emphasizing both the benefit and challenge of the newest waves of 
migration: “Its basic premise is that immigration holds great hope for the social and 
economic future of Catlonia, but also great doubts for a Catalonia that is intent on 
maintaining and increasing its political and cultural uniqueness.”401 This new approach to 
integration introduced the language of citizenship that was “plural and civic.” 402   
Consider the specifics of the 2005-2008 plan:  
1. Recognition of Cultural Diversity 
2. Human Rights and Respect for Personal Dignity 
3. Universality of public policies and respect for individual rights 
4. Assurance of the stability and cohesion of Catalan society 
5. Defense of the Catalan language as the language of the resident-citizens 
6. Coordination, cooperation, and co-responsibility 
7. Developing integration policies with European foundations403 
 
By this plan, Catalonia clearly articulates a liberal, individual- and human rights 
oriented perspective of citizenship (points 2, 3, and 7). Within this framework, it also 
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attempts to balance recognition of cultural diversity (point 1) with a clear emphasis on the 
prominence of Catalan language and the “cohesion” of Catalan society. Finally, this plan 
reinforces the notion of a pact with the notion of co-responsibility, or mutual obligations.  
Overall, it articulates a clearly integrationist and open model of Catalan society, which 
attempts to manage the cultural challenges of immigration while enjoying its economic 
and social benefits. This policy differs only slightly from what has long been the de facto 
and official discursive model of Catalan integration. However, it differs both in that it is a 
clear affirmation of pluralism, and that it speaks to the role of institutions in executing 
policies consistent with this model. In this context, competency over admission and 
integration jumped to the front of the agenda, as the changes to the 2006 Statute of 
Autonomy make clear. As Ricard Zapata-Barrero affirms, “from the point of view of self-
government, without public intervention, it is necessary to recognize that immigrants are 
not allies.”404 
Only recently, these measures for increased competency were struck down in 
Catalonia, meaning that Catalan integration policy, national identity, and philosophy / 
practice of accommodation practices are still in flux. Nonetheless, we can draw some 
tentative conclusions about these most recent developments, in practice, over the past 
decade.  
Racism in general has appeared in Spain and across Europe in response to new 
diversity, but in Catalonia, as in Quebec, these events have an added element of cultural 
anxiety, protectionism and xenophobia for at least some of the population.405  For 
example, since 2000, an anti-immigrant political part has had modest electoral success. 	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New waves of migration, particularly of North Africans and Arabs, have posed racial, 
linguistic, and religious challenges that Catalonia did not encounter in the past.406 As 
McRoberts writes, Catalonia’s civic nationalism is “now faced with much more rigorous 
challenges” than ever before, and its ability to meet these challenges is only now being 
tested.407 Similarly, Crameri notes that some elements of public rhetoric re-introduce an 
“ethnic” aspect of identity not present in previous articulations of what it means to be 
Catalan.408  As he writes, there seems not to be room for hyphenated identities (e.g. 
Morrocan-Catalan), as there are in Quebec.409  
 Still, despite these institutional and social challenges, Catalonia has begun to 
develop the makings of an intercultural policy, with room for accommodation and public 
support. As the immigration plan above intimates, Catalonia is working to define a 
common public culture that, as a first point, recognizes cultural diversity. The 
Multiculturalism Policy Index indicates that the Catalan government now “provides 
grants to local authorities and organizations that facilitate the integration of immigrants 
and that undertake programs designed to promote interculturalism and diversity.”410  
Similarly at the municipal level, Barcelona has made strides towards realizing itself as a 
plural but fundamentally Catalan city. The Ajuntament de Barcelona, in 2008, sought to 
promote equality and the commonality of citizenship, but emphasized, “intercultural 
relations take place in a specific milieu and context. For this reason, the cultural heritage 
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of the host society and its language are the essential foundations upon which 
interculturalism should be approached.”411 
Catalonia now can be said to be working to define a public philosophy based on 
inclusion and preservation, much as Quebec did before it. Still, the foundation for this 
progress is shaky. In recent dealings with Muslim Catalans, Davis notes the 
“government’s willingness to put boundaries on the ‘limits’ of plurality in Catalonia.”412 
Recognition of diversity therefore, still has clear parameters. As Aragón affirms,  
Within the sphere of diversity, the presence of immigrants in society in general 
and in school in particular is accepted as something positive, but a vector of 
rejection emerges when fasted with the possibility of establishing relations 
between cultures and religions beyond the assimilationist or integrationist 
model.413 
  
He concludes, though, that Catalonia’s developing model of diversity management 
“alienates the actions of the Catalan institutions both from the rigidity of the 
assimilationist models and from the relativism which certain forms of multiculturalism 
can reach.”414 To me, this seems to suggest that Catalonia is now entering a phase of 
interculturalism as a response to the new waves of immigrants and the particular 
challenge of linguistic, cultural, and racial pluralism. 
 Catalonia, surprisingly, confirms what we would expect in the model of 
intercultural nationalism, but in the absence of significant political competencies over 
immigration and integration. What does this demonstrate about Hypothesis 2? By Blad 
and Couton’s model, interculturalism requires that a common political and cultural 
“milieu” be institutionally protected and promoted, but not that the national minority has 
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control over admission and integration. I hypothesize, building on Kymlicka, that the 
exercise of these competencies is a necessary pre-condition to the development of this 
model. Catalonia seems to disprove this hypothesis by showing that these competencies 
might not be necessary. How should we explain this? 
 Having reviewed this case, I would posit Catalonia does demonstrate institutional 
protection of a dominant culture necessary for the development of intercultural 
natioanlism. Even without the significant cultural development and revitalization policy it 
has undertaken (spanning literature to media and broadcasting), the Generalitat is a 
Catalan nationalist government. Because Catalonia enjoys linguistic prestige and now 
mandates immigrant schooling in Catalan, Catalonia may simply have the competency it 
needs to provide it the security necessary for integration. Though it pursues control over 
admission policies and increased competencies with respect to integration, these policies 
are not necessary preconditions for openness.  
 Considering both Quebec and Catalonia, it seems that competencies of selection 
and integration may strengthen the national minority’s security, but are not necessary for 
national minority openness. These policies are just one aspect of the more important 
variable of an institutional framework that promotes and protects a common culture. 
Catalonia serves as a counter-point to the hypotheses of intercultural nationalism I 
develop, and suggests improvements to these hypotheses might take into account 
institutional competencies not strictly related to immigration, and  immigrant willingness 
to assimilate.  
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Conclusion: Evaluating the Justice of Competing Demands 
 
With these cases fully fleshed out, we can return to the theoretical question that 
drives this thesis in the first place – whether liberal multiculturalism can succeed on the 
liberal terms it sets itself. I feel that even at this stage in this project, I am just beginning 
to develop the language to consider these scenarios, and the contextual background to 
understand the complexities of the real world. Still, this chapter reviews the overlap 
between normative and political considerations, and offers some thoughts going ahead.  
These cases show decisively that national minority self-government can be 
reconciled with internal diversity – that is, it is clear that not all national minorities are 
inherently defensive. In both cases, we see the openness of the nation to incorporate and 
to a significant degree even accommodate immigrants. Openness necessitates the 
willingness to receive immigrants, integrate them into the public sphere, and have them 
become members of the nation (admission, integration, and nation policy). Beyond these 
processes, openness to internal multiplicity poses a far greater challenge, suggesting the 
provocative idea that national minorities can (or should) themselves become 
multicultural. Multiculturalism, as I affirm from the outset, spans ideology, policy, and 
practice. A society that recognizes and accommodates cultural pluralism goes beyond 
formal inclusion to recognize and respond to diversity as a defining aspect of the nation; 
this requires that the government acknowledge cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity 
while taking steps to address the needs and demands that members of these groups make.  
As both Quebec and Catalonia validate, national minority self-government can be 
compatible with the integration and accommodation of immigrants, but within the limits 
of intercultural nationalism. This assessment, of course, raises its own set of questions: is 
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there a right to cultural preservation? To what extent does protection for one group 
legitimize incursion on the rights of another? Can liberal ends justify illiberal means? 
How, if at all, can we assess the relative moral weight between immigrant minorities and 
national minorities?  
In particular, the outcomes present in these cases – admission policy, language 
policy, ‘cultural nationalism’ and intercultural accommodation – call out for further 
exploration. I am drawn to these normative questions, which seek to assess the morality 
and justice of these real-world scenarios. Each of these variables, including the specific 
policies we see enacted in these cases, provokes a rich debate about which arrangements 
best suit liberal norms, where and how values might conflict, and finally, what we ought 
to do. Bringing these various philosophical assessments together, we might assess each of 
the policies on the liberal credentials of its ends or means.   
I elect not to go down that road, though I believe that the model of intercultural 
nationalism warrants our endorsement. In part, I fear that by assessing each policy 
separately we run the risk of seeing the trees instead of the forest. Liberals have a 
tendency to concentrate on ever-narrower concerns, as my focus here on a minority 
within a minority reveals. This is referred to as the “Russian doll” dilemma; each doll (in 
this case, area of scrutiny) contains another “nested” inside it: states include nations 
include immigrants include Muslims include women, and so on, until we arrive at a 
single individual: the bearer of an unknowably complex identity. This process of 
narrowing, to a certain degree, is not a bad thing; on the contrary, I think it represents 
sensitivity to detail only possible when scholars and policy-makers have made so much 
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progress at a broader level. However, the utility of any specific focus should also be 
determined by how well it enables us to make inferences more broadly.  
Most importantly, it is clear that any conclusions we draw from these cases are 
ultimately subjective – there is no set of ‘best practice’ rules of minority self-government 
that can avoid the general tension between preservation and openness present in these and 
other cases. This is not to say that there are no moral standards whatsoever by which we 
can evaluate them – the use of ethnic admission criteria or harshly homogenizing 
integration policies (e.g. banning minority languages) come to mind as examples of 
policies which fall below this minimum standard. However, to the extent that distinct 
arrangements reflect a balance of legitimate, liberal goals, which facilitate the 
coexistence of national minorities and immigrant minorities within a single territory, 
these arrangements by necessity demonstrate some compatibility. Moreover, without 
veering into cultural relativism, it is important to consider the way that institutional 
arrangements reflect and interact with the specific conditions present in a given case. 
Defining a single overarching value judgment or normative proposition for all possible 
cases is not only impossible, but also unfruitful. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering, in a more general sense, the meaning and 
conditions of compatibility these cases show, and what these findings suggest going 
forward. Following Zapata-Barrero, I define compatibility above as the absence of 
infringement: national minorities and immigrants are compatible to the extent that they 
are not locked in a zero-sum game where the cultural rights gains of one necessarily limit 
those of the other. However, having reviewed these cases, compatibility seems, 
ironically, to have an added dimension of mutual constraint. Both the national minority 
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and the immigrant minority limit the cultural rights of one another. It is easy to fall into 
the trap of considering only how national minority immigration policies affect 
immigrants in their territory – for example: what degree or type openness do these 
policies articulate, who does the national minority permit to enter, how does the national 
minority define openness? When analyzing policy, as I do in the cases, this top-down 
focus is necessary to scrutinize the exercise of self-government. This approach allows us 
to assess the relative defensiveness or openness of the national minority as a governing 
institution – and also provokes normative questions about what limitations the national 
minority can justly pose on admission, language policy, etc.  
However, it is also worth considering how constraint works in the other direction. 
While national minorities generally exist within liberal states, the presence of internal 
diversity poses significant constraints and bottom-up challenges. The appearance of 
would-be immigrants or refugee claimants, the presence of members of distinct religions, 
cultures and languages speakers in public schools, courts, and the workplace, or the 
appearance of ethnocultural associations demanding recognition and public funding 
challenge the society and government in nested nations and liberal democracies alike. 
These challenges force all states, and national minorities in particular, to reconsider the 
meaning of belonging and national identity, what aspects or values are essential to the 
political community, and whether and how the maintenance of a national culture can be 
reconciled with the presence of internal diversity. Immigrants, as would-be members, 
defy the national minority to live up to the liberal values that enables their self-
government in the first place. Compatibility, therefore, has both elements of mutual gain 
and mutual constraint. Not surprisingly, scholars and policymakers disagree about what 
	   Lipton	  196	  
specific arrangements are just, best, or practical. But these subjective assessments reflect 
the very challenge I wish to highlight – the complex political and normative balancing act 
that occurs here. 
Looking out from these cases, what conclusions can we draw? First, it is 
important to consider that these are most likely cases. Though we a find compatibility in 
these cases, we also find limitations to multicultural accommodation and real tensions, 
particularly over time, in terms of nationality policy and accommodation. That is, though 
my assessment is that multinational federalism and immigrant multiculturalism can be 
reconciled, we would not expect to see this in every case. Interculturalism is a public 
philosophy of integration, couched in the idea of institutional promotion of a common 
culture, which necessitates limitations on both belonging and accommodation. The 
finding of limitations even in the most likely cases suggests that determining institutional 
arrangements and a philosophical basis for compatible immigrant-host interaction is no 
easy feat. This means that if we turn to less likely cases, like the Basque Country, for 
example, these findings of compatibility fall apart. Many minority nations remain hostile 
to immigration, and increased political competencies in these cases could do more harm 
than good.  
Interculturalism succeeds, to the extent that it does, in that it is both a public 
philosophy and an institutional arrangement – but this duality is common to all policy-
making: normative assessments must take into account political realities, just as political 
arrangements and policies express or embody philosophies about just or optimal 
arrangements.  
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Looking across the modern political landscape with this in mind, how different is 
intercultural nationalism from either the ‘ethnic’ or ‘open’ model I consider in Chapter 4? 
Even in comparison to archetypal models, of maximum defensiveness and maximum 
openness, the cases I examine here have far more in common with the latter. This finding 
is especially true when we consider that no society matches this ideal-type model of 
openness. All states both embody and actively promote some aspects of common culture, 
defining belonging and imposing limits. As liberal nationalists contend, these limits serve 
an important purpose within these states, facilitating redistribute politics, collaboration 
towards the common good, stability of institutions, deliberative democracy etc. We must 
consider, therefore, that “limitations” in the intercultural model do not necessarily 
represent shortcomings, but may actually serve liberal ends, as well.  
In the modern, globalizing world, cultural and national identities risk being 
“swept up” in an increasingly interconnected, homogenized global culture. Assuming that 
we value diversity, which I think we should, we encounter the challenge of how to 
reconcile the preservation and promotion of cultural distinctiveness – so much a part of 
what it means to be human – against the hybridization, interconnection, and change that 
mark the global landscape. Immigrant-receiving national minorities, by nature of their 
embededness in larger states, exemplify the pulls of internal pluralism and external 
homogeneity.415  
The backlash against multiculturalism that initially attracted my attention to this 
project shows that the challenges of defining culture and national identity in an 
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increasingly hybridized world will not disappear in the coming decades. The challenge 
national minorities encounter in attempting to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable 
needs for preservation and openness can be seen to varying degrees in many states, which 
are working to more clearly articulate common public values. As these developments 
show, the questions raised by cultural pluralism in liberal states requires moving beyond 
the traditional empirical-normative distinction to see how the two interact.  
If nothing else, this thesis highlight the complexities of multiculturalism for 
modern states, and considers whether and how it can achieve the liberal ends it sets for 
itself. The case of competing minority demands highlights the inevitable tensions in such 
cases, but also significant success and further room for improvement.  
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